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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
IMAGE-BASED AUTHENTICATION
by
Mozhgan Azimpourkivi
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Bogdan Carbunar, Major Professor
Mobile and wearable devices are popular platforms for accessing online services.
However, the small form factor of such devices, makes a secure and practical experience for user authentication, challenging. Further, online fraud that includes
phishing attacks, has revealed the importance of conversely providing solutions for
usable authentication of remote services to online users. In this thesis, we introduce image-based solutions for mutual authentication between a user and a remote
service provider. First, we propose and develop Pixie, a two-factor, object-based authentication solution for camera-equipped mobile and wearable devices. We further
design ai.lock, a system that reliably extracts from images, authentication credentials similar to biometrics.
Second, we introduce CEAL, a system to generate visual key fingerprint representations of arbitrary binary strings, to be used to visually authenticate online entities
and their cryptographic keys. CEAL leverages deep learning to capture the target
style and domain of training images, into a generator model from a large collection
of sample images rather than hand curated as a collection of rules, hence provides
a unique capacity for easy customizability. CEAL integrates a model of the visual
discriminative ability of human perception, hence the resulting fingerprint image
generator avoids mapping distinct keys to images which are not distinguishable by
humans. Further, CEAL deterministically generates visually pleasing fingerprint im-

vi

ages from an input vector where the vector components are designated to represent
visual properties which are either readily perceptible to human eye, or imperceptible
yet are necessary for accurately modeling the target image domain.
We show that image-based authentication using Pixie is usable and fast, while
ai.lock extracts authentication credentials that exceed the entropy of biometrics.
Further, we show that CEAL outperforms state-of-the-art solution in terms of efficiency, usability, and resilience to powerful adversarial attacks.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER

PAGE

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2.1 Secure image-based mobile authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2.2 Human-distinguishable Visual Key Fingerprint Generation(VKFG)
1.3 Outline of Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.

. 1
. 1
. 5
. 6
. 11
. 13

2. RELATED WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 Mobile Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.1 Biometric-based Authentication . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.2 Security Tokens and 2 Factor Authentication (2FA)
2.1.3 Graphical Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.4 Text-based Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.5 Wearable Device Authentication . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Image Feature Extraction and Matching . . . . . . .
2.3 Key Fingerprint Representation . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.1 Text-based Key Fingerprints . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.2 Graphical and image-based representations . . . . .
2.4 Deep Generative Models for Image Generation . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

15
15
16
19
21
23
24
24
25
26
27
28

3. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.1 Deep Neural Network Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.2 Layers in Deep Neural Networks . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.3 Training Using Gradient Decent Algorithm . . . . . . .
3.1.4 Representation Learning Using Deep Neural Networks
3.1.5 Generating Images Using Deep Neural Networks . . . .
3.2 Locality Sensitive Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 Error Correcting Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

30
30
31
32
36
39
43
44
45

4. PIXIE: IMAGE-BASED REMOTE AUTHENTICATION
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Model and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.2 Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.3 Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 Pixie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.1 Pixie Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.2 Image Capture & Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.3 The Authentication Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

46
46
51
51
52
53
54
54
56
57

viii

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

4.3.4 Pixie Filters . . . . . . . . .
4.4 Implementation and Data . .
4.4.1 Primary Image Datasets . .
4.4.2 Evaluation Datasets . . . .
4.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.1 Parameter Choice for Pixie
4.5.2 Pixie Under Attack . . . . .
4.6 User Study . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.1 Design and Procedure . . .
4.6.2 User Study Results . . . . .
4.7 Discussion and Limitations . .
4.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

61
66
66
67
68
69
76
79
79
84
97
104

5. AI.LOCK: IMAGE-BASED AUTHENTICATION WITH SECURE
AGE OF CREDENTIALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Model and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.2 Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.3 Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3 Problem Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4 The ai.lock Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.1 ai.lock: The Basic (SLSS) Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.2 ai.lock Variants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5 Implementation and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.1 Primary Data Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.2 Evaluation Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.6 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.6.1 ai.lock: Parameter Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.6.2 Cross validation performance for trained ai.lock model . . . . .
5.6.3 ai.lock Under Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.6.4 Resilience to Illumination Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.6.5 Is ai.lock δ-LSIM? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.6.6 On the Entropy of Imageprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.6.7 ai.lock Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.7 Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

STOR. . . . 106
. . . . 106
. . . . 109
. . . . 109
. . . . 111
. . . . 111
. . . . 113
. . . . 114
. . . . 115
. . . . 117
. . . . 119
. . . . 121
. . . . 123
. . . . 125
. . . . 125
. . . . 129
. . . . 131
. . . . 136
. . . . 137
. . . . 140
. . . . 142
. . . . 142
. . . . 145

6. CEAL: IMAGE-BASED KEY AUTHENTICATION
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2 Model and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2.2 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.

ix

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

146
146
150
150
151

6.2.3 Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3 Problem Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3.1 Requirements for a Key Fingerprint Generator .
6.4 The CEAL System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4.1 CEAL DCGAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4.2 Key Mapper (KMap) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.5.1 Real Outdoor Image Dataset . . . . . . . . . .
6.5.2 Ground Truth Human Perception Dataset . . .
6.5.3 HPD Classifier Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.6 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.6.1 HPD Training and Parameter Choice . . . . . .
6.6.2 CEAL DCGAN Parameter Choice . . . . . . .
6.6.3 Key Mapper Parameter Choice . . . . . . . . .
6.7 Empirical Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.7.1 User Study Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.7.2 Choice of Major Component Count . . . . . . .
6.7.3 CEAL Under Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.7.4 Human-Distinguishability of Vash . . . . . . . .
6.7.5 CEAL vs. Vash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.8 Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.9 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

152
153
155
155
158
164
165
165
165
169
172
172
174
176
177
177
178
180
185
186
189
190

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

x

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE

PAGE

4.1

Comparison of usability related metrics of Pixie’s camera based twofactor authentication approach with text, biometric and graphical
password authentication solutions. The Pixie user entry time is
faster than typing text passwords. The results of text-based passwords evaluated in § 4.6.2 are consistent with those from previous
work. Pixie’s median of login trials until success is 1, similar to other
solutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

4.2

Summary of user interface improvements identified during pilot studies.

4.3

Pixie notations and algorithm acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

4.4

Similarity table of three reference images R = {R1 , R2 , R3 } and a candidate image C. Red cells correspond to the nearest neighbor. R1
is the template image. AvgRef NN = (0.8 + 0.7 + 0.9)/3 = 0.8,
AvgRef F N = (0.7 + 0.6 + 0.8)/3 = 0.7 and AvgRef T empl = (0.8 +
0.9)/2 = 0.85. Then, minSim(C, R) = 0.5/0.7, maxSim(C, R) =
0.9/0.8 and T emplSim = 0.7/0.85. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

4.5

Summary of (top) Pixie features and (bottom) Pixie filter features. . . . 60

4.6

RBFilter and UBounds filter rules for reference and candidate images,
and their real world interpretation. RBFilter (top 2 sections) filters
images on which it predicts Pixie will fail. UBounds (bottom section)
filters images outside the space seen by Pixie during training. . . . . 65

4.7

ORB vs. SURF based Pixie (MLP classifier, no filter) performance, on
the Pixie dataset. SURF has lower FAR and FRR compared to ORB. 69

4.8

Classifier performance on Pixie dataset using ORB keypoint extractor
and no filter. Random Forest and MLP achieve the lowest EER, thus
we only use them in the following. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

4.9

Performance of Pixie MLP classifier with RBFilter on the Pixie dataset.
The disjunction of all the RBFilters on the reference images reduced
the FAR and FRR by more than 40%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

57

4.10 Pixie + CBFilter performance, for various combinations of supervised
learning algorithms. CBFilter is effective: when using RF, it reduces
the EER of Pixie (with MLP) to 1.87%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.11 Filters effects on Pixie performance. The combination of RBFilter and
CBFilter (RF) has the best performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.12 Performance of Pixie (with RBFilter and CBFilter) on the ALOI, Caltech101 and Google attack datasets: On more than 14M attack authentication samples, the FRR of Pixie is less than 0.09%. . . . . . . 76

xi

4.13 Participant demographics. We chose only students in order to have a
consistent experience for remote authentication (on the university
portal website, MyFIU). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.14 Confidence interval for the proportion of “agreement” answers to usability and security questions comparing Pixie and text-based authentication. Pixie is perceived to be easier to use, more memorable and
faster than text passwords. Pixie’s perceived advantage in ease of
use, memorability, and login speed is not due to random choice. . . . 93
4.15 Kendall’s Tau-b test shows significant positive correlation between preference of Pixie vs. text passwords, and its preference in terms of
ease of use, memorability, security, faster setup and login time. Preference over text passwords is also significantly correlated with the
overall memorability of the trinket and willingness to adopt Pixie. . 94
4.16 Trinket choice: object types chosen by participants, along with the number of unique objects belonging to each category and number of
unique trinket choice (object + angle) in the study. The gum pack
and watch (used in the training step and on-screen instructions) are
the types most frequently used by the participants. All the captured
watch trinkets are unique. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.1

ai.lock variants vs. commercial and academic biometric, token-based
authentication solutions, and text passwords. ai.lock MLSS variant
has no false rejects, as it is evaluated under attack samples only.
Under large scale datasets of powerful attacks, ai.lock achieves better
entropy than state-of-the-art biometric solutions. . . . . . . . . . . . 108

5.2

ai.lock notations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

5.3

Error tolerance threshold (τ ) values for the basic ai.lock obtained through
cross validation over the ai.lock dataset, when using PCs with feature
ranked 200-400. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

5.4

Error tolerance threshold (τ ) values for MLSS ai.lock obtained through
cross validation over the ai.lock dataset, when using PCs with feature
ranked 200-400. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

5.5

Cross validation performance (F1 score) for different values of t (number
of segments that need to match out of 5) when using PCs with feature
rank 200-400 and λ = 500 for SLMS and MLMS variants of ai.lock.
t = 3 consistently achieves the best performance. . . . . . . . . . . . 129

5.6

SLSS ai.lock performance on synthetic attack DS1. The FAR decreases
significantly as λ grows from 50 to 500. The FAR when λ = 500 is
only 0.2 × 10−6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

5.7

SLSS ai.lock performance on the synthetic credential attack. ai.lock
is unbreakable under 1.4 billion samples of the synthetic credential
attack: its FAR is 0 when λ ≥ 300. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

xii

5.8

ai.lock under the object guessing attack. The average number of trials
before the first false accept (FA) drops only slightly in the object
guessing attack scenario when compared to a random ordering of
attack images. Thus, knowledge of the authentication object type
provides the adversary only nominal guessing advantage. . . . . . . . 135

5.9

Average probability of collision, for valid (P1 ) and invalid (P2 ) samples
in the ai.lock holdout set per imageprint bit basis. In all cases,
P1 > P2 , thus conclude that ai.lock with single bit hash value is an
LSIM function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

5.10 Average probability of collision, for valid (P1 ) and invalid (P2 ) samples
in the ai.lock holdout set, when the ai.lock imageprint is considered
as image hash value and at most c = ⌊λ × (1 − τ )⌋ bits of error is
allowed. In all cases, P1 > P2 , thus conclude that ai.lock is an LSIM
function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.11 The average probability of imageprints collision for genuine and fake
pairs of images in ai.lock holdout set when at most c = τ × λ error
is allowed. ai.lock hash LSH-like property which maps the similar
images to binary strings with higher probability of collision. . . . . . 140
5.12 Processing time (in seconds) of SLSS ai.lock modules, for different values
of λ. The performance of the DNN module does not depend on λ
and is 0.7s for Inception.h5. The combined performance of the PCA
and LSH modules increases with λ but is under 70ms even when λ
= 500. When using Inception.h5, the overall ai.lock speed is below
0.8s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.1

Size of 6 generated image pair datasets, of either “same”, “different” or
“mixed” image pairs, used to train the HPD classifier. . . . . . . . . 170

6.2

Performance of the best HPD classifier and its underlying Siamese-like
network, over different HPD classifier datasets. . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

6.3

Attack image datasets we generated to break CEAL. We show the
dataset size, the portion of the (target, attack) samples that were
identified by HPD model 1, and the number of attack images validated by human workers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

6.4

Number of broken ceal images in (γ, d)-Attacks as identified by
HPD_model_1………………………………………………………..……183

6.5

Attack datasets generated using 10K random images for each key fingerprint representation and the result of user study to label identified
attacks by HPD model 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

xiii

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE
1.1

1.2

PAGE

Image-based authentication scenario. The user captures the image of
an object or scene with the device camera. The information about
reference credentials are securely store on the mobile device or on
a remote server. The user authenticates only if she can captures
another image of the same object or scene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

Visual key fingerprint-based authentication scenario: Given an arbitrary
input string, the VKFG function generates an image fingerprint representation of the input. A human verifier compares this image
against a securely acquired reference image fingerprint, e.g., from
trusted site, person-to-person, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

3.1

A neuron (with index i) in a feed forward neural network: the input to
the neuron is scaled, summed, added to a bias and is passed to a
non-linear activation function (Act) to produce the output. . . . . . 32

4.1

Pixie: (a) Trinket setup. The user takes photos of the trinket placing
it in the circle overlay. UI shows the number of photos left to take.
(b) Login: the user snaps a photo of the trinket. (c) Trinket setup
messages provide actionable guidance, when the image quality is low
(top), or the reference images are inconsistent (bottom). . . . . . . . 47

4.2

Examples of good (a-c) and low quality (d-f) trinket images. Trinkets are
small (parts of) objects carried or worn by users, thus hard to steal and
even reproduce by adversaries. ORB keypoints are shown as small, colored
circles. Good images have a high number of keypoints on the trinket. Low
quality images are due to (d) insufficient light conditions on shirt section,
(e) bright light and reflection, (f) image blur, or uniform, texture-less
trinket.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

4.3

Pixie system model: the user authenticates through a camera equipped
device (smartphone, smartwatch, Google Glass, car), to a remote service, e.g., e-mail, bank, social network account. The remote service
stores the user credentials and performs the authentication. . . . . . 51

4.4

Pixie registration and login workflows: to register, the user captures
“reference images” of the trinket, which are filtered for quality and
consistency. To authenticate, the user needs to capture a “candidate
image” of the trinket that matches the reference images. . . . . . . . 55

4.5

Example ORB keypoint matches between two images of the same trinket, taken in different conditions. Each line represents a match: it
connects matching keypoints (shown as small colored circles) from
each image. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

xiv

4.6

Example 2D histograms of KP-CNT of template image vs. AvgCrossSim(R).
(a) Correctly classified instances. (b) False reject instances. (c) False
accept instances. The legend in (a)-(c) shows the color code used for
the number of authentication instances. (d) Aggregated 2D histogram.
The darker regions with 1 in the center have a greater proportion of
misclassified than correctly classified instances. The regions with -1 in
the center correspond to value ranges on which we have no template
images. Conclusion: filter out reference sets with KP-CNT < 20 and
AvgCrossSim(R) < 0.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

4.7

Keypoint count distribution extracted from Nexus image set by (a) ORB
and (b) SURF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

4.8

ORB vs. SURF: Pixie speed on Mac and Nexus 4. (a) Average time to
extract keypoints. ORB takes an average 160ms on Nexus 4. (b) Average
time to match keypoint descriptors of two images. Only ORB is viable
on the Nexus 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

4.9

CBFilter test methodology: create a large training set (RSB) that does
not contain reference images from the fold on which we later run
Pixie (F1 ). Run CBFilter on the reference sets from fold F1 , filter
the reference sets that fail, then run Pixie on the filtered F1 . . . . . . 74

4.10 Example master images for Pixie: each of these images matches multiple
reference sets of the Pixie dataset. Master images tend to have a rich
combination of shapes, shadows, colors and letters. . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.11 Pre-study level of agreement of the participants with ease of remembering faces, photos and text. 42% of the participants strongly agree to
their ease of remembering photos and faces vs. only 16% who agreed
it is easy for them to remember text. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.12 Pixie in-app instructions (best viewed in color), showing how to (a)
setup a trinket, (b) confirm the trinket, (c) enter credentials for the
MyFIU account the first time the app is used, and (d) login using
the trinket. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.13 Box plot for entry time of Pixie across 3 sessions vs. text password in
session 1. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test revealed that Pixie’s
entry time in each session was significantly less than the entry time
for text passwords. For a single participant, the Pixie entry time was
70.51s during session 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

xv

4.14 (a) Results at the end of session 1. (a - top) Perceived performance
of Pixie compared to text passwords. Pixie dominates on ease of
use, memorability and speed dimensions. (b - bottom) Pixie ease of
use: 95% of participants agreed that Pixie is easy to use. (b - top)
Pixie perceived memorability. 86% of participants agree that the
trinkets are easy to remember after session 1, but reach consensus
after session 3. (b - bottom) Perceived memorability of Pixie vs. text
passwords (TP). No participant believes text passwords are more
memorable after session 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.15 Kendall’s Tau-b correlations between willingness to use, emotional responses (pleasure and excitement), and ease of use (SA/SD = Strongly
Agree/Disagree), during session 3. No participant rated Pixie as unpleasant. Willingness to use correlates positively with pleasant and
average levels, as well as with agreement with ease of use. . . . . . . 95
5.1

ai.lock model and scenario. The user captures the image of an object or
scene with the device camera. ai.lock converts the image to a binary
imageprint, and uses it as a biometric, in conjunction with a secure
sketch solution, to securely store authentication information on the
device or on a remote server. The user can authenticate only if she
is able to capture another image of the same object or scene. . . . . 110

5.2

ai.lock architecture. ai.lock processes the input image through a deep
neural network (i.e., Inception.v3), selects relevant features, then
uses locality sensitive hashing to map them to a binary imageprint.
ai.lock uses a classifier to identify the ideal error tolerance threshold
(τ ), used by the secure sketch block to lock and match imageprints. . 115

5.3

(a) 3 overlapping segments of an image. (b) Top: sample images generated by DCGAN, Bottom: visually similar images in Nexus Dataset
to images generated by DCGAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

5.4

Comparison of ai.lock performance (F1 score) when using different subset of principal component feature ranks for different imageprint
length (λ) values. PCs ranked 200-400 constantly outperform other
tested subsets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

5.5

PCA motivation: FRR vs. FAR of (i) ai.lock when using PCA (with features ranked 200-400), (ii) ai.lock with no feature selection (“Raw”),
and (iii) 250 independent instances of ai.lock when using a feature
selection approach that randomly selects 200 features. ai.lock with
PCA consistently achieves the lowest FRR and often the lowest FAR. 128

xvi

5.6

(a-c) ai.lock cross validation performance, and (d-f) ai.lock holdout performance using different ai.lock variants: Single Layer Single Segment (SLSS), Multi Layer Single Segment (MLSS), Single Layer
Multi Segment (SLMS), Multi Layer Multi Segment (MLMS). Exploiting information from multiple Inception.v3 DNN layers (multi
layer variants) lowers the FRR, while splitting images into smaller
segments (multi segment variants) lowers the FAR. The MLMS variant of ai.lock consistently achieves the lowest FAR, that can be as
low as 0% for the holdout dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

5.7

Histogram of the number of broken reference images, using the synthetic
attack dataset DS1. The x axis shows the range for the number of
times a breakable Nexus reference image is defeated by the attack
images and the y axis shows the number of such breakable images.
A majority of the “broken” reference images are defeated only by a
small number of candidate images. The ratio of broken references
(r) decreases significantly when λ increases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

5.8

(a) Cross validation FAR, (b) Cross validation FRR , (c) Holdout FAR,
and (d) Holdout FRR of SLSS ai.lock when trained over the ai.lock
and synthetic image attacks of DS2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

5.9

FAR of ai.lock on synthetic image attack, when trained on the ai.lock
dataset vs. when trained also on DS2. The “vaccinated” ai.lock
improves its resistance to the synthetic image attack: the FAR drops
by more than 74%, 51% and 59% when λ is 50, 150 and 350 respectively.134

5.10 Histograms of normalized Hamming similarity between imageprints of
valid and invalid authentication samples in the ai.lock holdout set.
The red rectangles pinpoint the focus areas: valid samples with Hamming similarity below 0.6 and invalid samples with Hamming similarity above 0.6. Higher values of λ provide more effective separation
between valid and invalid samples: when λ = 500, no invalid samples
have similarity above 0.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.1

Adversary model: Let’s assume that Alice is trying to verify the identify of his contact, Bob. For this, Alice computes the fingerprint of
the public key of the contact and compares it to a trusted reference
of Bob’s key fingerprint that she has obtained previously through a
secure out of band channel. However, the adversary can perform a
man-in-the-middle-attack. Particularly, the adversary attempts to
impersonate the victim (Bob), by using a public key whose corresponding fingerprint image will be perceived to be the same as that
of the victim (Bob). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

6.2

CEAL System. CEAL accepts as input a binary string and used input
mapper module to map the input to the input latent vector components to Gceal ). The generator network, then generates the visual
key fingerprint (ceal) corresponding to the input string. . . . . . . . 156

xvii

6.3

CEAL DCGAN architecture and training. We use the combination of
Discriminator loss and HPD loss to train the generator to generate
distinguishable and realistic images. We also learn a latent vector
that consist of major and minor components (see Conjecture 6.4.2).

158

6.4

Human Perception Discriminator (HPD) architecture. HPD passes input images I1 and I2 through the Inception.v1 network, applies 3
fully connected layers to generate image feature vectors O1 and O2 ,
computes the Squared Euclidean distance between O1 and O2 and
passes it through a fully connected layer to the computed distance.
HPD classifies I1 and I2 as different or same based on this distance. . 160

6.5

Image pairs generated while training CEAL: Step 1 focuses on promoting
CEAL to generate different images when a major component value
is flipped (set to 1 and -1). Step 2, focuses on promoting minor components to not change the visual characteristic of generated images
when their values are modified. Step 3, prompts CEAL to generate
diverse set of images by further training it using major components.
(see § 6.4.1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

6.6

The distribution of “different” and “same” labels as annotated by MTurk
workers. The number of image pairs that are identified as same
decreases as we flip more number of minor components or major
components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

6.7

Sample (target, attack) image pairs we generated for (γ = 78, d = 1)attacks, along with the human subjects’ labeled for these image pairs.181

6.8

Sample (target, attack) image pairs we generated for (γ = 78, d)-attacks,
along with the human subjects’ labeled for these image pairs. . . . . 182

6.9

(γ = 92, d)-adversary: The break ratio of 1 million target ceal images
for each value of d, where d is the Hamming distance between the
attack and the target binary fingerprints and 0 < d < 93 according
to (left) HPD model 1 and (right) HPD model 2 (see § 6.7.3) . . . . 184

6.10 Distribution of “different” and “same” labels as annotated by human
workers for Vash image pairs. The number of image pairs that are
identified as same decreases as the number of buckets (b) and number
of nodes (n) in the tree are decreased. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

xviii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation

Mobile and wearable devices are popular platforms for accessing sensitive online
services such as e-mail, social networks and banking accounts. Traditional solutions
for authentication equation are not always suitable for mobile and wearable devices.
For instance, while the traditional text password or PIN are widely used, and can be
securely stored, accessed and converted to cryptographic keys, the small form factor
of mobile and wearable devices disqualifies them as being user-friendly. In addition,
while fingerprint based protection is convenient, it requires specialized hardware
that is not ubiquitous in all mobile devices.
Generally, a secure and practical experience for mobile device-based user authentication raises significant challenges: the small and limited form factor of these
devices, especially for wearable devices (e.g., smartwatches [Sam17] and smartglasses [Vuz17]), complicates the input of the commonly used text-based passwords,
while the memorability of these passwords poses a significant burden on users who
access a multitude of services [WWB+ 05b]. Further, the form factor of mobile and
wearable devices renders them easy targets for theft followed by attacks to recover
the user’s authentication credentials, keying information, or sensitive information.
Biometric authentication solutions seemingly address the issues with small form
factor of mobile and wearable devices. Biometric authentication features, comprised of “something you are”, provide a basis for sufficiently strong systems security, instant verification and convenience for users. Forecasts put the total biometrics software and hardware market revenue exceptions to a staggering $15 billion for 2025 [KW17], which is dominated by applications in consumer device au-
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thentication, mobile banking, point of sale payments, cashpoints, and IT systems
security. However, the cost-benefit analysis of biometrics does not include personal implications to users, who are the least prepared for the imminent negative outcomes, and are not often given equally convenient alternative authentication options. Users have at most 10 fingerprints for all of their accounts in
their lifetime, yet unlike passwords and credit card numbers, biometrics cannot
be reset and re-issued when compromised. Furthermore, biometrics such as fingerprint, face and gait cannot even be kept secret. More importantly, as surrendering
biometrics may become de facto mandatory [MK16, Kee15], existing vulnerabilities [XPFM16, PLK+ 12, ACJP14, GRGB+ 12], coupled with the compromise of large
scale biometrics databases [Pet15], raise significant long term security concerns, especially as transactions authenticated by biometrics across different systems are
linkable and traceable back to the individual identity.
In addition, token-based authentication solutions, e.g., SecurID [RSA17], usually
require extra hardware and expensive infrastructure [Sec15] (e.g. for issuing, managing, and synchronizing the token). In addition, use of these solutions can impact
usability: the user needs to enter password plus an additional code to the device to
authenticate.
A secret image-based authentication approach, where users authenticate using
arbitrary images they capture with the device camera, may address several of the
above problems. For instance, the authentication is not tied to a visual of the user’s
body, but that of a personal accessory, object, or scene. As illustrated in Figure 1.1,
a user sets her reference credential to be an image of a nearby object or scene. To
authenticate, the user captures a candidate image; the authentication succeeds only
if the candidate image contains the same object or scene as the reference image. In
this dissertation, we introduce Pixie and ai.lock (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), two
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Figure 1.1: Image-based authentication scenario. The user captures the image of an
object or scene with the device camera. The information about reference credentials
are securely store on the mobile device or on a remote server. The user authenticates
only if she can captures another image of the same object or scene.
secret image-based authentication solutions. These solutions improve on (1) biometrics, by freeing users from personal harm, providing plausible deniability, allowing
multiple keys, and making revocation and change of secret simple and (2) tokenbased authentication, by eliminating the need for an expensive infrastructure. Visual
token-based solutions (e.g., based on barcodes or QR codes) [MPR05, HPOH12] can
be seen as special cases of secret image-based authentication.
Further, online fraud that includes phishing attacks [Ram10], has revealed the
importance of conversely providing solutions that allow users to verify the authenticity of online services they access or the identity of other users with whom they
communicate, e.g., social networking friends, e-mail contacts, etc. One approach
that allows the users to perform such verification, without any reliance on trusted
third parties with predefined authorities, is through the use of key fingerprints.
Key fingerprints [wae16, akw, GSS+ 06, Hui00, LLvG09, PS99] help humans
compare arbitrary data strings (e.g., keys, addresses, and identifiers) for equality.
Key fingerprints have a wide range of applications, including preventing phishing
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[Ram10, RAM+ 18] and Bitcoin clipboard [Sub18] attacks, authentication in Endto-End Encrypted (E2EE) applications, device pairing and security indicators, see
§ 6.2.2 for more details.
Efficient Key Fingerprint Generation (KFG) solutions need to minimize the time
taken by a human to compare the data, and minimize the success rate of “collision”
attacks, where adversaries find different key fingerprints perceived as being the same
by humans. Tan et al. [TBB+ 17] have shown that Visual Key Fingerprint Generation (VKFG) solutions and Vash [vas14] in particular, that convert input strings
into images for humans to compare, outperform several text-based key fingerprint
solutions (e.g. [wae16, Hui00]) in terms of both human attack detection rate and
comparison time.
The attack success rate against visual key fingerprint representation solutions
is however still unacceptable, exceeding 10% [TBB+ 17]. One reason for this is
that existing solutions do not take into account the limits of human perception
and how it relates to the space of images that they generate. More specifically,
existing solutions cannot predict if specific changes in the input data will generate
human-distinguishable changes in the generated images. Further, we show that most
Vash [vas14]-generated images are vulnerable to attack (see § 6.7.4), and out of only
10,000 random-generated Vash images, we found 24 human-validated collisions.
Unlike existing solutions that only generate structured images (e.g. Vash [vas14],
Unicorn [vdE17] and CLPS [OKS+ 13]), a straightforward approach to generate realistic and diverse set of images from input strings, is to use a Generative Adversarial
Network (GAN [GPAM+ 14]). GANs can model the distribution of image samples,
and can be used to draw previously unseen samples from the estimated distribution.
In this dissertation, we introduce, implement and evaluate CEAL, short for CrEdential Assurance Label, a human-centric VKFG solution that employs GANs [GPAM+ 14]
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Figure 1.2: Visual key fingerprint-based authentication scenario: Given an arbitrary
input string, the VKFG function generates an image fingerprint representation of the
input. A human verifier compares this image against a securely acquired reference
image fingerprint, e.g., from trusted site, person-to-person, etc.
to generate realistic, attack-resilient images (i.e. ceals), that are easy to compare
by humans. As depicted in Figure 1.2, to authenticate an identity, the user needs
to generate the image key fingerprint corresponding to the identity using VKFG.
Then, he compares this image to a reference image of the key fingerprint that he has
obtained through a secure channel. Unlike existing solutions that base their security
on cryptographic hash functions or pseudo-random number generators, CEAL has
built-in “input-spreading” properties that endow it with second pre-image and collision resistance properties that is required for key fingerprint generation solutions.

1.2

Contributions

In this dissertation, we design secure, efficient and usable solutions for mutual authentication between mobile device users and remote parties. Specifically, we propose three image-based authentication solutions. The first two approaches are designed for authenticating a mobile device user either locally, to a mobile device, or
remotely to a remote service provider. Conversely, we present a visual key fingerprint representation solution to allow users to verify the authenticity of a remote
identity, e.g., remote service provider, social network contact or a nearby device the
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user is willing to connect. In the following, we briefly introduce these systems that
include: Pixie, ai.lock and CEAL.

1.2.1

Secure image-based mobile authentication

We introduce Pixie and ai.lock, two secret image-based authentication methods
for mobile and wearable devices. Pixie is an object-based authentication solution
that employs traditional image processing techniques to extract image features (i.e.,
“keypoints”) and match user captured images. Pixie has an important drawback
when deployed on mobile devices: the image keypoints that it extracts need to be
stored and matched in cleartext on vulnerable devices. Therefore, to eliminate this
problem, we need to make sure that the image features are stored on a secure remote
server. In contrast, ai.lock uses state of the art, Deep Neural Network (DNN) based
image feature extraction (see § 3.1.4) along with locality sensitive hashing (see § 3.2)
to extract binary imageprints that are robust to changes caused by image capture
conditions. The ai.lock’s imageprints can be securely stored and matched using
secure sketches. This makes ai.lock resilient to device capture attacks. Furthermore,
on larger and more complex attack datasets, the use of DNNs enabled ai.lock to
achieve False Acceptance Rate (FAR) that are at least 2 orders of magnitude smaller
than those of Pixie (≤ 0.0015% vs. 0.2 − 0.8%), for similar FRRs (4%).
In the following sections, we briefly describe the Pixie and ai.lock systems. In
addition, we describe our major contributions when designing these systems.
Pixie
We introduce Pixie, an easy to use camera-based remote authentication solution for
mobile and wearble devices, see [CaS17d] for a short demo. Pixie can establish trust
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to a remote service-based on the user’s ability to present to the camera a previously
agreed secret physical token. We call this token, the trinket. We use the term trinket
to signify the uniqueness and small size of the token, not its value.
Users choose their trinkets similar to setting a password, and authenticate by
presenting the same trinket to the camera upon further authentication attempts.
The fact that the object is the trinket, is secret to the user. Pixie extracts robust,
novel features from trinket images, and leverages a supervised learning classifier to
effectively address inconsistencies between images of the same trinket captured in
different circumstances.
Pixie combines graphical password [BCVO12, Pas17, DMR04] and token-based
authentication concepts [RSA17, VAS17], into a two factor authentication (2FA)
solution based on what the user has (the trinket) and what the user knows (the
trinket, the angle and section used to authenticate). Contrary to other token-based
authentication methods, Pixie does not require expensive, uncommon hardware to
act as the second factor; that duty is assigned to the physical trinket, and the mobile
device in Pixie is the primary device through which the user authenticates. Pixie
only requires the authentication device to have a camera, making authentication
convenient even for wearable devices such as smartwatches and smartglasses.
Our major contributions are as follows:
• We introduce Pixie, a novel camera-based two factor authentication solution
for mobile and wearable devices. Pixie leverages the ubiquitous cameras of
mobile devices to snap images of trinkets carried by the users. A quick and
familiar user action of snapping a photo is sufficient for Pixie to simultaneously perform a graphical password authentication and a physical token-based
authentication, yet it does not require any expensive, uncommon hardware.
Pixie establishes trust based on both the knowledge and possession of an arbi-
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trary physical object readily accessible to the user, called trinket. Users choose
their trinkets similar to setting a password, and authenticate by presenting the
same trinket to the camera.
• We extract robust, novel features from trinket images, and leverage a supervised learning classifier to effectively address inconsistencies between images
of the same trinket captured in different circumstances. Pixie classifier determines if a candidate image contains the same token (i.e. trinket) as a set of
reference images.
• We develop several image-based attacks including brute force image pictionary
attacks, a shoulder surfing flavor and master image attacks. We construct more
than 14.3 million authentication instances and show that Pixie is resilient to
these attacks.
• We manually collect a dataset of images that consist of 1400 images of 350
different objects. We only selected objects that are good candidate to be
used as trinket. We have captured 4 images for each trinket, that differ in
background and lighting conditions, i.e., either indoors using artificial light or
outdoors in daylight conditions. We make our datasets including the Pixie
attack datasets, available for download [CaS17c].
• We implement Pixie in Android and study the usability and discoverability of
Pixie as a novel form of authentication. We show through a user study with 42
participants that Pixie is accurate, faster than text passwords and perceived
as such by users. In addition, we show that Pixie’s trinkets are memorable.
• We publish Pixie as an open source prototype, with code and the Android
installation file available on GitHub [CaS17e] and Google Play Store [CaS17b].
Pixie work is published in proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile,
Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies (IMWUT) in 2017 [ATC17a].
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ai.lock
Image-based mobile authentication approach, as in Pixie, raises important challenge
when deployed to locally authenticate a user to a mobile device (local authentication
scenario): an adversary who captures or compromises the device that stores the
user’s reference credentials (e.g. mobile device) and has access to its storage, should
not be able to learn information about the reference credentials or their features.
To address the problem of secure storage and matching of the image features, we
introduce ai.lock, a practical, secure and efficient image-based authentication system
that can be used for both local and remote authentication scenarios. Unlike Pixie,
ai.lock uses state of the art, DNN-based image feature extraction (see 3.1.4) along
with Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) [Cha02] to extract binary imageprints that
are robust to changes in image capture conditions. We show that imageprints can
be securely stored and matched using secure sketches [DRS04]. This makes ai.lock
resilient to device capture attacks.
We measure the security of ai.lock against brute force attacks on more than 3.5
billion authentication instances built from more than 250,000 images of real objects,
and 100,000 synthetically generated images using a GAN[RMC15] trained on object
images. We show that the ai.lock estimated entropy is superior to a fingerprint-based
authentication built into popular mobile devices.
Our major contributions are as follows:
• We introduce ai.lock, a practical, secure and efficient image-based authentication system that converts general mobile device captured images into
biometric-like structures, to be used in conjunction with secure sketch constructs and provide secure authentication and storage of credentials.
• To extract invariant features for image-based authentication, ai.lock leverages
(1) the ability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to learn representations of
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the input space (i.e., embedding vectors of images) that reflect the salient
underlying explanatory factors of the data, (2) Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) [F.R01] to identify more distinguishing components of the embedding
vectors and (3) Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) [Cha02] to map the resulting
components to binary space, while preserving similarity properties in the input
space. We call the resulting binary values imageprints. ai.lock builds on
a secure sketch variant [DRS04] to securely store reference imageprints and
match them to candidate imageprints.
• We propose the LSH-inspired notion of locality sensitive image mapping functions (δ-LSIM), that convert images to binary strings that preserve the “similarity” relationships of the input space, for a desired similarity definition (see
§ 5.3). A δ-LSIM function can be used to efficiently match images-based on
their extracted binary imageprints.
• We develop several image-based attacks including brute force image dictionary
attacks using real images as well as 100,000 synthetically generated images
using a GAN trained on object images. We vaccinate ai.lock to be more
resistant to synthetic image attacks. We also develop a synthetic credential
attack to brute force ai.lock. Finally, we introduce an object/scene guessing
attack to evaluate ai.lock in a scenario similar to shoulder surfing attack. We
show that ai.lock is resilient to attacks: Its FAR on 140 million synthetic image
attack samples is 0.2 × 10−6 %. ai.lock was unbreakable when tested with 1.4
billion synthetic credential attack samples. The estimated Shannon entropy
[Sha01] of ai.lock on 2 billion image pairs is 18.02 bits, comparing favorably
with state-of-the-art biometric solutions. Further, we show that ai.lock is a
δ-LSIM function, over publicly available image datasets as well as images we
collected (see § 5.6.5).

10

• We implement ai.lock in Android using Tensorflow [ABC+ 16]. We have released the code and data on ai.lock Github [CaS17a]. We show that ai.lock
is fast, imposing an overhead of under 1s on a Nexus 6P device. We have
published ai.lock work in proceedings of the 33rd Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference (ACSAC) in 2017 [ATC17b].

1.2.2

Human-distinguishable Visual Key Fingerprint Generation(VKFG)

Although recent studies by Tann et al. [TBB+ 17] suggests that visual key fingeprints
are more usable, the attack success rate against Visual Key Fingerprint Generation
(VKFG) solutions is still unacceptable, exceeding 10% [TBB+ 17]. One reason for
this is that existing solutions do not take into account the limits of human perception
and how it relates to the space of images that they generate. More specifically,
existing solutions cannot predict if specific changes in the input data will generate
human-distinguishable images. Further, we show that most images generated by
state-of-the art VKFG (i.e., Vash [vas14] an implementation of random art [PS99])
are vulnerable to attack (§ 6.7.4), and out of only 10,000 random-generated Vash
images, we found 24 human-validated collisions.
In this dissertation, we introduce, implement and evaluate CEAL (CrEdential
Assurance Labeling), a user-centric contact authentication system. The CEAL system generates unique, hard to spoof images (i.e., ceals) for each relationship between
a user and a contact, and enables users to visually verify the authenticity of information received from contacts. Ceals can be embedded in social networks, online
sellers, or bank accounts, in order to authenticate the owner of a ceal to the user.
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Ceals protect users from man-in-the-middle attacks, where attackers impersonate
the users to contact other users (e.g., their customers, friends, and contacts).
CEAL generates its images (i.e. ceals) using a Deep Generative Models (see
§ 3.1.5). Unlike existing solutions that base their security on cryptographic hash
functions or pseudo-random number generators, CEAL has built-in “input-spreading”
properties that endow it with second pre-image and collision resistance properties.
First, we reveal important vulnerabilities of existing VKFG solutions. We then
perform large-scale brute-force attacks using more than 255M pairs of (target, attack) keys, that differ only in small number of bits, to break CEAL. We then identify
potential successful attacks using a classifier that can predict if a pair of images are
perceived as same or different by human. We then present these identified images
along with their corresponding target images to Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
worker to label them. We show that even under attack of such a powerful adversary,
the break ratio of CEAL images is small (< 1.0%).
We provide the following contributions:
• Vulnerabilities in State-of-the-Art Solution. We reveal important vulnerabilities of Vash [vas14], the leading visual key fingerprint representation
solution. We show that even in a small sample of 10K Vash images 24 pairs
of images were identified as same by our human subjects.
• Human Perception Discriminator (HPD). Unlike [YN04], we build a
classifier that predicts if two images (generated by a GAN) will be perceived
as being the same or different by average humans. We show that despite sparse
human annotated data, an HPD with high precision and low recall can be built
and still be effectively used for CEAL. We also show that the HPD has good
performance even when evaluated on radically different images than those in
training (Vash images).
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• Hash-Like CEAL. We develop the first VKFG solution with built-in hash
properties (second pre-image and collision resistance). We train CEAL DCGAN, a Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Network (DCGAN) [RMC15],
that is unlike the generic model (see § 3.1.5), is trained i) using HPD to generate not only realistic, but distinguishable images, ii) with constraints that
ensure separation of latent vector components into major and minor components while maximizing the capacity of major components. We publish the
data and code to build CEAL DCGAN and HPD networks.
• Datasets. We generated more than 500 synthetic image pairs and used crowdsourcing workers to label these image pairs as either same or different. In
addition, we collected labels for more than 7000 ceal image pairs, including
likely attack image pairs using human workers. Finally, we collected the labels
for 270 vash image pairs that we generated. We publish these image datasets
along with the collected labels.

1.3

Outline of Dissertation

This dissertation is organized as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we review and discuss the relevant work to authentication for
mobile and wearable devices. We then review relevant literature to the problem
of key fingerprint representation including existing solutions. We also, review
traditional and more advance methods for extracting useful image features
that can be employed for image comparison and matching.
• In Chapter 3, we review the required background relevant to this work including DNNs, image generation using DNNs, locality sensitive hashing, and error
correcting codes.
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• In Chapter 4, we describe the system and adversary model for image-based
authentication scenario. We introduce Pixie, a novel image-based authentication solution. We evaluate its performance, including under attack, and study
its usability. We discuss Pixie limitations and application that goes beyond
mobile-device authentication.
• In Chapter 5, we describe the system and adversary model for image-based
authentication scenario that is performed locally on the mobile device. We introduce ai.lock, an image-based authentication solution that extras biometriclike features from authentication images and use them for secure storage and
matching of the images on the mobile device. We evaluate ai.lock performance
under adversarial attacks. We discuss ai.lock limitations and application and
finally conclude this study.
• In Chapter 6, we reveal important vulnerabilities of existing VKFG solutions.
We then introduce CEAL, a visual key fingerprint generation solution that
incorporates visual human perception into the key fingerprint generation process to guarantee the generated images are human distinguishable. We build
CEAL using Tensorflow [ABC+ 16] and evaluate its performance under powerful attacks. We then describe the limitations and future directions to improve
the key fingerprint images generated by CEAL.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we first present the relevant work to both image-based authentication and key fingerprint representation, the two major related fields to this dissertation. Particularity, we review existing solutions for authentication in mobile and
wearable devices. Then, we describe traditional methods for image feature extraction and matching. We also review modern approaches using Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) for image feature extraction. Next, we review exciting key fingerprint representation methods. Finally, we review deep generative models for image generation
and differentiate our work to existing solutions.

2.1

Mobile Authentication

The image-based client authentication solutions that we present in this dissertation (i.e., Pixie and ai.lock) are camera based authentication solutions that combine
graphical password and token based authentication concepts into a single step 2 Factor Authentication (2FA) solution. Proposed image-based authentication solutions
are based on what the user has (the particular trinket among all the other objects
that the user readily has access to) and what the user knows (angle and viewpoint
used to register the trinket). The unique form factor of image-based authentication
solution differentiates it from existing solutions based on typed, drawn, or spoken
secrets. We briefly survey and distinguish our image-based authentication solution
from existing solutions.
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2.1.1

Biometric-based Authentication

Biometric based mobile authentication solutions leverage unique human characteristics, e.g., faces [DLHvZH15], fingerprints [App17b], gait [JW15], to authenticate
users. In particular, the form factor of Pixie and ai.lock (the image-based authentication solutions we present in this dissertation) makes them similar to camera based
biometric authentication solutions based on face [BCF+ 13, TSK+ 12, DLHvZH15]
and gaze [KAH+ 16, LDGW15]. Consequently, Pixie and ai.lock share several limitations with these solutions, that include (i) vulnerability to shoulder surfing attacks
and (ii) susceptibility to inappropriate lighting conditions, that can spoil the performance and usability of the authentication mechanism [BUI+ 15, MB14].
In addition, previous studies [BUI+ 15, DLHvZH15] report that face biometrics
adoption might be problematic as participants have expressed mixed feelings toward
using them. For instance, participants in the De Luca et al. [DLHvZH15] user study
expressed feeling awkward, as authentication can be perceived as taking a selfie in
public. While we have not evaluated this dimension, we expect trinket shots to be
perceived as less awkward than the appearance of taking selfies in public.
Another concern in biometric authentication solutions that requires a camera is
to verify the liveness of the authentication secret to prevent spoofing attacks. In
face based authentication, liveness can be verified by requiring the users to blink
or move their mouth upon capturing the image of the face [KFB08a]. Boehm
et al.

[BCF+ 13] introduced a form of challenge-response liveness verification for

gaze based authentication where the user gaze at and follows a moving icon on
the screen. We note that liveness verification solutions, e.g. based on consistency
between the device motions and motion directions inferred from images captured
by the camera [MR16], can bring advantages of liveness verification to Pixie and
ai.lock.
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In contrast to biometrics, Pixie and ai.lock enable users to change the authenticating physical factor, as they change accessories they wear or carry. This reduces
the risks from an adversary who has acquired the authentication secret from having lifelong consequences for the victims, thereby mitigating the need for biometric
traceability and revocation [PPJ03].
In addition, due to the diversity of the trinkets, we need to solve a harder problem
than existing biometrics based authentication solutions: while existing biometrics
solutions focus on a single, well studied human characteristic, image-based authentication trinkets can be arbitrary objects or scenes, thus lack the convenience of a
set of well known features.
We note that Pixie and ai.lock can be used in conjunction with biometric solutions as an additional authentication factor. For instance in touchscreen devices, we
can use the touch gesture used to shoot the trinket, as an additional authentication
factor [DLHB+ 12].
Biometric Protection
Our work is also related to the problem of protecting biometric templates. We
summarize biometric protection solutions, that can be classified into fuzzy biometric
protection and feature transformation approaches [JNN08].
Fuzzy biometric template protection. This approach leverages error correcting
codes to verify biometric data. Techniques include secure sketch and fuzzy extractor [DRS04], fuzzy vault [JS02] and fuzzy commitment [JW99], and have been
applied to different biometric data, e.g. palm and hand [LS15].
In Chapter 5, we extend the secure sketch under the Hamming distance solution
from [DRS04]: reconstruct the biometric credential, then compare its hash against
a stored value. We briefly describe here the password set and authentication pro-
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cedures for ai.lock, using generated imageprints, i.e., the authentication credential
(see Chapter 5). Let ECC be a binary error correcting code, with the corresponding
decoding function D, and let H be a cryptographic hash function.
• Image password set. Let R be the reference image captured by the user
and let πR = π(R) be its ai.lock computed imageprint. Generate a random vector
x, then compute and store the authentication credentials, SS(R, x) = hSS1 , SS2 i,
where SS1 = πR ⊕ ECC(x) and SS2 = H(x).
• Images based authentication. Let C be the user captured candidate image,
and let πC = π(C) be its ai.lock computed imageprint. Retrieve the stored SS value
and compute x′ = D(πC ⊕ SS1 ). The authentication succeeds if H(x′ ) = SS2 .
Dodis et al. [DRS04] further proposed the fuzzy extractor concept that extracts
a uniformly random string R from the protected biometric in an error-tolerant way.
They then show how to construct this given a secure sketch. Fuzzy extractors can be
used to securely encrypt the mobile data with strong keys extracted from biometrics
with sufficient entropy. In Chapter 5, we show that on our experimental datasets,
ai.lock’s entropy is 16-18 bits, comparing favorably with state-of-the-art biometric
authentication solutions (see Table 5.1).
Transformation based biometric template protection. A transformation is
applied both to biometric template and biometric candidate, and the matching process is performed on the transformed data. In an invertible transformation (a.k.a.,
salting [JNN08]), a key, e.g., a password, is used as a parameter to define the transformation function [TGN06]. The security of this approach depends on the ability
to protect the key. In contrast, in non-invertible schemes [MCF+ 10, RCCB07] a
one-way transformation functions is used to protect the biometric template, making
the inversion of a transformed template computationally hard even when the key is
revealed.
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Hybrid approaches. Hybrid transformation and fuzzy protection approaches have
also been proposed. Nandakumar et al. [NNJ07] introduced an approach to make
the fingerprint fuzzy value stronger using a password as salt. Song et al. [OJN08]
used discrete hashing to transform the fingerprint biometric, which is then encoded
and verified using error correcting codes.

2.1.2

Security Tokens and 2 Factor Authentication (2FA)

The trinket concept is similar to token based authentication, such as door keys and
hardware security tokens [RSA17], as authentication involves access to a physical
object. Hardware tokens are electronic devices that provide periodically changing
one time passwords (OTP), which the user needs to manually enter to the authentication device. Software token solutions, such as Google’s 2-step verification [Goo17],
require the user to retrieve a verification code sent to the mobile device (e.g., through
SMS) from the mobile device and type it into the authentication device. This further
requires the device to be reachable from the server, hence introduces new challenges
(e.g. location tracing, delays in phone network, and poor network coverage). Moreover, such solutions provide no protection when the device is stolen. They also
impact usability, as the user needs to type both a password and a verification code.
Solutions such as [CDK+ 12, SJSN14, KMSv15] treat the mobile device as a second factor. Further, they eliminate user interaction to retrieve a token from the
mobile device to the authentication device (e.g. a desktop) by leveraging proximity
based connectivity (e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi). For instance, in PhoneAuth [CDK+ 12],
where the user authenticates from a browser to a remote server, the mobile device
stores a private key of the user and uses it to sign server issued challenges. In Shirvanian et al. [SJSN14], the mobile device associates with an access point created
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on the authentication device. In SoundProof [KMSv15], the second factor (proximity between the mobile and authentication devices), is ensured by verifying the
consistency of the ambient noise captured by the two devices’ microphone sensors.
Other approaches exist that seek to transform biometrics into tokens that the
user needs to carry, with important implications on biometric privacy and revocation
capabilities. For instance, TAPS [TAP17] is a glove sticker with a unique fingerprint
intended for TouchID.
Token-based authentication requires an expensive infrastructure [Sec15] (e.g. for
issuing, managing, synchronizing the token). Pixie and ai.lock provide mechanisms
that make objects usable as passwords, with the existing infrastructure. They may
also provide a personalized and inexpensive alternative to such tokens. In addition,
as the user action of scanning a bar-code is replaced with snapping of a photo of a
personal object image-based authentication can provide a faster alternative to visual
token based authentication, especially when the trinket is readily accessible to the
user, e.g., tattoo, piece of jewellery worn by the user, etc.
In addition, the mobile device or a specialized device can act as a secondary
device for storing a token for the second authentication factor. By contrast, in
image-based mobile authentication we assign the duty of storing the token for the
second factor to a physical object outside the mobile device. The mobile device is
the sole device that is used to authenticate to a back-end application or to access the
services on remote servers. As an added benefit, the physical factor of the trinket
renders image-based authentication solution immune to the “2FA synchronization
vulnerabilities” introduced by Konoth et al. [KvdVB16], that exploit the ongoing
integration of apps among multiple platforms.
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2.1.3

Graphical Passwords

Pixie’s and ai.lock’s visual nature is similar to graphical passwords, that include
recall and recognition systems. In the following, we briefly describe these solution,
see [BCVO12] for a survey.
Recall based solutions such as DAS (Draw-A-Secret) [JMM+ 99] and variants [DY07,
GGC+ 08] ask the user to enter their password using a stylus, mouse or finger.
YAGP [GGC+ 08] extends DAS with approximate matches for input passwords.
Pass-Go [TA08] uses a finer grained grid than DAS and restricts the user movement
to grid lines and intersections, eliminating small shape variations. GrIDsure [Gem]
displays digits in a 5×5 grid and requires the user to memorize a pattern within this
grid. On login, the user is displayed with a grid permutation and needs to input
the digits shown within the pattern. DAS variants are popular on smartphones,
including Android and Blackberry (PatternLock). However, Zhao et al. [ZAH15]
propose an attack framework that is able to crack a significant portion of picture
gesture passwords.
Recognition-based systems (e.g., Passfaces [Pas17, DP00]) exploit the human
ability to better recognize previously seen images. To create a password, users
select and memorize a set of images (e.g., faces), which they need to recognize from
among other images during the authentication process. Davis et al. [DMR04] have
shown that when the users are in charge of choosing their own images, such schemes
may be insecure, e.g., passwords may be correlated with the race or gender of the
user. Similarly, GeoPass [TMSA13] is a graphical location based authentication
schema which requires the users to choose and remember a location on digital maps
as their password. Passfaces [Pas17, BS00, DNO08], the most popular recognitionbased system, uses images of human faces. Awase-E [TK03] allows users to use their
own images, improving flexibility and memorability, and increasing the attack search
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space. Similar to Passfaces, Awase-E imposes several verification steps, where the
user needs to correctly select the reference images from the decoys in each step.
Story [DMR04] extends the Passface approach with a “sequentiality” requirement:
users need to identify their reference images in the correct order. Weinshall [Wei06]
extends the basic scheme with a keyboard based navigation of displayed images, to
prevent spyware and shoulder-surfing attacks.
Cued-recall systems improve password memorability by requiring users to remember and target specific locations within an image [WWB+ 05a, WWB+ 05c].
PassPoints [WWB+ 05a, WWB+ 05c], one of the first solutions, also includes the sequentiality requirement: it presents the user with an image, on which he needs to
select a sequence of key points. To authenticate, the user is shown the cue (the
image) and needs to identify the key points, in the correct sequence. Suo [Suo06]
introduced a shoulder-surfing resistant extension that blurs random areas of the
image and asks the user to decide if a key point is within the clear area.
Pixie and ai.lock (see Chapters 4 and 5) can be considered to be a recognitionbased graphical password systems with dynamically generated images, where the
physical world around the user represents the set of possible passwords. Since the
user freely presents the candidate password through a photo of the physical world,
captured in different light, background, and angle conditions, we need to implement
an accurate matching of trinkets. Trinkets can be small portions of items worn by
users (e.g., shirt pattern, shoe section). Thus, even if the attacker is able to see and
reproduce the trinket, the attacker does not know the required section and angle of
the trinket. These image-based authentication solutions accurately verify that the
candidate image contains the same trinket part as a previously captured reference
image(s). This process endows image-based authentication with attack resilience
properties: to fraudulently authenticate, an adversary needs to capture both the
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mobile device and the trinket, then guess the correct part of the trinket or angle of
a scene that was used when registering the image password.

2.1.4

Text-based Passwords

Traditional solutions to authenticate users on a mobile phones are based either
on entering a Personal Identification Number (PIN) or a password. The usability of traditional text-based passwords has been well studied in literature, see
e.g., [TSK+ 12, MKS+ 16, CFS+ 09, SKD+ 14]. Several limitations are associated with
text passwords on memorability and usability especially when adopted in mobile
platforms.
Melicher et al. [MKS+ 16] found that creating and entering passwords on mobile
devices take longer than desktops and laptops. In mobile devices, text-based passwords need to be entered on spatially limited keyboards on which typing a single
character may require multiple touches [SWKW13], due also to typing the wrong
key. Cherapau et al. [CMAB15] identified memorability and less typing as reasons
that users choose PINs rather than longer and more secure passwords (or passcodes)
to protect their mobile devices. Shay et al. [SKD+ 14] have shown through a large
user study of different password-composition policies, that more than 20% of participants had problems recalling their password and 35% of the users reported that
remembering a password is difficult. Trewin et al. [TSK+ 12] found that face biometrics can be entered faster than text based passwords. Shay et al. [SKD+ 14] reported
that user entry time for text passwords ranges between 11.6-16.2s (see Table 4.1) in
line with our evaluation (see § 4.6.2).
Image-based authentication solution replaces the user action of typing a password
with pointing the camera to the trinket and snapping a photo of it. In Chapter 4, we
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show that Pixie is perceived as more memorable than text passwords (see § 4.6.2).
We also show that Pixie entry time is faster than text based passwords on a mobile
device.

2.1.5

Wearable Device Authentication

The special form factor and limited input method of wearable devices make the
employment of conventional authentication methods, such as PIN, cumbersome for
users. However, wearable devices are sometimes equipped with physiological (e.g.,
ECG, EEG) and kinesthetic sensors that open up a range of new possibilities for
authentication solutions on these devices.
Not only the biometric information collected by wearable devices are used for
user authentication [BCTPL16], wearable devices can be used as the second authentication factor: in iAuth [LL16] the smartwatch collects and sends the motion
patterns of the user to authenticate to a smartphone. Wearable authentication solutions often leverage the available sensors to address the small form factor of the
devices: Yoon et al. [YPL15] use the light state changes captured by the ambient
light sensor as a PIN entry method. WatchMe [VVBVS15] uses the smartwatch
camera to process the input (e.g. PIN) drawn by the user on a canvas. Similarly,
Pixie and ai.lock can be employed as a form of authentication in wearable devices
that are equipped with a camera.

2.2

Image Feature Extraction and Matching

Traditional feature extraction (e.g. [RRKB11, BTVG06, LCS11, Low04]) are based
on finding “keypoints” on the images. These keypoints can then be used to compare against similar keypoints on another image and are usually resistant to scale
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or rotation [RRKB11, BTVG06]. Particularly, these algorithms extract several features (piece of information, a.k.a descriptor) about the pixel values surrounding the
keypoints. Later, these descriptors can be used to identify the patch in the image
when comparing it against other patches in another image. In Chapter 4, we use
SURF (Speeded Up Robust Features) [BTVG06] and ORB [RRKB11] algorithms,
to extract scale and rotation invariant image keypoints and use them for image
matching.
In order to match two images, one can compare all keypoint in the image to
all the other keypoints in the second image to find the closest keypoints based on
a distance measure (bruteforce matching). However, this is expensive and time
consuming. Instead in Chapter 4, we use Fast Library for Approximate Nearest
Neighbors (FLANN)-based matcher [ML09]. These are algorithms that are developed for fast nearest neighbor search based on a specific distant measure.
More advanced methods for feature extraction includes using Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [LB+ 95]. These networks take advantage of local connectivity
to extract salient image features from images. The representations learned by CNNs
are shown to resemble the primate visual system [CHY+ 14]. In addition, they can
help predict human eye fixation [KWB17], and capture information about artistic
style of images that are meaningful to humans [GEB16]. Specifically, we use the
ability of CNNs to capture underlying images features and use these features to
train different image classifiers (see § 5.4 and 6.5.3).

2.3

Key Fingerprint Representation

In this section, we review the relevant key fingerprint representation solutions. This
is particularly, related to the CEAL system that we introduce in Chapter 6.
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2.3.1

Text-based Key Fingerprints

Key fingerprint representation methods transform an input key (e.g. (hashed) public key) into a shorter, human readable format. The numeric [wae16] format uses
numbers (0-9) to represent a binary key fingerprint in based 10 instead of 2. However, the most commonly used textual key fingerprint representations encode the
key into a hexadecimal (letters A-F and numbers 0-9) or based32 (Latin alphabet) strings. In both numeric and alphanumeric representation, the string can be
grouped into chunks of equal length. Chunking can slightly affect the user verification speed [DSB+ ].
In addition to (alpha)numeric representation, the key fingerprints can be represented as a set of pronounceable words [Hui00]. In this method, the binary key
fingerprint is splitted into chunks. Each chunk is then mapped to a word that is
selected from a dictionary. Other teqniques use syntactically correct English sentences [akw, GSS+ 06] to represent key fingerprints.
The text-based schema used for key fingerprint representation impacts the efficiency and accuracy of verification process [DSB+ , TBB+ 17, VWO+ 17]. Under an
targeted attack scenario, an adversary may try to generate a key whose fingerprint
differs in positions which are not apparent to an inattentive human verifier (e.g.
middle of the string instead of its beginning or the end [DSB+ , TBB+ 17]). Dechand
et al. [DSB+ ] evaluate the performance and usability of key fingerprint representation using (alpha)numeric strings, words and sentences. Based on their findings,
wildly adopted hexadecimal representation performs poorly both from verification
accuracy and usability aspects. In addition, while representing the key fingerprints
using a large dictionary of words can increase the verification speed, representing
keys using sentences achieved the best attack detection rate.
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2.3.2

Graphical and image-based representations

Several techniques represent the key fingerprints visually, using graphics or synthetically generated images. Visual key fingerprint representation solutions,such
as Random art [PS99] and OpenSSH Visual Host Key [LLvG09], use the key to
generate a structured image.
For instance, Vash [vas14], is an open source implementation for Random art [PS99],
that converts input binary strings into corresponding image “fingerprints”. Vash
uses the input string as the seed to a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG),
then uses the output of this PRNG to construct an expression tree structure. The
number of nodes of the tree, which we denote by N, is chosen randomly by PRNG.
Vash then converts this tree to an image fingerprint: Each node in the tree corresponds to an operation function, which modifies the pixel values of the fingerprint
image. Each operation is chosen randomly using the PRNG, from an existing pool
of 17 operations, e.g., ellipse, flower, squircle, etc. In addition, the parameters of an
operation are chosen randomly in [0, 1]. However, this value can then be mapped
to a numbers in a different range.
Avatar representation techniques have also been used as key fingerprint representation. For instance, in [vdE17] a unicorn image with randomly chosen properties
is drawn based on the input key and a PRNG.
Further, the text-and-image hybrid solution and the most widely used solution,
OpenSSH visual host key [LLvG09] splits the 128 bits MD5 hash of the input key,
into chunks. Each chunk is then processed to decide how to navigate on canvas
according to a set of rules and add specific ASCII characters to the canvas. WPMonsterID [mon] randomly selects pieces of the visual representation from a dataset
of images. However, this requires a large image dataset to ensure the uniqueness
and distinguishability of key fingerprints.
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Tan et al. [TBB+ 17] performed user studies to compare several textual and
graphical key fingerprint representation solutions. Their findings suggest that visual key fingerprints can speed up the verification of key fingerprints. In their
experiments, Vash [vas14] outperformed the unicorn solution [vdE17] and several
text-based key fingerprint representation solutions (e.g. hexadecimal and numeric
representations) in terms of both attack detection rate and comparison time.
In contrast, CEAL is the first visual key fingerprint representation solution designed to ensure that the human visual system can differentiate between image
fingerprints generated from different keys. In Chapter 6, we show that despite its
reliance on a PRNG, Vash is unable to satisfy the requirements that we introduce
for visual key fingerprint representation (see 6.3.1). Particularly, we show that not
all the images generated by Vash are human-distinguishable, especially when the
number of overlaid shapes and colors on the canvas increases. This is expected,
as the visual sensitivity of human to changes diminishes with increased spatial frequency [YN04]. Further, we show that CEAL outperforms Vash. Over a set of 10K
random vash images, we identified 24 images indistinguishable, however, using the
same procedure, we did not identify any indistinguishable images for CEAL.

2.4

Deep Generative Models for Image Generation

Deep Generative Models (DGMs) are DNNs that are usually trained, using unsupervised learning, to summarize explanatory key features of samples in the training
data. The trained model can be used to draw samples from the modeled data distribution, i.e. generate fake and unseen but realistic and plausible instances similar to
the samples in the training dataset. There are two major classes of generative mod-
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els: Variational AutoEncoder (VAE) [KW13] and Generative Adversarial Networks
(GAN) [GPAM+ 14].
In this dissertation, we focus on GANs for generating images (see § 3.1.5 for
a review on the conventional components and training process of a GANs). Note,
GANs are an active area of research and there has been many efforts to generate
realistic and high resolution images using this networks (e.g. [KALL18]).
In Chapter 4 and 5, we use a traditional GAN to model an adversary who can
use these networks to draw a large number of plausible image samples to break
image-based authentication solutions that we introduce.
In addition, in Chapter 6, we introduce CEAL DCGAN (see § 6.4.1), a GAN
network trained to generate realistic and human distinguishable images. To train
this network, we modify the process of training GANs to generate images that are
not only realistic but human distinguishable. CEAL DCGAN uses a network with
similar architecture as in DCGAN [RMC15] to generate images. However, it can be
replaced with any state-of-the-art GAN-like network (e.g. [KALL18]).
Similar to [CDH+ 16, DBML18], we modify the training process of GAN to generate images with particular properties. InfoGAN [CDH+ 16] uses unsupervised
learning to distangle the visual characteristics (e.g. style, color, pose of objects,
etc.) of the generated images by a GAN. Similar to CEAL, SDGAN [DBML18] uses
a supervised approach to train a GAN with latent vectors that include components
representing both identities (e.g. individual humans) and observations (e.g. specific
photographs) of human faces.
In CEAL, we decompose the latent vector components (the input to a GAN) into
major and minor components (see Conjecture 6.4.2). The major components learn
to carry information about human distinguishability aspect of the generate images,
while minor components represent other properties of the images (e.g. realism).
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CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we present the necessary background relevant to this research. First,
we review Deep Neural Networks(DNNs), including the generative models for generating images. We review the components of these networks and how these networks
are trained.
We then present the background on locality sensitive hashing for transforming
real valued vectors into binary strings while preserving the similarity relationships
of the input vectors. In addition, we briefly review BCH [BRC60] an error correcting
code that we use in this dissertation.

3.1

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)

Deep learning [Sch15] is a branch of machine learning that attempt to model and
learn high level abstractions in data. A Deep Neural Networks (DNN), is a network
of connected processing units (neurons/nodes) that are wired in an specific fashion
to perform a task. In the simplest case, a neural network can be defined by input,
hidden and output neurons. An input neuron accepts a real value as input and
passes a modified version of it, by using a transformation function, to the neuron(s)
in the next layer. Each neuron is connected to other neurons in the next layer
through a weight, which is a model parameter. In addition, there is a value, referred
to as bias, associated with each neuron in a neural network. The neuron uses its
connected weights and its bias to transform the input of the neuron into its output.
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3.1.1

Deep Neural Network Models

Neural network models are usually used for function approximation. There are three
major types of neural network models: (1) discriminative models, (2) generative
models, and (3) hybrid models. Here, we briefly describe these models. Consider
a pattern recognition problem where we want to identify the relationship between
covariant input samples to a target variable y, where y could be discrete (e.g., as in
classification problems) or continuous (e.g., as in regression problems).
Generative Models
A generative model learns the joint probability distribution of samples and their
corresponding class labels, i.e., p(x, y). Once this model is estimated, we can apply
Bayes rule to indirectly compute the conditional probability of y given the sample
x, i.e., p(y|x). In the case of a classification problem, a generative model learns the
distribution of individual classes. In addition, generative models potentially learn
the natural features and properties of data. As a result, these models can be used
for drawing (unseen) samples from the same distribution as in original data. In
practice, generative models are widely used for unsupervised feature learning.
Discriminative Models
Unlike generative models, discriminative models are directly trained to estimate the
conditional probability of a target value given a sample, i.e., p(y|x). Discriminative
models learn the boundary of samples from different classes. Many of traditional
classification algorithms, such as logistic regression and SVM, can be categorized as
discriminative models.
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Figure 3.1: A neuron (with index i) in a feed forward neural network: the input
to the neuron is scaled, summed, added to a bias and is passed to a non-linear
activation function (Act) to produce the output.
Hybrid Models
Hybrid models combine the generative and discriminative models to perform a task.
For instance, the output of a discriminative model can be used as a criteria to guarantee certain property of the samples generated by a discriminative model. Similarly,
a generative model can assist with training a discriminative model by improving the
optimization process or providing regularization for the model [Den12]. In CEAL
(see Chapter 6), we use a discriminative model (i.e., Human Perception Discriminator) to push an image generator (a generative model) to generate only images that
are human distinguishable.

3.1.2

Layers in Deep Neural Networks

Independent of the DNN type, i.e., discriminative, generative or hybrid, the architecture of a neural network consist of connected neurons that are stacked on top of
each others in different layers. There are several types of layers in a neural network.
Here, we briefly introduce some of these layers that are usually used in practice and
the networks we have designed or used in the dissertation.
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Fully Connected Layer
In a feed forward neural network with fully connected layers, the connection between
the neurons of different layers do not form a cycle: the nodes in each layer are
connected to all the other nodes in the next layer, while, there is no connection
between the neurons in one layer. In a forward pass, the information flows in only
one direction from input layer to optionally intermediate (hidden) layers and finally
the output layer. A single neuron accept as input a vector x with n components (i.e.,
x is a n-dimensional vector) and produces a single output. The output of the neuron
is computed using h = W T x + b. In this equation, W is the weights connecting the
neuron to the input or the neurons in the previous layer, and b is neuron’s bias.
This bias can increase the computational capability of the neuron. However, the
relation between the input and output of a layer is linear, hence, a neuron acts
only as a linear transformation function. In order to increase the computational
capability of a neuron, a non-linear function is applied to the output of each node.
This non-linear function is referred to as the “activation function”. Therefore, the
transformation of input to the output is performed through hout = Act(h) where
Act is an activation function. In § 3.1.2, we review several activation functions that
we have used in the networks designed or used in this dissertation.
The notation above can be extended to a network with a layer that has multiple
neurons. Let m be the number of neurons in this layer. Each node is connected
to the nodes/input components from the previous layer through a set of weights
i.e., {W (1) , W (2) , W (3) , ..., W (m) }. Also, for these nodes we have biases {b1 , b2 ,
b3 , ..., bm } respectively. Then, the activation of ith node in this layer is computed
T

T

as ai = Act(W (i) x) + bi , where W (i) is the transpose of the ith ’s nodes weights.
Figure 3.1 depicts this process. To summarize, in a fully connected layer, each
neuron computes the dot product between the input and its weights, adds the bias to
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the dot product value and optionally applies a non-linearity (i.e., activation function)
to the result obtained in previous step.
Convolutional Layer
Convolutional layer derives its name from the convolution operator in mathematics.
A convolutional layer is organized in 3-dimensions: width, height, and depth. In
addition, to provide weight sharing and local connectivity, the neurons in each layer
are connected only to a small region of the previous layer. The spatial span of
this connectivity is referred to as the “receptive field” of a neuron. The size of the
receptive field along depth axis is always equal to the depth of the input. The set
of weights that are used to transform an input region to output are referred to as a
“filter” (a.k.a. kernel). The output of a convolutional layer is computed by sliding
the filter from the top left corner of the input to the bottom left corner, s step at a
time. s is a hyperparameter and is referred to as “stride”. This process is similar
to the convolution operation. To perform the convolution operation, the input is
sometimes padded with zeros around the boarders to simplify calculations. Based
on the size of the input (I), receptive field of a filter (f), stride (s) and the size
of padding (p), we can compute the size of the output of a convolutional layer as
(I − f + 2p)/(s + 1).
As an example, consider an image as input to a convolutional layer. Let the
size of the image be m × m × d where m is the width and height of image and
d is the number of channels in the image, e.g., an RGB image has d = 3. The
convolutional layer itself can have k filters of size f × f × q where f < m and
q = d. In this case, each neuron in the convolutional layer has weights that are
connected to a [f × f × d] region in the input, for a total of f × f × d weights plus
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one bias parameter. With stride 1 and no padding, the output of such layer has size
(m − f + 1) × (m − f + 1) × (k).
Pooling Layer
Commonly, convolutional layers are followed by a pooling layer. The purpose of
this layer is to reduce the spatial dimensionality of the intermediate representations
and the number of parameters of the network. Consequently, overfitting can be
controlled by reducing the number of parameters.
Similar to a convolutional layer, a pooling layer has filters of small size, however,
each pooling layer filter is applied independently on each slice of the input on the
depth axis. The dimensionality of the representations are reduced by applying either
a minimum or maximum function, or by taking the average over the receptive field
of a filter. Depending on the function used, the pooling layer is referred to as a min
pooling, max poling or average pooling layer.
Activation Function
In order to increase the computational capacity of the neural networks, a non-linear
function is applied to the output of the layers in an element wise fashion. Here, we
review the activation functions we use in this dissertation.
Sigmoid. The sigmoid (a.k.a logistic) activation function accepts a real-valued
number as input and squashes it into range of (0,1). The mathematical form of this
function is σ(x) =

1
.
1+e−x

Softmax. The softmax function is the generalized version of logistic function that
squashes a k-dimensional vector of real values into a k-dimensional normalized probability values: all the output values add up to 1. The mathematical form of softmax
function for the j th element of input is ϕ(x)j =

exj
Pk
i=1
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exi

. In this equation, x is a

k dimensional input and 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Softmax function is usually used in case of
multi-class classification problems where it computes normalized probabilities over
k different mutually exclusive classes. In contrast, sigmoid function is used in case
of binary classification problem (i.e., when k = 2).
Tanh. Tanh activation function provides a zero-centered activation by squashing
the neuron’s output to range [-1, 1]. Tanh can also be considered as a scaled sigmoid
function, i.e., tanh(x) = 2σ(2x) − 1.
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU). The ReLU is one of the most popular activation
functions. It cuts the activation of the neuron at zero by computing the function
ReLU(x) = max(0, x).

3.1.3

Training Using Gradient Decent Algorithm

In a feed-forward neural network, the connections between the nodes of different
layers do not form a cycle. In other words, there is no feedback connections that
connects an output of the model to itself. Therefore, the information in a feedforward neural network flows in only one direction: from the input to the output
by passing each hidden layer in the network. The purpose of a feed-forward neural
network is to approximate a function y = f (x, θ), where x is the input and θ is the
set of model parameters (i.e., the layers’ weights and biases).
In a forward pass, the output of the model is computed based on the input: each
layer performs a transformation on the input data and passes the result to the next
layer. When the output of the network is computed, a loss (a.k.a error) function is
calculated based on the model output and expected output (e.g., actual class label
associated with the input). In the next step, the parameters of the neural network
are adjusted to gradually reduce the loss value. This process is performed in a
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backward pass, using gradient descent algorithm or similar, from the output node
to the input.
In Chapter 6, we use the well-known cross-entropy loss for binary classification
problem, defined as cross entropy(y, ŷ) = −ylog(ŷ) − (1 − y)log(1 − ŷ), for a given
input sample. Here, y is the target class label of the input, while ŷ is the predicted
class.
In addition, we use weighted contrastive loss [CHL05] to train a twin network to
classify images as either “same” or “different”. The purpose of this loss is to enable
the network to differentiate between the two images. Equation 3.1 shows how the
weights are updated based on this loss for two input samples I1 and I2 .

L(θ, Y, I1 , I2 ) = 12 (1 − r)(1 − Y )(Dθ 2 ) + 21 rY (max(0, µ − Dθ ))2

(3.1)

θ denotes the model parameters (weights and biases), and Y is the actual class
label of the image pair, i.e. 1 for different and 0 for same images. Dw is the Euclidean
distance between the outputs of the twin networks for the input image pairs (I1 and
I2 ). r ∈ [0, 1] is the weight (importance) assigned to the positive (different) class
and µ ∈ R, µ > 1 is a margin.
Types of Gradient Descent
Depending on the number of samples used for computing the loss function, gradient
decent algorithm can be categorized into three category: (1) Batch Gradient Decent
(BGD), (2) Stochastic Gradient Decent (SGD) and (3) mini-batch gradient decent.
Batch Gradient Decent (BGD) optimization. In the BGD algorithm, the
weights are incrementally updated after one pass over all the training samples. Such
pass over training data is referred to as a training “epoch”. In other words, in BGD
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all the training samples are used to compute the loss function. The value of the loss
is then used to updated the network’s weights.
Stochastic Gradient Decent (SGD) optimization. Unlike BGD algorithm, in
SGD algorithm the weights are updated after observing each sample individually.
Mini-batch Gradient Decent optimization. In mini-batch gradient decent algorithm, the weights are updated after processing a fixed size of samples from the
training data. The size of this set is referred to as “batch-size”. The batch-size
is a hyper parameter and it’s value is usually selected based on the memory and
computational capacity of the system on which the training is performed. In this
dissertation, we use mini-batch gradient decent algorithm for training the neural
networks.
Gradient-based Optimization
In this section, we review two different gradient-based optimizer that we use in this
dissertation for training the Human Perception Discriminator and CEAL neural
networks (see Chapters 5 and 6).
Gradient decent optimizer. In this method, the weights of the model are adjusted in the negative direction of gradient of loss function with respect to weights.
This is because the gradient represents the direction in which the function is maximized. Particularly, the gradient of the loss with respect to weights are computed
using

∂L(θ)
,
∂wij

where L is the loss value and wij is the weight of j th node in ith layer

of the network. Once this derivatives are computed, the weights are updated using Equation 3.2. In this equation, η is hyperparameter known as “learning rate”.
Learning rate defines the step sizes we take in the opposite direction of gradient to
minimize the loss function. Choosing the right learning rate is very important: if it
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is too large, the model might not converge to local/global minima; while if it is too
small, the learning would be so slow.

wij := wij − η

∂L(θ)
∂wij

(3.2)

Adam optimizer. In traditional gradient descent method, a single learning rate
is used for all weight updates. In addition, the value of this learning rate is constant during training. However, Adam optimization algorithm “computes individual
adaptive learning rates for different parameters from estimates of first moment (the
mean) and second moment (the uncentered variance) of the gradients.” [KB15].
Particularly, the decaying first moment (mt ) and second moment (vt ) are estimated
as in Equation 3.3 and Equation 3.4. mt and vt are estimates of the first and the
second moments of the gradients respectively.

3.1.4

mt = β1 mt−1 + (1 − β1 )gt

(3.3)

vt = β2 vt−1 + (1 − β2 )gt 2

(3.4)

Representation Learning Using Deep Neural Networks

Representation or feature learning is a field of machine learning that seeks to construct a suitable representation of the input vectors for the learning task. The idea
is to transform the raw input vectors into a new space that captures the most important factors of the unknown generating distribution of the input data. Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) [F.R01] is an ancestor of such solutions that performs
a linear transformation of the input vectors to capture the directions (components)
with the highest variability.

39

In contrast, DNNs leverage linear and non-linear transformations, performed by
several processing layers, in order to learn a high level abstract feature set of the
input data. A well-known method for finding a feature representation for images
is to use an auto-encoder [Bal87]. An auto-encoder is a neural network with two
components: an encoder that transforms the input image into a compact code; and
a decoder that attempts to reconstruct the input image from the code. An autoencoder is trained in an unsupervised fashion, to minimize the reconstruction error
of the input at the output. When the network is trained, the code can be considered
as the compact representation of the salient features of the input data.
Further, the representation learned by DNNs can be re-purposed for a new task.
This process is referred to as “transfer learning” [YCBL14]. Empirical results have
shown the effectiveness of representations learned by DNNs for different tasks including image classification [YCBL14, DJV+ 14, PCS17], and verification of different
biometric information [CHL05, MCP+ 15, PHJ16].
Particularly, one can use the entire or part of a pre-trained model weights (source
model) to build a new network for performing a different similar task (target model).
In this setting, the target model weights are initialized by transferred weights from
the source model. Then, these weights can be retrained for the new task. In another
setting, additional new layers are stacked on the (partial) copy of the source model
and the new layers are fine-tuned for the target task using a labeled dataset of
samples.
Transfer learning facilitates the learning process for the new network as the
extracted feature by the source model are also useful for performing the new task.
For instance, let us assume we have a DNN that is trained to classify images of
certain objects, e.g., cat, dog, flower, tree, house. We can use this network to
train a classifier for distinguishing other classes of images, such as different types
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of flowers, e.g., iris, lily, etc. For this, we can stack one of the deepest layers of
the pre-trained network with several additional (fully connected) layers. Then, we
retrain the new layers to optimize the network weights for the new task using labeled
samples of flower images. The source model can extract useful image features (e.g.,
features that resemble Gabor filters, color, etc.) that are also useful for performing
the target task (i.e. flower classification).
In addition, in a recent study Elsayed et al. [EGSD18] introduced reprogramming
DNNs. This is a new form of transfer learning approach where instead of using pretrained model weights, or the features extracted by this model, the input to the
pre-trained model is modified so that the network performs well on the new task.
This can be considered as reprogramming the network.
In contrast to image classification problem, ai.lock and CEAL image-based authentication solutions differ in their need to ensure that two object/scene images
are the same or different for the purpose of authentication. In ai.lock and CEAL
architectures, we exploit the ability of DNNs to learn features of the input images
and capture the important underlying explanatory factors of images. We conjecture
that such features will have small variations among images of the same object or
scene, captured in different circumstances.
Pre-trained Deep Neural Networks
We are interested in the task of extracting robust and salient features of images
using the abilities of DNNs. Training a DNN with millions of parameters is computationally expensive and requires a large training dataset of labeled samples, rarely
available in practice. Instead, we employed a “transfer learning” [SZL15] approach:
obtain a trained DNN and use it for a similar task.
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Particularly, we exploit different pre-trained networks for image feature extraction: when the image is input to a pre-trained network, we consider activations of
specific layer, or multiple layers, as corresponding image features.
In this dissertation, we use two versions of Inception network for image feature
extraction. Inception networks use a specific module a.k.a Inception modules in
their architecture. The Inception module was introduces by Google engineers to
enable the network to have a deeper architecture, hence pushing the performance of
image classification task for computer vision. This module uses filters of different
sizes in the convolutional layers. The output of convolution operations using these
filters are then concatenated, enabling the network to learn from multiple sources of
information when performing the task. This continuous effort has resulted in several
versions of Inception. Each version provides an improvement over the prior version,
however, depending on the task in hand and the dataset in use, an earlier version
can have better performance over a later one.
Pre-trained Inception.v1. For image feature extraction in CEAL, we use Inception.v1 [ten17, SLJ+ 15] network pre-trained on ImageNet dataset [DDS+ 09], of
1.2 million images of 1,000 different object categories, for image classification (see
Chapter 6).
Pre-trained Inception.v3. Similar to Inception.v1, Inception.v3 [SVI+ 16a] is a
network pre-trained on ImageNet dataset [DDS+ 09], of 1.2 million images of 1,000
different object categories. We use this network for image feature extraction in
ai.lock (see Chapter 5).
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3.1.5

Generating Images Using Deep Neural Networks

In § 3.1.1, we described the generative models. Generative models digest a large
dataset, related to some domain (e.g., images, sentences, sounds, videos, etc.), and
learn to generate data samples that look similar to this dataset. In this dissertation,
we focus on image data generation.
A Deep Generative Model (DGM) is usually trained, using unsupervised learning,
to summarize explaining key features of images in training dataset. The trained
model can be further used for drawing samples from this data distribution, i.e.
they can generate fake but visually realistic and plausible images. There are two
major classes of generative models: Variational AutoEncoders (VAEs) [KW13] and
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [GPAM+ 14]. VAEs consist of two DNNs,
i.e., a encoder part that transforms the input images to a compact hidden code
(a.k.a. latent variable); and a decoder part that learns to reconstruct the hidden
code back into the input image. VAEs are trained to minimize the reconstruction loss
of the decoder when there is a prior on the distribution of latent variables, i.e., the
encoder is constraint to generate latent variables that follow a specific distribution
(e.g. normal, or uniform).
A GAN [GPAM+ 14] is implemented by a system of two competing DNNs: (1) a
generator network (G) that transforms the input latent vector into an image. The
latent vector is usually selected from a simple distribution such normal or uniform
distributions. We assume that the latent vector components are randomly drawn
from U(−1, 1); (2) a discriminator (D) network that differentiates between instances
from the real images and synthetic images generated by the G network. G and D
are trained alternately: D is trained using the images generated by G and a set
of real images from a training dataste. G uses the output of D for the images it
generated to generate better images that can deceive D into believing they are real.
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The competition will drive G to generate image samples that look like images from
the training dataset.
In Chapters 4 and 5, we use a GAN model with the same architecture as in Deep
Convolutional Generative Adversarial Networks (DCGAN) [RMC15] to generate a
huge number of synthetic image samples that look similar to the real images in
our training datasets. We use these synthetic datasets to attack Pixie and ai.lock
image-based authentication solutions. In addition, in Chapter 6, we use a DCGAN
generator in CEAL system. We modify the process of training this DCGAN to
generate images that are not only realistic, but distinguishable by human visual
system. The images that CEAL generates can be used to represent a key fingerprint
corresponding to a public key or identity.

3.2

Locality Sensitive Hashing

Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) seeks to reduce the dimensionality of data, while
probabilistically preserving the distance properties of the input space. LSH was initially used to solve the near neighbor search problem in high dimensional spaces [IM98].
While seemingly the ideal candidate to provide the ai.lock functionality (i.e. mapping an image into a binary string), LSH does not work well on images: images
of the same scene or object, captured in different conditions, e.g., angle, distance,
illumination, will have dramatically different pixel values, leading to a high distance
between the images and thus also between their LSH values.
We use however Charikar’s [Cha02] LSH as a building block in ai.lock. Charikar’s [Cha02]
LSH defines a family of hash functions in the space Rd . Specifically, the LSH
function hr is based on a randomly chosen d-dimensional Gaussian vector with independent components r ∈ Rd , where hr (u) = 1 if r · u ≥ 0 and hr (u) = 0 if
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r · u < 0 (· denotes the inner product). This function provides the property that
P r[hr (u) = hr (v)] = 1 −

θ(u,v)
,
π

for any vectors u and v, where θ(u, v) denotes the

angle between the input vectors.

3.3

Error Correcting Codes

In this dissertation, we use binary Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem BCH [BRC60,
Hoc59b] codes. A t-error-correcting BCH code can correct up to t bits. In this case,
the code words, generated by encoder, are guaranteed to be at least in d hamming
distance of each other, where d ≥ 2t + 1. We represent a t-error correcting code
with message length n and code word length k bits as BCH(n, k, t).
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CHAPTER 4
PIXIE: IMAGE-BASED REMOTE AUTHENTICATION

4.1

Introduction

We introduce Pixie, a novel, camera based two factor authentication solution for
mobile and wearable devices, see Figure 4.1 and [CaS17d] for a short demo. A quick
and familiar user action of snapping a photo is sufficient for Pixie to simultaneously
perform a graphical password authentication and a physical token based authentication, yet it does not require any expensive, uncommon hardware. Pixie establishes
trust based on both the knowledge and possession of an arbitrary physical object
readily accessible to the user, called trinket. While the trinket is essentially an authentication token, it is not (necessarily) electronic, but can be any object easily
accessible to the user during the authentication process, e.g., wallet, watch, clothing
pattern. Pixie also differs from authentication based on biometric, since the trinket
can be changed, as users change accessories they wear or carry.
Just like setting a password, the user picks a readily accessible trinket of his
preference, e.g., a clothing accessory, a book, or a desk toy, then uses the device
camera to snap trinket images (a.k.a., reference images). All the user needs to do to
authenticate is to point the camera to the trinket. If the captured candidate image
matches the reference images, the authentication succeeds.
Challenges. Building a secure and usable trinket based authentication solution
is difficult. Unlike biometrics based solutions, trinkets can be chosen from a more
diverse space than e.g., faces, thus lack the convenience of a set of well known
features. In addition, users cannot be expected to accurately replicate during login,
the conditions (e.g. angle and distance, background) of the trinket as in the setup
process. Thus, Pixie needs to be resilient to candidate images captured in different

46

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 4.1: Pixie: (a) Trinket setup. The user takes photos of the trinket placing it
in the circle overlay. UI shows the number of photos left to take. (b) Login: the user
snaps a photo of the trinket. (c) Trinket setup messages provide actionable guidance, when the image quality is low (top), or the reference images are inconsistent
(bottom).
circumstances than the reference images. To address these challenges, Pixie requires
the users to capture multiple trinket images in registration phase. In addition, we
leverage robust keypoints [BTVG06, RRKB11] extracted from images of the trinket
to perform image matching. Particularly, we identify a novel set of features extracted
from a 1-to-1 matching of candidate to reference image keypoint descriptors. We
then train a classifier on these features to decide if the candidate and reference
images “match”.
We identified an additional challenge in early pilot studies: Pixie users can use
low quality reference trinkets, (e.g. with uniform textures, or inconsistent reference
images with different viewing angles), or capture low quality images of their trinkets,
(e.g., blurry, or with improper lighting conditions, see Figure 4.2(d)-(f)). In order to
help the users pick high quality images of trinket, we develop features that capture
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

Figure 4.2: Examples of good (a-c) and low quality (d-f) trinket images. Trinkets are
small (parts of) objects carried or worn by users, thus hard to steal and even reproduce
by adversaries. ORB keypoints are shown as small, colored circles. Good images have a
high number of keypoints on the trinket. Low quality images are due to (d) insufficient
light conditions on shirt section, (e) bright light and reflection, (f) image blur, or uniform,
texture-less trinket.

the quality of reference and candidate images as defined by the likelihood of causing
false accepts or false rejects. We use these features to implement image filters that
detect and reject low quality images before they can be used as Pixie trinkets. We
introduce two rules of Pixie filters for rejecting trinket images: (i) images on which
they predict Pixie will fail, and (ii) images with feature values for which Pixie has
not been trained.
It is crucial to give the user actionable feedback about how to choose a better
trinket when the Pixie filters reject a trinket image. For instance, a set of reference
images can be rejected because they contain different trinkets, or because one of
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Success rate
(%)

Entry Time
(s)

Number of trials
before success

84.00
88.10

7.99 (Std=2.26, Mdn=8.51)
12.5 (Std=6.5, Mdn=11.5)

1.2 (Std=0.4, Mdn=1)
1.4 (Std=1.02, Mdn=1)

Text password (comp8) [SKD+ 14]*

75.0-80.1

(Mdn=13.2)

1.3

Eye tracking [LDGW15]
GazeTouchPass [KAH+ 16]
Face biometric [TSK+ 12]
Face & eyes [BCF+ 13]*
Face & voice [TSK+ 12]
Voice biometric [TSK+ 12]
Gesture (stroke) biometric [TSK+ 12]

77.2-91.6
65
96.9
N/A
78.7
99.5
100

¡ 9.6
3.13
(Mdn=5.55)
20-40
(Mdn=7.63)
(Mdn=5.15)
(Mdn=8.10)

1.37 (Std=0.8, Mdn=1)-1.05 (Std=0.3, Mdn=1)
1.9 (Std=1.4, Mdn=1)
N/A
1.1
N/A
N/A
N/A

87.92
57
88
74

0.9 (Std=0.63, Mdn=0.74)
18.1 (Mdn=15.7)
3.1-4.1
3.64 (Std=1.66)

1.13(Std=0.06, Mdn=1.11)
2.2
N/A
N/A

Solution
Pixie
Text password (MyFIU)

Android pattern unlock [HDLE16]
Passpoints [CFS+ 09]*
Xside [DLHvZ+ 14]
SmudgeSafe [SSB+ 14]
* The study device is a computer.

Table 4.1: Comparison of usability related metrics of Pixie’s camera based two-factor
authentication approach with text, biometric and graphical password authentication
solutions. The Pixie user entry time is faster than typing text passwords. The results
of text-based passwords evaluated in § 4.6.2 are consistent with those from previous
work. Pixie’s median of login trials until success is 1, similar to other solutions.
them is blurry. Most supervised learning classifiers are not easily interpretable, thus
cannot indicate the nature of the problem. In order to provide meaningful actionable
feedback, we identify feature threshold values that pinpoint problem images and
naturally translate into user instructions (see Table 4.6), e.g. blurry images, and
inconsistent reference sets.
Implementation and evaluation. We implement Pixie for Android, and show
using an extensive evaluation that Pixie is secure, fast and usable, and perceived
as such by users. Pixie achieves a False Accept Rate (FAR) of 0.02% and a False
Reject Rate (FRR) of 4.25%, when evaluated over 122, 500 authentication instances.
Pixie processes a login attempt in 0.5s on a HTC One mobile device.
Table 4.1 compares usability related metrics of Pixie’s camera based two-factor
authentication approach with text, biometric and graphical password authentication solutions. While Pixie takes longer than biometric authentication based
on face [TSK+ 12], it is still faster than several authentication solutions based on
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gaze [BCF+ 13, LDGW15]. We note that while fingerprint based authentication is
fast and convenient [BUI+ 15], it is only applicable to devices that invest in such
equipment. In contrast, cameras are ubiquitously present, including on wearable
devices such as smartwatches and smartglasses.
To evaluate the security of Pixie, we introduce image based dictionary, or “pictionary” attacks, based on public trinket image datasets and images that we collected
online. On pictionary attacks consisting of 14.3 million authentication attempts,
Pixie achieves a FAR below 0.1%. We show that knowledge of the trinket type does
not provide an adversary with a significant advantage: on our online trinket image
dataset, the average number of “trials until success” exceeds 5, 500 irrespective of
whether the adversary knows the type of the trinket or not. In addition, we introduce and study the concept of master images, whose diverse keypoints enable them
to match multiple trinkets. We develop features that enable Pixie to reduce the
effectiveness of master images.
A user study performed with 42 participants over 8 days in 3 sessions, reveals
that Pixie is “discoverable”: without prior training and given no external help, 86%
and 78% of the participants were able to correctly set a trinket then authenticate
with it, respectively. Pixie’s trinkets were perceived as more memorable than text
passwords, and were also easily remembered 2 and 7 days after being set.
Without any additional practice outside of the 3 sessions, participants entered
their trinket progressively faster. Participants think Pixie is easier to use, more
memorable and faster than text passwords. We found that preference of Pixie over
text passwords correlates positively with its preference on ease of use, memorability
and security dimensions and overall perception of trinket memorability and willingness to adopt Pixie. In addition, 50% of participants reported that they preferred
Pixie over text passwords. 62% of the participants were willing to adopt Pixie.
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Figure 4.3: Pixie system model: the user authenticates through a camera equipped
device (smartphone, smartwatch, Google Glass, car), to a remote service, e.g., email, bank, social network account. The remote service stores the user credentials
and performs the authentication.

4.2
4.2.1

Model and Applications
System Model

Figure 4.3 illustrates the system model. The user has a camera equipped mobile device, called the authentication device. Authentication devices include smartphones,
tablets, resource constrained devices such as smartwatches and smartglasses, and
complex cyber-physical systems such as cars. The user uses the authentication device to access remote services such as e-mail, bank and social network accounts, or
cyber-physical systems, e.g., home or child monitoring systems.
We assume that the user can select and easily access a physical object, the trinket.
The user sets the authentication secret to consist of multiple photos of the trinket,
taken with the device camera. We call these “reference” images, or reference set. To
authenticate, the user snaps a “candidate” image of the trinket. This image needs
to match the stored, reference set. As illustrated in Figure 4.3, in this chapter,
we focus on the scenario where the user is willing to authenticate to a remote

51

service using Pixie. The remote service will store the reference images securely and
perform the image match over candidate images captured on and sent by the mobile
device. However, the mobile device can also be used to store the reference images,
and perform the image matching. In this case, the device associates the reference
images with the user’s remote authentication credentials (e.g. OAuth [DH12]). If
the image match succeeds, the credentials are sent to the remote service. In § 4.7
we compare the merits and drawbacks of each approach.
It worth mentioning that, Pixie can be used both as a standalone authentication
solution and as a secondary authentication solution, e.g., complementing text based
passwords.

4.2.2

Application

While this chapter centers on a remote service authentication through a mobile device scenario, Pixie has multiple other applications such as authentication in camera
equipped cyber-physical systems. For instance, cars can use Pixie to authenticate
their drivers locally and to remote services [Sec17]. Pixie can also authenticate
users to remote, smart house or child monitoring systems, through their wearable
devices. Further, doorlocks, PIN pads [Sec17, Sch17] and fingerprint readers can
be replaced with a camera through which users snap a photo of their trinket to
authenticate.
Pixie can be used as an alternative to face based authentication when the users
are reluctant to provide their biometric information (e.g. in home game systems
where the user needs to authenticate to pick a profile before playing or to unlock
certain functionalities). Pixie can also be used as an automatic access control check-
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point (e.g. for accessing privileged parts of a building). The users can print a visual

token and use it to pass Pixie access control checkpoints.
In addition, given the large number of people who work from home [Sed14],
Pixie can provide an inexpensive 2FA alternative for organizations to authenticate
employees who are connecting to the private network remotely [Gol]: replace the
hardware tokens with user chosen Pixie trinkets.
We note however that as we discuss later, Pixie may be unsuitable in authentication scenarios that include (1) a high risk associated with external observers, (2)
poor light conditions, (3) unpredictable movements, e.g., while walking or in public
transportation, or (4) depending on the trinket object type, situations where the
user cannot use both hands.

4.2.3

Adversary Model

We assume that the adversary can physically capture the mobile device of the victim.
We also assume that the adversary can use image datasets that he captures and
collects (see § 4.4) to launch brute force pictionary attacks against Pixie (see
§ 4.5.2).
Similar to PIN based authentication to an ATM, Pixie users need to make sure
that onlookers are far away and cannot see the trinket and its angle. We assume
thus an adversary with incomplete surveillance [FA12], who cannot observe or record
the trinket details. However, we consider a shoulder surfing attack flavor where
the adversary sees or guesses the user’s trinket object type. The adversary can then
use datasets of images of similar objects to attack Pixie (see § 4.5.2).
Further, we also consider an adversary that attempts to launch a master image
attack, i.e., identify images that contain diverse features and match many trinkets.
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Example master images include “clutter” images, with an array of shapes, colors
and shadows (see § 4.5.2).
In remote authentication scenario, we assume that the reference trinket images
are transferred to the remote server through a secure channel (e.g. SSH). These
images are then stored on the server securely through encryption. In the scenario
where the reference images have to be stored on the mobile device, we assume that
the adversary cannot access the stored image password: the images could be secured
through hardware-level protection, e.g., [Tru17], or through privacy preserving feature extraction and matching solutions [WHWR16, QYR+ 14, HLP12], see § 4.7 for
a discussion. Depending on the scenario, the adversary seeks to either authenticate
on the captured device, or to use the device to gain access to the victim’s online
service accounts.
It is important to note that, we are not assuming a naive or unmotivated adversary whose only means is to take photos of trinkets, as such limited adversaries are
known to create a false sense of security [BML06]. The adversary that we assume
is able to launch massive image-based attacks on Pixie using public image libraries.

4.3
4.3.1

Pixie
Pixie Requirements

Pixie is a two factor authentication solution as it requires both a possession factor
and a knowledge factor to authenticate the user. The possession factor is the trinket.
The knowledge factor is the knowledge of the trinket itself, its angle and section used
to authenticate. In addition to being resilient against attacks (see § 4.2.3), Pixie
needs to satisfy the following requirements:
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Figure 4.4: Pixie registration and login workflows: to register, the user captures
“reference images” of the trinket, which are filtered for quality and consistency. To
authenticate, the user needs to capture a “candidate image” of the trinket that
matches the reference images.
• Trinket image quality. Pixie needs to ensure the quality of trinkets and
images. Early pilot studies showed that not all the trinkets that the users
chose, or the photos that they took, were suitable for authentication.
• Trinket match. Pixie needs to match images of the same trinket, even when
captured with a different background, lighting, or from a slightly different
distance or angle.
• Discoverability. New users should easily discover the functionality of Pixie.
• Deployability. Pixie should be easy to integrate into existing systems.
Figure 4.4 depicts the modular approach we use for Pixie to address these goals. The
image capture module seeks to address part of the first requirement, by facilitating
the capture of high quality trinket images. The authentication module tackles the
second requirement through the use of trained classifiers to match trinket images.
To simultaneously address the first and third requirements, i.e., to ensure the discoverability of Pixie while guiding new users through the capture of high quality
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photos and the choice of visually complex objects as the secret, the filter module
detects and eliminates low quality images and invalid reference sets. We now detail
each module.

4.3.2

Image Capture & Feedback

We performed pilot studies to identify early problems with the Pixie user interface.
For instance, during the pilot studies, some users captured trinket photos whose
background provided more features than the trinkets. This revealed that the trinket
needs to be the main object in captured images. To simultaneously satisfy this
requirement, and the trinket quality requirement above, we design Pixie to guide
the user to take larger photos of trinkets. We achieve this by overlaying a circle on
the camera image: the user needs to fit the trinket impression inside the circle (see
Figures 4.1(a) and 4.1(b)). Since Pixie does not allow zooming in, the user needs
to bring the camera closer to the trinket, hence take a larger photo. Pixie crops the
image, and keeps only the largest rectangle parallel to the sides of the device that
fits the circle.
In addition, we observed that the quality of trinket images captured by the
users could be low (e.g. blurry or dark, see Figure 4.2), or the users may take
inconsistent trinket images in the registration phase. To ensure the quality of trinket
images and the consistency of reference images, we identified common problems that
occur during the image capture process (e.g., insufficient light, trinket with plain
texture). Then, we mapped prefilter rejection decisions provided by Pixie’s image
filter (see § 4.3.4) into informative error messages (see Figure 4.1(c)). Furthermore,
to facilitate the discoverability of Pixie, we designed and included a step by step
in-app instruction guide on how to use Pixie (see Figure 4.12). Table 4.2 summarizes
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Requirement

Pixie Feature

Increase the size of trinket &
Reduce the background area in trinket images

1. Disable camera zoom
2. Overlay a circle as the target area on the camera view

Ensure the quality of reference and candidate images
Ensure consistency of reference images

1. Design prefilters for checking the quality of images
2. Translate the prefilter criteria into an actionable feedback to the users

Improve the discoverability of Pixie

1. Show number of remaining images to take in registration screen
2. Show camera capture icon for login page
3. Add step by step in-app instruction on how to use Pixie

Table 4.2: Summary of user interface improvements identified during pilot studies.

Figure 4.5: Example ORB keypoint matches between two images of the same trinket,
taken in different conditions. Each line represents a match: it connects matching
keypoints (shown as small colored circles) from each image.
the design improvements we made to the Pixie UI.

4.3.3

The Authentication Module

The authentication module is responsible for addressing Pixie’s second requirement
(see § 4.3.1), of matching the candidate image against the reference images. Pixie
extracts robust keypoints from these images, then computes a 1-to-1 mapping between the resulting keypoint sets (see Figure 4.5 for an illustration), and filters out
low quality matches. Pixie extracts a suite of features from the keypoint match
process and uses supervised learning to decide if the candidate image matches the
reference set. We now detail this process.
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Symbol

Description

R
R
C
T (R)

The set of reference images
Any of the reference images in the reference set (R)
The candidate image
Template image of reference set (R)

NNSim(C, R)
F NSim(C, R)
AvgRef NN(R)
AvgRef F N(R)
AvgRef T empl(R)

Nearest neighbor similarity of C to R
Furthest neighbor similarity of C to R
Avg. nearest neighbor similarity of each reference image
Avg. furthest neighbor similarity of each reference image
Avg. similarity of reference images to template image

KP-CNT
DTC-KP
White-CNT
DTC-White

Number of keypoints in an image
Avg. distance of keypoints to their centroid in an image
Number of detected edge (white) pixels of an image
Avg. distance of edge (white) pixels to their centroid

MinCrossSim(R) Min. similarity among all the pairs of images in R
MaxCrossSim(R) Max. similarity among all the pairs of images in R
AvgCrossSim(R) Avg. similarity among all the pairs of images in R
ORB [RRKB11]
SURF [BTVG06]
RANSAC [FB81]
FLANN [ML09]

ORB keypoint extraction algorithm
Speeded Up Robust Features keypoint extraction algorithm
Random Sample Consensus algorithm for fitting the model to data
Fast Approximate Nearest Neighbor Search

Table 4.3: Pixie notations and algorithm acronyms.
Table 4.3 summarizes the most important Pixie features notations. Let C denote
the candidate image, R be the set of reference images, and R be any of the reference
images (see § 4.2.1).
Keypoint matching
We use SURF (Speeded Up Robust Features) [BTVG06] and ORB [RRKB11] algorithms, to extract scale and rotation invariant image keypoints from the candidate
and reference images, e.g., shown as small colored circles on images in Figure 4.5 and
4.2. We also extract the descriptors of the keypoints, which represent their characteristics. To determine if a candidate image C and a reference image R contain
the same trinket, we compute a 1-to-1 matching between their keypoint descriptors
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Similarity Table
R1
R2
R3
C

R1
1
0.7
0.7
0.7

R2
0.9
1
0.8
0.5

R3
0.8
0.6
1
0.9

Table 4.4: Similarity table of three reference images R = {R1 , R2 , R3 } and a candidate image C. Red cells correspond to the nearest neighbor. R1 is the template image. AvgRef NN = (0.8+0.7+0.9)/3 = 0.8, AvgRef F N = (0.7+0.6+0.8)/3 = 0.7
and AvgRef T empl = (0.8 + 0.9)/2 = 0.85. Then, minSim(C, R) = 0.5/0.7,
maxSim(C, R) = 0.9/0.8 and T emplSim = 0.7/0.85.
(e.g., shown as lines in Figure 4.5). We use brute-force matching for ORB keypoints,
where each keypoint of the candidate image is matched with the closest keypoint
(in terms of Hamming distance) of the reference image. For SURF keypoints, we
use the FLANN-based matcher [ML09].
An exhaustive matching of each keypoint in the candidate image to a keypoint in
the reference image will produce low quality, outlier matches. We experimented with
several existing filters: applying a threshold on the matched keypoint distances, cross
checking the matched keypoints in both images, and RANSAC [FB81], to identify
and remove outlier matches. The RANSAC based filter performed the best, hence
we use it implicitly in the following.
Image similarities and the template image
Given two images C and R, we define their similarity Sim(C, R) to be the ratio
between the number of keypoint matches of C and R, after the above filter and
outlier detection steps, and the number of keypoints in C. We also define several
concepts as bellow. These concepts are exemplified in Table 4.4.
Given C and the set R, we define the nearest neighbor similarity of C to R as
NNSim(C, R) = max {Sim(C, R)|∀R ∈ R}, and the farthest neighbor similarity,
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Solution

Features

Details

Pixie

Keypoint stats.
Keypoint nearest neighbors
Perspective transformation

Statistics of ORB/SURF keypoints
Keypoint match stats.
RANSAC optimal map of match keypoints

Pixie filters

Keypoints
Edge pixels
Reference quality

Count and spread of keypoints
Count and spread of edge pixels
Reference image similarities stats.

Table 4.5: Summary of (top) Pixie features and (bottom) Pixie filter features.
F NSim(C, R) = min {Sim(C, R)|∀R ∈ R}.
Given a reference set R, we define the average nearest neighbor similarity value
of each reference image, to the other reference images in R: AvgRef NN(R) =
ΣR∈R N N Sim(R,R−R)
|R|

. Similarly, we define the average farthest neighbor similarity value

of each reference image to the other images in R: AvgRef F N(R) =

ΣR∈R F N Sim(R,R−R)
|R|

In addition, given a reference set R, we define its template image, T (R), as
P
the reference image R whose value r∈R−R Sim(r, R) is the maximum among all
reference images in R. Intuitively, T (R) is the reference image “closest to the center”
of the reference set. We define AvgRef T empl(R) as the average similarity of images
in R to T (R).
Pixie matching features
We use the above concepts to extract the following features (see Table 4.5, top section for a summary). We use these features to train a supervised learning algorithm
(e.g. random forest) to decide whether a candidate image matches to a reference
set.
• Keypoint counts. The keypoint count of C and T (R).
• Match based features. The number of keypoints in C and T (R) that match, before
the RANSAC filter. The min, max, mean and SD of the distance, size, response
and angles between the matched keypoints in C and T (R), after RANSAC.
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.

• Quality of the reference set. AvgRef NN(R), AvgRef F N(R) and AvgRef T empl(R).
• Similarity to template. The similarity of C to T (R), normalized by the average
similarity of the images in R to T (R), i.e.,

Sim(C,T empl(R))
.
AvgRef T empl(R)

• Similarity to reference set. We define minSim(C, R) =

min{Sim(C,R)|∀R∈R}
:
AvgRef F N (R)

the

ratio of the similarity between C and “farthest” reference image, and the average
least similarity between reference images. Similarly, we define maxSim(C, R) =
max{Sim(C,R)|∀R∈R}
.
AvgRef N N (R)

• Homography: Output of homography between C and T (R): the perspective transformation between the planes of the two images (3 features).

4.3.4

Pixie Filters

Early pilot studies revealed that Pixie users can capture low quality images. Such
images, either reference or candidate, hinder the ability of the authentication module
to discern candidate images, increasing the FRR of Pixie. Furthermore, they impose
gratuitous network latency in the remote authentication scenario (see § 4.2.1).
Several conditions may prevent taking high quality images Figure 4.2(d)-(f)
shows example outcomes of such conditions, including (i) improper lighting or choice
of a complex background that generates irrelevant keypoints, (ii) unsteady hand and
(iii) choice of trinkets with constant texture. We also observed that some pilot study
participants, during the reference set registration process, took photos containing
different trinkets, or different areas of the same trinket. Such reference images may
not only reduce the accuracy of the authentication process, but may also introduce
vulnerabilities: an attacker may find it easier to capture a candidate image that is
similar to one of 3 different reference images, hence, increase the chance to break
the authentication mechanism.

61

To address these issues, we introduce a set of filters (see Figure 4.4) that reject
problematic images captured by the user. We propose the two rules of filtering, that
set out the operation space for Pixie image filters:
• Filter Rule #1: Pixie may not willfully fail by operating on images on which
it predicts it will fail.
• Filter Rule #2: Pixie may not operate in a space where it has not been
trained.
In the following, we detail these rules and describe the resulting filters.
Filter Rule #1: CBFilter and RBFilter
We introduce CBFilter and RBFilter, filters that identify reference and candidate
images on which they predict Pixie will fail. The filters leverage the following
features, (see Table 4.5 (bottom section) for a summary).
Filter features. First, we define KP-CNT as the keypoint count of an image.
The intuition for using this feature is that an image with a low KP-CNT (e.g.,
Figure 4.2(f) with only 5 keypoints) is likely to negatively impact the accuracy of
Pixie’s matching process. A second feature is based on the center, or centroid of the
keypoints extracted from an image: let DTC-KP (distance to center of keypoints)
denote the average distance between the keypoints of the image and their centroid.
DTC-KP measures the spread of the keypoints across the image. The intuition is
that a high DTC-KP may indicate that some keypoints do not belong to the trinket
but to the background. Third, to detect blurry images, we use the Canny edge
detector [Can86] to identify edge pixels that delimit objects in the image. Let WhiteCNT denote the number of detected edge (“white”) pixels of an image. White-CNT
is an indicator of the clarity of the image: a low White-CNT denotes a blurred
image, with few trinket edges. We also introduce DTC-White (distance to center of
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Figure 4.6:

Example 2D histograms of KP-CNT of template image vs.
AvgCrossSim(R). (a) Correctly classified instances. (b) False reject instances. (c) False
accept instances. The legend in (a)-(c) shows the color code used for the number of authentication instances. (d) Aggregated 2D histogram. The darker regions with 1 in the center
have a greater proportion of misclassified than correctly classified instances. The regions
with -1 in the center correspond to value ranges on which we have no template images.
Conclusion: filter out reference sets with KP-CNT < 20 and AvgCrossSim(R) < 0.6.

white pixels), the average distance of the white pixels to their centroid. DTC-White
denotes the spread of the edge pixels, i.e., the size of the trinket. Finally, to detect
inconsistent reference images, we define MinCrossSim(R), MaxCrossSim(R) and
AvgCrossSim(R), to be the minimum, maximum and average similarity (see § 4.3.3)
among all the pairs of images in R. Small cross similarity values indicate reference
images of non-identical trinkets.
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CBFilter: Classifier Based Filter. Given the reference set R and its template
image T (R) (see § 4.3.3), CBFilter uses a suite of features to train a supervised
learning algorithm and determine if R is suitable to participate in the authentication process. The features include KP-CNT, DTC-KP, White-CNT, DTC-White
of T (R), the average, minimum and maximum of KP-CNT, DTC-KP, White-CNT,
DTC-White over all the images in R, and MinCrossSim(R), MaxCrossSim(R)
and AvgCrossSim(R).
RBFilter: Rule Based Filter. Pilot studies demonstrated the need to give relevant feedback to users as early as possible: early pilot study participants expressed
frustration when they discovered that the photos they took were not suitable at the
end of the registration, or worse, during the authentication process. The output of
CBFilter cannot however be used to provide meaningful feedback.
To address this limitation, we identified common problems that occur during the
image capture process, e.g., improper light, trinket with plain texture or not identical
reference images. We then developed a set of rules for these filter features, that (i)
predict if an image or image set will not perform well during authentication, and (ii)
that can be transposed to one of the problems identified. For instance, we found that
a small KP-CNT is associated with insufficient light, blur, or trinkets with a plain
texture, while a small AvgCrossSim value can indicate reference images containing
non-identical trinkets. Figure 4.1(c) illustrates the feedback provided when the user
captures a low quality trinket (top) or inconsistent reference images (bottom).
To identify such rules, we run Pixie on the Pixie dataset, a dataset of reference
set and candidate image pairs that are captured in different conditions (see § 4.4 for
more details). Specifically, we investigate reference sets and candidate images that
contributed to misclassified instances as follows. For each pair of the above filter
features, we plot the 2D histogram of instances that were correctly classified, and
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Image type

Filter Rule

Interpretation

Reference
Reference
Reference

KP-CNT < 20
DTC-KP < 30
AvgCrossSim < 0.6

Low quality image or plain trinket
Low quality image or plain trinket
Non-identical trinkets in reference set

Candidate

KP-CNT < 20

Low quality image or plain trinket

Candidate
Candidate
Candidate

DTC-KP > 44, 600
Out of bounds image
White-CNT > 22, 400 Out of bounds image
DTC-White > 160
Out of bounds image

Table 4.6: RBFilter and UBounds filter rules for reference and candidate images,
and their real world interpretation. RBFilter (top 2 sections) filters images on which
it predicts Pixie will fail. UBounds (bottom section) filters images outside the space
seen by Pixie during training.
that contributed to false accepts (FA) and false rejects (FR). Figures 4.6(a)-(c) illustrates this process for the KP-CNT of template images T (R) vs. AvgCrossSim(R)
pair of features. Then, we aggregate the results for the three 2D histograms, see Figure 4.6(d), by calculating the contribution of each type of classification result (i.e.,
FA, FR, True Accept (TA) and True Reject (TR)) in a cell of the 2D histogram.
The dark regions have a larger proportion of misclassified than correctly classified
instances. This enables us to identify “problem” regions, where the contribution
of misclassified instances (FA and FR) is larger than that of correctly classified instances (TA and TR). We then define rules, i.e., threshold values, that avoid clusters
of problem regions. For instance, based on the bottom area of Figure 4.6(d), we reject reference sets whose template has KP-CNT < 20. Similarly, we reject reference
sets with AvgCrossSim(R) < 0.6, as we have none with AvgCrossSim(R) < 0.4
(cells with −1), and those in [0.4, 0.6] are frequently misclassified.
Through a similar process, we have identified several other filtering rules for reference sets and candidate images, and their real world interpretation, see Table 4.6
(top 2 sections). RBFilter uses these rules to reject low quality reference and candi-
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date images, and extend Pixie with informative error messages that guide users to
improve the quality of captured images.
Filter Rule #2: UBounds
We train Pixie on a dataset of images that do not cover the entire value space of
the filter features. Pixie cannot make informed decisions on candidate images whose
features take values in sub-areas not seen during training. We have identified several
such sub-areas for the Pixie dataset. The UBounds filter consists of the “universe
boundary” rules listed in Table 4.6 (bottom section), that define these sub-areas.
By rejecting candidate images that satisfy these rules, UBounds presents a conservative performance for Pixie: Pixie would easily reject UBounds rejected candidate images, thus artificially increasing its perceived accuracy. As a result, we do
not use this rules when evaluating performance of Pixie.

4.4

Implementation and Data

We have implemented Pixie using Android 3.2, OpenCV 2.4.10 and Weka [Wek17].
In order to evaluate the performance of the Pixie features and using several supervised learning algorithms, we have collected and generated the following datasets:

4.4.1

Primary Image Datasets

Nexus image dataset. We used a Nexus 4 device to capture 1, 400 photos of 350
unique trinkets, belonging to 33 object categories. We selected only objects that can
be easily carried by users and are thus ideal candidates for image-based trinkets, e.g.,
watches, shoes, jewelery, shirt patterns, credit cards and logos. We have captured 4
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images for each trinket, that differ in background and lighting conditions, i.e., either
indoors using artificial light or outdoors in daylight conditions.
Google Image dataset. We used Google’s image search site to retrieve at least
200 images from each of the 33 object categories of the Nexus image dataset, for a
total of 7, 853 images. This dataset forms the basis of a shoulder surfing attack (see
§ 4.5.2).
ALOI dataset. We use the illumination subset of the Amsterdam Library of Object
Images (ALOI) [GBS05a] dataset, that contains 24 different images for 1000 small
objects (i.e., natural trinket choices) captured under various illumination conditions.
We cropped these images to the size of the Nexus images (270 × 312 pixels), while
keeping their object centered.
Caltech101 dataset. We use Caltech101 [FFFP04] dataset which is a collection
of 9, 145 images of small and large objects, from 101 object categories.

4.4.2

Evaluation Datasets

Pixie dataset. To evaluate Pixie, we generate authentication instances that consist
of one candidate image and 3 reference images. To prevent “tainting”, we need to
ensure that instances used for testing do not contain reference images that have
appeared in a training instance. For this, we use the 1, 400 images of the 350
trinkets, to generate 10 Pixie subsets, each containing 10 folds, as follows. To
generate one of the 10 folds of one of the 10 subsets, we first randomly split the
350 trinkets into 10 sets of 35 trinkets each. For each trinket in a set, we randomly
select one of its 4 images as candidate; the remaining 3 images are reference images.
The trinket then contributes to the fold by one genuine instance (its candidate +
its 3 reference images) and 34 “fraud” instances. Each fraud instance combines
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the trinket’s candidate image with the 3 reference images of one of the other 34
trinkets in the subset. Thus, each fold consists of 35 authentic and 1190 = 35 × 34
fraud instances. Then, one of the 10 Pixie subsets contains 12, 250 authentication
instances. Thus, the Pixie dataset has a total of 122, 500 authentication instances.
Attack datasets. We use the Nexus dataset (§ 4.4) to build 3 authentication attack
datasets based on the ALOI, Google Image and Caltech101 sets.
We generate the authentication attack instances for each attack dataset, and
group them into 10 folds, as follows. We randomly split the 350 unique trinkets
of the Nexus dataset into 10 subsets of 35 trinkets each. For each trinket in a
subset, we randomly select 3 out of its 4 images, to form a reference set. We then
combine this set with each of the images from ALOI, Google Image, and Caltech101
datasets, respectively. We repeat this process for all the 35 reference sets in a
fold. Thus, in the ALOI attack dataset, a fold contains 840K = 35 × 24K attack
instances, for a total of 8.4M ALOI based attack instances. Similarly, the Google
Image attack dataset contains 2.7M+ attack instances, while the Caltech101 attack
dataset contains 3.2M+ instances.

4.5

Evaluation

We evaluate the performance of Pixie’s optimal configuration under the attacks
introduced in § 4.2.3. We report the performance of Pixie through its False Accept
Rate (FAR), False Reject Rate (FRR), Equal Error Rate (EER), and F-measure.
FAR can be defined as a the ratio of number of times an authentication system allows
an unauthorized access divided by the number of identification attempts. FPR can
be defined as the ratio of the number of times an authentication system incorrectly
rejects the access of an authorized user divided by the total number of identification
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Keypoint Detector

FAR(%) FRR(%) F-measure(%) EER(%)

ORB

0.10

9.83

93.08

4.87

SURF

0.07

4.80

96.40

2.80

Table 4.7: ORB vs. SURF based Pixie (MLP classifier, no filter) performance, on
the Pixie dataset. SURF has lower FAR and FRR compared to ORB.
attempts. EER defined the rate at which both acceptance and rejection are equal.
Finally, F-measure is the harmonic mean of precision (i.e. ratio of truly accepted
attempts to all accepted attempts) and recall (i.e., 1 − F NR).
Experimental setup. Throughout this section, we have applied 10-fold crossvalidation tests [Koh95] to assess how the results of the statistical analysis will
generalize to an independent data set. The advantage of this method is that all
observations are used for both training and validation, and each observation is used
for validation exactly once.
For our experiments, we have used a Mac OS X (2.9 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU,
and 8GB DDR3 RAM) and a Nexus 4 smartphone (Quad-core 1.5 GHz Krait, and
2GB RAM; 8MP camera sensor, f/2.4 aperture).
We have used the Weka version 3.7.9 data mining suite [Wek17] to perform the
experiments, with default settings: For the back-propagation algorithm of the Multi
Layer Perceptron (MLP) classifier, we set the learning rate to 0.3 and the momentum
rate to 0.2.

4.5.1

Parameter Choice for Pixie

We first identify the parameters for which Pixie performs best.
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Figure 4.7: Keypoint count distribution extracted from Nexus image set by (a) ORB
and (b) SURF.
ORB vs. SURF for image keypoint extraction
We compare the performance of Pixie when using two popular keypoint extraction
algorithms, ORB [RRKB11] and SURF [BTVG06]. We use a MLP classifier for
the Pixie classifier, and no filter. We perform the evaluation through 10-fold cross
validation on each of the 10 subsets of the Pixie dataset (see § 4.4). Table 4.7 reports
the performance of ORB and SURF: SURF has lower FAR and FRR, leading to an
EER that is smaller by 2% than that of ORB.
Figure 4.7 shows the distribution of the per image number of keypoints extracted
by ORB and SURF from the Nexus dataset (see § 4.4). We extract at most 500
keypoints with ORB, while with the extended descriptors, SURF discovers up to
1, 289 keypoints. We have extracted 385, 361 ORB keypoint descriptors from the
1, 400 Nexus dataset images, each being 256 bits long.
Figure 4.8(a) compares the average time to extract ORB and SURF keypoints
on the Mac and Nexus 4 devices, over 100 Nexus dataset images (that include
images with low, medium and high number of keypoints). On both devices, SURF is
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Figure 4.8: ORB vs. SURF: Pixie speed on Mac and Nexus 4. (a) Average time to
extract keypoints. ORB takes an average 160ms on Nexus 4. (b) Average time to match
keypoint descriptors of two images. Only ORB is viable on the Nexus 4.

significantly slower than ORB. On a Nexus 4, ORB takes 0.15s to extract keypoints,
while SURF takes on average more than 2.5s on the Mac and almost 5s on the Nexus
4.
Figure 4.8(b) compares the speed of the matching step, when using ORB and
SURF descriptors. These values are computed using the comparison of 10, 000
image pairs: 100 × 100, for the aforementioned subset of 100 Nexus images. SURF
is consistently slower than ORB: On Nexus 4, SURF takes an average of 2.72s to
match the descriptors of a pair of images, and may exceed 3s for images with many
keypoints. ORB takes only 0.66s on average to match the descriptors.
Given the trade-off between speed and accuracy, SURF is more suitable when
the image processing and matching tasks can be performed on a server. The faster
ORB should be preferred in the mobile authentication scenario, when these tasks
have to be performed by a mobile device. In the following experiments, we set
Pixie’s keypoint extraction algorithm to be ORB.
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Pixie Classifier

FAR(%) FRR(%) F-measure(%) EER(%)

MLP

0.10

9.83

93.08

4.87

RF

0.02

10.74

93.90

3.82

SVM

0.00

12.57

93.04

10.74

Decision Tree (C4.5)

0.17

11.54

91.01

7.66

Table 4.8: Classifier performance on Pixie dataset using ORB keypoint extractor
and no filter. Random Forest and MLP achieve the lowest EER, thus we only use
them in the following.
Images

Filtering Rule

FAR(%) FRR(%) F-measure(%)

Reference

KP-CNT <20

0.09

6.60

95.06

Reference

DTC-KP <30

0.10

9.12

93.46

Reference

AvgCrossSim <0.6

0.07

8.10

94.53

Reference

All 3 Filters

0.06

4.46

96.75

Candidate

KP-CNT <20

0.27

12.39

89.33

Candidate

White-CNT <2000

0.25

10.55

90.61

Candidate
Ref. & cand.

Both Filters
All RBFilter Rules

0.25
0.04

9.86
5.25

91.04
96.58

Table 4.9: Performance of Pixie MLP classifier with RBFilter on the Pixie dataset.
The disjunction of all the RBFilters on the reference images reduced the FAR and
FRR by more than 40%.
Classifier Choice
We use the Pixie dataset to identify the best performing classifier for Pixie’s authentication module. Table 4.8 shows the results: Random Forest (RF) and MLP
outperform Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Decision Tree (DT) through lower
FAR and FRR. In the following, we use only RF and MLP as Pixie’s classifiers.
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Pixie with filters
In this section, we evaluate the effect of Pixie filters that we have introduced in
§ 4.3.4 separately and in combination.
Pixie with RBFilter. We evaluate the effects of the RBFilter rules of Table 4.6
on the performance of Pixie. For this, in each of the 100 classification experiments
(10 folds cross validation over each of the 10 subsets of the Pixie dataset), we
remove from the Pixie test fold all the authentication instances that satisfy the
rules. Specifically, we have removed the instances whose (i) reference images have
fewer than 20 keypoints, a distance to the centroid of keypoints of less than 30, or
an average cross similarity of under 0.6, and (ii) whose candidate image has fewer
than 20 keypoints. We then run Pixie (with MLP) on this filtered dataset.
Table 4.9 shows that almost all the rules are effective and increases Pixie’s Fmeasure. The disjunction of all the reference set filter rules is the most effective, for
an F-measure of 96.75% (3.8% improvement from the unfiltered 93.08% of Table 4.7).
The 3 reference set filter rules remove an average of 6.68 reference sets from a testing
fold. When also using the candidate image filter, that removes an average of 82.23
authentication instances per testing fold, Pixie’s F-measure drops to 96.58%. This
is because we count the “valid” instances removed by the candidate filter as part of
FRR, even though they are likely of low quality and can mislead Pixie.
Pixie with CBFilter. Figure 4.9 illustrates the process we employed to evaluate
the impact of CBFilter on the performance of Pixie. To provide a large training
set for CBFilter, we first build a Reference Set Bank (RSB), that contains all the
reference sets that appear in the 10 subsets of the Pixie dataset. For each such
reference set, the RSB also stores its “class”, according to the outcome of Pixie
(see step 1 of Figure 4.9). If the reference set has been part of any authentication
instance (in the Pixie dataset) that was incorrectly classified by Pixie (i.e., either as
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Figure 4.9: CBFilter test methodology: create a large training set (RSB) that does
not contain reference images from the fold on which we later run Pixie (F1 ). Run
CBFilter on the reference sets from fold F1 , filter the reference sets that fail, then
run Pixie on the filtered F1 .
FR or FA), its class is 1, otherwise it is 0.
We use the RSB set for the following evaluation process, performed separately for
each subset of the Pixie dataset. Each of the subset’s 10 folds, (step 2 in Figure 4.9)
is used once for testing. Given one such fold, e.g., F1 in Figure 4.9, we extract its
reference sets. We train CBFilter on all the reference sets of RSB, that are different
from the reference sets of fold F1 , then test CBFilter on the reference sets of F1
(step 3 and 4 in Figure 4.9). We filter from F1 all the reference sets that are labeled
as 1 by CBFilter, i.e., predicted to be a likely culprit of a future false rejection or
false acceptance. Finally, we train Pixie on the 9 other folds (F2 , ..., F10 ) and test it
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Pixie

CBFilter

FAR(%) FRR(%) F-measure(%) EER(%)

MLP

MLP

0.07

6.34

95.54

2.97

MLP

RF

0.06

4.70

96.52

1.87

MLP

C4.5

0.02

7.19

95.92

2.35

MLP

SVM

0.10

9.83

93.08

4.87

RF

MLP

0.02

7.64

95.63

2.72

RF

RF

0.01

5.74

96.77

1.96

RF

C4.5

0.02

7.19

95.92

2.35

RF

SVM

0.02

10.74

93.90

3.82

Table 4.10: Pixie + CBFilter performance, for various combinations of supervised
learning algorithms. CBFilter is effective: when using RF, it reduces the EER of
Pixie (with MLP) to 1.87%.
Algo

FAR(%) FRR(%) F-measure(%)

Pixie

0.10

9.83

93.08

Pixie & RBFilter

0.04

5.25

96.58

Pixie & CBFilter

0.06

4.70

96.52

Pixie & RBFilter & CBFilter

0.02

4.25

97.52

Table 4.11: Filters effects on Pixie performance. The combination of RBFilter and
CBFilter (RF) has the best performance.
on the filtered F1 . We repeat this process 100 times (for the 10 folds of each of the
10 subsets of the Pixie dataset).
Table 4.10 compares the performance of various classifiers for both Pixie and
CBFilter. It shows that CBFilter is effective: when using RF classifier, it reduces
the EER of Pixie to 1.87% (from 4.87%), and removes 3.45 reference sets on average
from a testing fold.
Pixie, RBFilter and CBFilter. When used in combination with RBFilter, CBFilter removes an additional 0.9 reference sets on average from a testing fold. RBFilter’s
candidate rule also removes 79.59 instances. Table 4.11 compares the performance
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Attack Dataset

FAR(%)

Google

0.054

ALOI

0.087

Caltech101

0.042

Table 4.12: Performance of Pixie (with RBFilter and CBFilter) on the ALOI, Caltech101 and Google attack datasets: On more than 14M attack authentication samples, the FRR of Pixie is less than 0.09%.
of the combined Pixie, RBFilter and CBFilter against the performance of the unfiltered Pixie, as well as Pixie’s combination with only one of the filters. When used
together, the filters reduce the FAR of the basic Pixie by 80% and its FRR by 56%.
Comparison to other authentication methods. The performance of Pixie
(EER=1.87) compares favorably with the performance of other biometric based
authentication solutions. For instance, Meng et al. [MWFZ15] report EERs of 2-4%
and 2-6% for authentication solutions based on face and fingerprint. Samangouei
et al. [SPC15] report EERs of 13-30% for attribute based face authentication, and
Taigman et al. [TYRW14] report an EER of 8.6% for face recognition using features
extracted by deep neural networks. The gaze-challenge authentication solution of
Sluganovic et al. [SRRM16a] has an EER of 6.3%, while Zhao et al. [ZFSK14] report
EERs between 4.1-9.6% for touch gesture based authentication.

4.5.2

Pixie Under Attack

We use the Google Image based attack dataset (see § 4.4) for a shoulder surfing
attack, and, along with the ALOI and Caltech101 datasets, to evaluate brute force
pictionary attacks.
We investigate the performance of Pixie, trained on one of the 10 Pixie dataset
subsets, under the attacks of § 4.2.3. We use the previously identified parameters:

76

the ORB keypoint extractor, MLP for the Pixie classifier, RF for the CBFilter
classifier, and all the rules for RBFilter. We do not cosider UBounds filter as by
using UBounds filter we obtain a conservative performance of Pixie: with UBounds,
Pixie would easily reject out of bounds images, artificially boosting its accuracy.
Pictionary Attack
Under the Google Image attack dataset, Pixie achieved a FAR of 0.054%, see Table 4.12. 216 of the 350 trinkets were not broken. However, we counted each such
trinket as success at 7, 853 trials (i.e. the total number of attack images). Then,
the average number of Google dataset based “trials until success”, over the 350
trinkets is 5, 766.12. For the ALOI based attack, when using both RBFilter and
CBFilter, Pixie achieved a FAR of 0.087%. Under the Caltech101 attack, Pixie’s
FAR is 0.042%. The higher FAR of the ALOI pictionary attack dataset may be due
to the similarity of its images of small objects to images in the Pixie datase. Pixie
filters about 10 reference sets from each attack dataset. In addition, it filters a small
number of candidate images (82 and 5) from the Google and Caltech101 datasets,
but 1,449 candidate images from the ALOI dataset.
Restricted Shoulder Surfing Attack
We use the Pixie and Google Image datasets to evaluate the “guessing entropy” [DMR04]
of the restricted shoulder surfing attack. The attack proceeds as follows: for each
reference set of a Pixie dataset trinket, we re-order the Google dataset images to
start the brute force attack with images of the same type as the trinket. We then
use each image in the re-ordered Google dataset as candidate, and count the number
of trials before a match (false accept) occurs. Thus, this experiment evaluates the
scenario where the adversary exploits his knowledge of the trinket type.
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Figure 4.10: Example master images for Pixie: each of these images matches multiple reference sets of the Pixie dataset. Master images tend to have a rich combination
of shapes, shadows, colors and letters.
As in the pictionary attack above, we counted each of the 216 unbreakable trinkets as “success” at 7, 853 (the size of the attack dataset) trials. Then, the average
number of “trials until success”, over the 350 Pixie dataset trinkets was 5, 639.53.
This result is similar to the above pictionary attack: in fact, an unpaired t-test
did not find a statistically significant difference in the number of trials to break a
reference set between the two scenarios (p − value = 0.44, for α = 0.05). Thus, in
our experiments, knowledge of the trinket type does not provide the adversary with
a significant guessing advantage.
The Master Image Attack and Defense
We identified 788 master images in the ALOI dataset, 75 in the Caltech Image
dataset, and 127 in the Google dataset. Master images match multiple Pixie reference sets. Upon manual inspection, we observed that master images are not of
the same type of trinket as the reference set that they match. Instead, they contain
an array of shapes, shadows, letters and colors, that translate into a diverse sets of
keypoints, see Figure 4.10 for examples. Less than half of the master images in the
ALOI (224), Caltech101 (34) and Google (30) datasets match at least 5 reference

78

sets. 1 master image in the Caltech101 dataset matches 51 reference sets.
Defense. The shape formed by the matched keypoints in a master image is likely to
be inconsistent with that of the “victim” reference set. We leverage this observation
to introduce several new features: the distance to the centroid of the matched
keypoints (DTC-MKP) in the candidate and template images, and the minimum,
maximum and mean of the DTC-MKP over all pairs of candidate and reference
images. We train the Pixie classifier using this enhanced feature set, and test it on
the ALOI attack dataset. The enhanced Pixie reduces the number of effective ALOI
master images (matching at least 5 reference sets) by 60%, i.e., from 224 to 88.
To evaluate the effect of the new features on the FRR, we run Pixie with both
RBFilters and CBFilters on the 10 Pixie data subsets (see § 4.4) in a 10-fold cross
validation experiment similar to that of § 4.5.1. We observed that when new features
are included in the classification task, the FRR of Pixie decreases slightly from 4.25%
(last row in Table 4.11) to 4.01%, while its FAR remained unchanged (0.02%). We
conclude that the newly added features do not increase Pixie’s FRR.

4.6

User Study

We have used a lab study to evaluate the usability of Pixie’s trinket based authentication and compared it against text-based passwords. In this section, we describe
the methodology and results.

4.6.1

Design and Procedure

We performed a within-subjects study, where all the participants were exposed to
every conditions considered. Specifically, the conditions were to authenticate from a
smartphone to the Florida International University Portal Website (MyFIU), using
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(i) their username and text-based password and (ii) their Pixie trinket. MyFIU is a
site that provides students with information about class schedules and administrative functionality.
We have recruited participants from the university campus over e-mail lists,
bulletin boards and personal communications. All the participants were students
enrolled at the university. The reason for selecting students for the study was to
ensure a consistent and familiar login procedure to MYFIU remote service. The
participants in our study achieved text password authentication times on par with
previously reported results (see § 4.6.2). Considering the ubiquity of mobile devices,
we believe that the participants had no unfair advantage when compared to other
social groups of similar age, with respect to their ability to perform the basic action
of snapping a picture with a smartphone.
In the following, we first present some demographic information about the (n=42)
participants in this study, then describe the procedure we used to perform the user
study.
Demographics. We have recruited 42 participants for our lab study. Table 4.13
shows the demographics of the participants, obtained through the study questionnaires. In addition, 41 (98%) participants said they use their phones to login to
their online accounts.

Figure 4.11: Pre-study level of agreement of the participants with ease of remembering faces, photos and text. 42% of the participants strongly agree to their ease
of remembering photos and faces vs. only 16% who agreed it is easy for them to
remember text.
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Demographic

Number

Proportion (%)

Gender
Female
Male

11
31

26
74

Age
Min
Max
Median

18
50
28

Android
iPhone
Windows phone

20
21
1

48
50
2

Undergraduate
Graduate

16
26

38
62

CS/IT
Other majors

38
4

90
10

Use phone to login to remote services?

41

98

Table 4.13: Participant demographics. We chose only students in order to have a
consistent experience for remote authentication (on the university portal website,
MyFIU).
Prior to the study, we also asked the participants to express their level of agreement using a 5-point Likert scale (from 1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree) with
how easy it is for them to remember text, photos and faces. Figure 4.11 shows the
summary of the participants responses. More than 42% of the participants strongly
agreed that it is easy for them to remember faces and photos. However, only 16%
of the participants strongly agreed it is easy for them to remember text. While
64.29% of the participants said it is not easy for them to remember text, a lower
47.62% and 42.86% of the participants said it is not easy for them to remember
photos and faces respectively. A pairwise non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test revealed no significant difference between the perceived memorability for different items. Based on this analysis and given the picture superiority effect [NRW76],
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4.12: Pixie in-app instructions (best viewed in color), showing how to (a)
setup a trinket, (b) confirm the trinket, (c) enter credentials for the MyFIU account
the first time the app is used, and (d) login using the trinket.
we posit that memorizing trinkets and their secret angles could be perceived to be
as memorable as faces and text. We compare the perceived memorability of trinkets
and text passwords in § 4.6.2.
The study procedure. We have conducted the study in an indoor lab using the
existing artificial lighting. For the authentication device, we have used an HTC One
M7 smartphone (1.7GHz CPU, 2.1 MP camera with f/2.0 aperture, 4.7 inch display
with 1920 × 1080 resolution, and 137.4 × 68.2 × 9.33mm overall size).
The study consisted of 3 sessions, taking place on day 1, day 3 and day 8 of
the experiment. From the total of 42 participants, 31 participants returned for
and completed session 2 (7 female). Due to scheduling constraints, 3 participants
returned for session 2 on day 4 or 5. 21 participants returned for and completed
session 3 (4 female). The lab sessions proceeded as follows.
In the first session, we briefed participants about the purpose of the study: to
explore the usability and the user interface design of a mobile device application.
Then, we asked them to use Pixie to login to their MyFIU account, using their
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credentials (username and password). Pixie associates the text credentials with the
trinket’s reference images. During subsequent login sessions, the users only needed
to correctly capture the image of their trinket in order to access their account.
Our goal was to let the participants experience Pixie for authentication, thus we
did not ask them to enter their text password in subsequent sessions. As a result,
the comparison of Pixie with text passwords is based only on the data collected in
session 1.
Subsequently, the first session consisted of 3 steps. In the discoverability step, we
gave no verbal instructions to participants. Instead, we asked each participant to try
to figure out how to use Pixie, given only the in-app instructions, that show a watch
as a trinket example. Figure 4.12(a-d) shows snapshots of Pixie app instructions for
setting up a trinket, verifying the trinket, setting up the MyFIU account when the
app is used for the first time and login step using trinket.
In the training step, we explained Pixie’s purpose and walked the participant
through the process of setting and testing a trinket using a gum pack. However, we
neither justified why we chose this trinket, nor specified what other objects can be
used as trinkets. We then asked the participants to set a trinket for the rest of the
study.
In the third, repeatability step we asked the participant to repeat the login part of
the process. To avoid input based on muscle memory, we distracted the participant’s
attention between the second and third step by playing a game for 5 minutes.
In session 2 and 3, the participants were asked to login to their MyFIU account
with the trinket they chose in session 1. At the end of each session, the participants
filled out questionnaires that use Likert scales (ranging from 1-strongly disagree to 5strongly agree). The questionnaires evaluate Pixie and compare it against text-based
passwords on perceived security, ease of use, memorability and speed dimensions.
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In addition, at the end of session 3, we have used “emocards” [DOT01] to evaluate
the emotional responses of users toward Pixie and text password authentication.
Emocards are 16 cartoon faces, each representing one of 8 distinct recognizable
facial expression (1 per gender). Emocards assist users to non-verbally express their
emotions about products, in terms of pleasantness (pleasant, neutral, unpleasant)
and arousal (calm, average, excited), two commonly accepted dimensions of emotion
responses [Rus80].
Participant dropout. The participant drop from session 1 to session 3 is not due
to a dislike of Pixie. To conclude this, we have compared the distributions of the
answers of the 21 participants who dropped and of the 21 participants who stayed
until session 3, on their overall impression of Pixie and their willingness to adopt it.
Both questions were rated on a Likert scale. The Mann-Whitney test shows that
the difference between the two populations is not statistically significant (p = 0.7532
for the first question, and p = 0.0701 for the second question at α = 0.05). The
participant drop can be due to the difficulty of scheduling 3 sessions across 8 days,
at the end of the semester.
Ethical considerations. We have worked with our university Institutional Review Board to ensure an ethical interaction with the participants during the user
study. We have asked the participants to avoid choosing sensitive trinkets. The
entire experiments took around 40 minutes per participant. We compensated each
participant with a $5 gift card.

4.6.2

User Study Results

Pixie is a novel authentication solution. Thus, we first present insights from its use
across the 3 sessions, with a focus on discoverability. We then detail Pixie’s observed
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memorability and performance, as well as the participant perception and emotional
responses. All the statistical tests performed in this section used a significance level
of α = 0.05.
User Experience
We now detail the user experience across the 3 sessions.
Session 1: discoverability. Without previous knowledge of Pixie, 86% of the participants (36) were able to correctly set up their trinkets. Therefore, Pixie’s Failure
to Enroll (FTE) rate is 14%. From the 14% (6) participants who failed to enroll,
3 did not notice that the 3 trinket photos had to be of the same object, captured
from similar angles. While Pixie provides a tooltip on the trinket capture button
that guides the user to take another picture of the trinket when the app is used for
the first time (see Figure 4.1(a)), these 3 participants took random pictures from
different objects in the lab. These participants also did not understand the meaning
of several words, as English was their second language:

[P20]: “Include one page saying what the trinket is. Like [sic], you can
say that trinket is an object that you will be using to sign in to your
account”.
[P21]: “I don’t understand what plain texture means”.

In all 3 cases, the Pixie prefilters identified the issue correctly. The other 3
unsuccessful participants chose trinkets with a plain texture (e.g., palm of hand,
pencil, objects with plain black surface) that generated errors. They either dismissed
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error messages quickly or were not sure what to choose as a trinket to eliminate the
errors.
Subsequently, 3 other participants were unable to perform the trinket verification
step within 3 trials. This occurred due to (i) bad lighting conditions around the
trinket, (ii) the participant forgetting the trinket angle, or (iii) a texture-less (plain)
trinket. While the Chi-square test did not identify significant differences in the error
rates caused by any of the aforementioned circumstances (p > 0.05), this could be
because of the limited number of samples.
Session 1: Training. All the participants were able to set up a trinket successfully,
reducing the FTE rate of Pixie from 14% in the discoverability step to 0%. All the
participants then tested their trinkets within 4 trials (M = 1.29 trials, Std = 0.6):
76% of the participants were able to login from the first trial. The other 24% had
lighting related difficulties (e.g., the trinket reflected the light, or was in the shadow).
Only one participant required 4 trials.
Session 1: Repeatability. All the participants except one, were able to successfully complete this step within 3 trails (M = 1.29 trials, Std = 0.6). One participant
required 4 trials.
Sessions 2 and 3. In session 2, 84% of the participants were able to login from the
first trial, 13% logged in within 2-3 trials and only one participant needed 6 trials
(M = 1.35 trials, Std = 1.02). 2 participants did not carry their trinkets and had
to reset them. In session 3, 81% of the participants were able to login from the first
trial and all the other participants were able to login within 2-3 trials (M = 1.20
trials, Std = 0.40).
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Participant Performance
To measure participant performance we use success rate [CFS+ 09], defined as the
number of successful attempts to the total number of attempts. In order to compare
the success rate of participants for text-based passwords and Pixie, we analyzed the
data from either of the login recalls of each session. We only consider successful
Pixie authentication sessions within 3 trials (see § 4.6.2). This is similar to MyFIU,
where the participants need to reset their passwords after 3 unsuccessful trials.
The success rate of Pixie improves from session 1 (82.00%) to session 2 (83.33%)
and session 3 (84.00%). Throughout all the 3 sessions, the Pixie success rate for
successful authentication sessions is slightly lower than the success rate for the textbased password in session 1 (88.10%). This is not surprising, given the significantly
lower number of practice opportunities for Pixie, compared to the ubiquitous text
passwords. However, the Chi-square test revealed no significant difference between
the success rate for Pixie and text password in session 1 (χ2 (1) = 0.506, p = 0.48).
Similarly, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test found no significant difference in terms
of the number of attempts for a successful login for Pixie within different sessions,
and between Pixie and text-based password in session 1.
Memorability
During session 2, 96% of the participants (all except one) were able to remember
their trinkets. 2 participants did not immediately recall the part of the trinket
they used to authenticate, but they figured it out in the 3rd attempt. These 2
participants were able to login in the first attempt in the 3rd session. 2 participants
did not carry their trinkets and had to reset them in session 2. During session 3,
all the participants were able to remember their trinkets. We contrast these results
with the memorability of text passwords: 5 participants did not remember their
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Figure 4.13: Box plot for entry time of Pixie across 3 sessions vs. text password
in session 1. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test revealed that Pixie’s entry time in
each session was significantly less than the entry time for text passwords. For a
single participant, the Pixie entry time was 70.51s during session 1.
MyFIU password and had to reset it in the first session. This is consistent with
previous findings: Wiedenbeck et al. [WWB+ 05b]) report that more than 17% of
text-based passwords are forgotten in one week.
User Entry Time
We have measured the user entry time, the interval from the moment when a user
starts Pixie and when Pixie submits the captured photo to the authentication module. Figure 4.13 shows the box plot of the user entry time for Pixie in different
sessions vs. the time for text passwords, during session 1. The shortest authentication session was 3.01s and the longest session was 70.51s for Pixie. The average entry time improves from session 1 (M=9.71s, Std=11.42s, Mdn=6.24s), to
session 2 (M=9.71s, Std=4.66s, Mdn=8.32s) and session 3 (M=7.99s, Std=2.26s,
Mdn=8.51s). However, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests did not reveal any statistically significant differences between the Pixie user entry time across the 3 sessions.
We expect however that additional practice can further improve Pixie’s entry time.
Moreover, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test revealed that the entry time for Pixie
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was significantly less than the entry time for text passwords in session 1 (W =
845.0, p = 0.000). We emphasize that in contrast to text passwords, Pixie participants did not have the opportunity to practice beyond the steps of the above
procedure.
Table 4.1 compares the entry time for Pixie and other authentication solutions
based on biometrics or text and graphical passwords. Although Pixie’s entry time is
higher compared to solutions based on face or voice, it compares well to several other
solutions. For instance, Shay et al. [SKD+ 14] report an entry time of 11.6-16.2 for
text passwords. MyFIU passwords are similar to the comp8 category in [SKD+ 14]
(at least 8 characters, and include a lowercase English letter, uppercase English
letter, and digit) for which [SKD+ 14] report a median entry time of 13.2s. The
additional safeguards of Boehm et al.’s [BCF+ 13] face and eyes based biometric
solution result in an entry time of 20-40s. Chiasson et al.

[CFS+ 09] report an

entry time of about 15s for Passpoints. Trewin et al. [TSK+ 12] reported an entry
time of 8.1s for gesture (stroke) based biometric. The eye tracking solution of Liu
et al. [LDGW15] requires 9.6s and the audio or haptic based solution of Bianchi et
al. [BOK11] requires 10.8 − 20.1s.
In addition, we evaluated the processing overhead of Pixie: the time required
to decide if a candidate image matches the reference set. The average processing
overhead of Pixie on the HTC One smartphone over 94 successful authentication
trials is 0.5 seconds.
Perception
We asked the participants to express their perception about Pixie and text passwords
by providing answers to a set of questions in a 5-point Likert scale (from strongly
agree to strongly disagree). In the following we presents the participants response.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.14: (a) Results at the end of session 1. (a - top) Perceived performance
of Pixie compared to text passwords. Pixie dominates on ease of use, memorability
and speed dimensions. (b - bottom) Pixie ease of use: 95% of participants agreed
that Pixie is easy to use. (b - top) Pixie perceived memorability. 86% of participants
agree that the trinkets are easy to remember after session 1, but reach consensus
after session 3. (b - bottom) Perceived memorability of Pixie vs. text passwords
(TP). No participant believes text passwords are more memorable after session 3.
In session 1, 81% of the participants agree that overall, Pixie is easier to use
than text-based passwords (Figure 4.14(a) (top)). 83% and 86% of the participants
agree or strongly agree that trinket setup and login steps are easy (Figure 4.14(a)
(bottom)). 95% of participants agree or strongly agree that overall, Pixie is easy to
use.
Furthermore, 86% of the participants agree or strongly agree that trinkets are
easy to remember, see Figure 4.14(b) (top). 67% of the participants agree that
trinkets are easier to remember than passwords, while only 5% of the participants
believe the opposite, see Figure 4.14(a) (top) and Figure 4.14(b) (bottom). These
results improve in sessions 2 and 3. At the end of session 3, all the participants
agree that trinkets are easy to remember (Figure 4.14(b) (top)): 12 participants
changed their opinion in favor of Pixie’s memorability. No participants believe that
text passwords are easier to remember than trinkets, see Figure 4.14(b) (bottom).
A two-sample proportion test revealed that the proportion of the participants who
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think Pixie is memorable, significantly increases from session 1 to session 2 and 3

(Z = 2.36, p = 0.009 and Z = 2.05, p = 0.020).
36% of the participants believe that Pixie is more secure than text passwords,
and 31% of the participants believe that passwords are more secure (Figure 4.14(a)
(left)). Several participants felt strongly about the security of Pixie, e.g.,:

[P27] “This method is even more secure than text-based passwords, because even if someone sees me during the password entry, he wouldn’t
know what part of the object I have selected as my trinket and cannot
easily figure it out”.

68% of participants agree or strongly agree that the trinket based login is fast.
74% of participants agree or strongly agree that the trinket setup step is fast. 95%
and 59% of the participants agree that Pixie’s login and trinket setup steps are
faster compared to the corresponding text password operations. (Figure 4.14(a)
(top)). 50% of the participants say that they prefer trinkets over text passwords
(Figure 4.14(a) (top, bottom bar)).
When asked if they would use trinket based authentication in real life 26% of
participants said that they would use Pixie for most of their accounts, 36% would
use it for at least some of their accounts, and 36% would consider using it. Only
2% of the participants (1) said that they would not use it. Several participants felt
strongly about adopting Pixie:

[P18]: “Why isn’t [Pixie] integrated with the original MyFIU mobile application as another option for signing to my account?”.
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[P40]: “I always forget my passwords [...] I always store them in my
browser. I would definitely use Pixie if it is available”.
[P27]: “I think this is a good method because I usually forget my passwords for my accounts”.

While we did not include survey questions on trinket availability, one participant
asked:
[P8]: “What if I do not wear the same watch everyday?”.

Other participants suggested to use multiple trinkets to ensure trinket availability:
[P21]: “That would be good if we could set multiple trinkets and use any
of them to authenticate”.

Statistical analysis. To differentiate true choice from random chance, we combine the strongly agree and agree answers into an “agreement” answer, and the
strongly disagree and disagree answers into a “disagreement” answer. We then use
a one-sample binomial test with a confidence interval in order to test whether the
proportion of agreement of the participants with a statement is sufficiently different
from a random choice (50%). Table 4.14 presents this result for the proportion of
“agreement” answers to each question. Pixie is perceived easier, more memorable
and faster than text passwords for login and the perceived advantage is not due to
random choice. However, the participants did not perceive a significant difference
in the setup speed and the security of Pixie over text passwords.
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Question

Sample proportion

Easier to use
More memorable
Faster Login
Faster Setup
More secure

80.95
66.67
95.24
58.54
35.71

95% CI
(65.88,
(50.45,
(83.83,
(40.96,
(21.55,

91.39)
80.43)
99.41)
72.27)
51.97)

p
0.000*
0.044*
0.000*
0.441
0.088

* Statistically significant result at α = 0.05.

Table 4.14: Confidence interval for the proportion of “agreement” answers to usability and security questions comparing Pixie and text-based authentication. Pixie
is perceived to be easier to use, more memorable and faster than text passwords.
Pixie’s perceived advantage in ease of use, memorability, and login speed is not due
to random choice.
Analysis of User Feedback
Table 4.15 shows that the general preference of Pixie over text passwords significantly correlates positively with its preference on ease of use, memorability and
security and speed dimensions. The preference over text passwords is also significantly correlated with overall perception of trinket memorability and willingness
to adopt Pixie. Interestingly, we observed a significant correlation between preference over text passwords on security and the participant feeling of owning a unique
trinket (τ = 0.36, p = 0.005).
The participant willingness to use Pixie also correlates positively with perceived
memorability (τb = 0.29), perceived ease of use (τb = 0.28), general preference
over text passwords (τb = 0.32), preference over text passwords on security (τb =
0.28), and preference on ease of use (τb = 0.04). We observe a negative correlation
between the willingness to use Pixie and the number of login attempts (τb = −0.16),
highlighting the impact of unsuccessful logins. However, the correlations are not
statistically significant.
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Prefer Pixie over text passwords

τb

p

Easier to use
More memorable
More secure
Faster Setup
Faster Login

0.60
0.54
0.38
0.46
0.48

0.000*
0.000*
0.003*
0.000*
0.000*

Pixie Memorability
Willingness to Use Pixie

0.40 0.003*
0.60 0.000*

* Indicates a statistically significant correlation at α = 0.05.
Table 4.15: Kendall’s Tau-b test shows significant positive correlation between preference of Pixie vs. text passwords, and its preference in terms of ease of use, memorability, security, faster setup and login time. Preference over text passwords is also
significantly correlated with the overall memorability of the trinket and willingness
to adopt Pixie.
Emotional Response
The emocard experiment revealed that Pixie generates only positive emotions: 81%
of the participants reported a “pleasant”, and 19% reported a “neutral” experience.
In addition, 47% of the participants were “calm”, 34% were “average” and 19%
were “excited”. In contrast to Pixie, only 5% of the participants (1) reported a
“pleasant” level for text passwords, while 57% reported “unpleasant” and 38% reported “neutral” levels. A one-sided test of the difference of proportions revealed
that the proportion of the participants who perceived Pixie as pleasant was significantly larger than the proportion of the participants who perceived text passwords
as pleasant (Z = 4.01, p = 0.000).
The Kendall’s Tau-b correlations plotted in Figure 4.15 shows that the participant reports of willingness to use Pixie correlate positively with levels of pleasure
and excitement, as well as Pixie’s perceived ease of use. While 4 participants reported excitement for Pixie’s novelty, functionality and performance, we observe
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Figure 4.15: Kendall’s Tau-b correlations between willingness to use, emotional responses (pleasure and excitement), and ease of use (SA/SD = Strongly
Agree/Disagree), during session 3. No participant rated Pixie as unpleasant. Willingness to use correlates positively with pleasant and average levels, as well as with
agreement with ease of use.
no correlation between “excited” levels and willingness to use. This is a positive
finding, as authentication solutions should not generate high arousal levels.
Trinket Choice
We manually analyzed the trinket images captured by the participants in the first
session (42 trinkets) and those captured by the participants who reset their trinket
in session 2 (2 trinkets). We allowed the participants to pick any nearby object as
a trinket. The 42 participants picked a total of 36 unique trinkets, from 31 unique
objects of 18 types, chosen from among participant owned objects and lab objects.
The gum pack and watch were the most frequently chosen object types. However,
all the 6 watch trinkets were different, and the 16 participants who chose a gum
pack have captured 8 unique trinket images (object + angle combination).
In the discoverability step, 8 participants used their watches as trinkets. We did
not observe a significant difference in user choice of trinket between the discoverabil-
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Object type
Gum pack
Watch
Mug
Logo
Keychain
Car remote control key
Sunglasses
A piece of puzzle
Shoe
Kohl container
Backpack pin
Hair clip
Cigarette box
Match box
Water Bottle
iphone menu
University ID card
Tattoo
Total

# of unique objects # of participants

# of unique trinkets

3
6
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

16
6
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

8
6
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

31

44

36

Table 4.16: Trinket choice: object types chosen by participants, along with the
number of unique objects belonging to each category and number of unique trinket choice (object + angle) in the study. The gum pack and watch (used in the
training step and on-screen instructions) are the types most frequently used by the
participants. All the captured watch trinkets are unique.
ity and training steps: 18 participants used the same trinket in the discoverability
and training steps. 8 participant chose their trinket to be their watches. The other
trinket categories chose by participants that are not among those in Table 4.16
include: pen/pencil, book and computer mouse.
We have used the images captured by the participants to “brute force” the
reference sets of each participant. We removed 8 reference sets as they were identical
(the top view of the same gum pack). This has produced a single “success” event,
for the two participants who chose the same side of the same gum pack, with very
similar angles. As we described previously, the participant preference of Pixie over
text passwords on security correlates significantly with the participant feeling of
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owning a unique trinket. We did not observe a statistically significant difference
between the feeling of owning a unique trinket and participants gender.

4.7

Discussion and Limitations

Authentication speed. Our user study shows that Pixie’s authentication speed
in session 1 is 25% faster than well rehearsed text passwords and improves through
even mild repetition. However, Pixie’s entry time is longer than the reported entry
time for face based authentication solutions (see Table 4.1). This may be due to
either the novelty of Pixie or the way the images are captured, i.e. using the back,
not the front camera for capturing trinket images.
Secure image storage and processing. The storage and processing of the trinket images needs to be performed securely. While outside the focus of this chapter,
we briefly discuss and compare trinket image storage and processing solutions that
are performed on the remote service vs. the user’s authentication device. A remote server based solution trivially protects against an adversary that captures the
authentication device, as the device does not store or process sensitive user information. The image matching process is also faster on a server than on a mobile
device (see § 4.5.1). The drawbacks are the overhead of transmitting candidate images over the cellular network, and the imposition on users to register a different
reference image set for each remote service.
The authentication device based solution can easily associate the reference images with the user’s authentication credentials (e.g. OAuth [DH12]) for multiple remote services. However, since an attacker can capture and thus access the
storage of the mobile device, reference images cannot be stored or processed in
cleartext. The storage and processing of reference images can however be secured
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through hardware-level protection, e.g., TrustZone [Tru17], or by using privacy
preserving image feature extraction solutions that work in the encrypted domain,
e.g., [WHWR16, QYR+ 14, HLP12]. In Chapter 5, we introduce ai.lock, an imagebased authentication solution similar to Pixie, that alleviate the problem of secure
storage of credentials.
Deployability. Pixie is well suited for OAuth [DH12] authorization to access remote services from the mobile device: Pixie authenticates the user to the app on the
mobile device, which can then proceed with the OAuth protocol with the remote
server.
Default authentication. If the trinket based authentication fails a number of
times (due to e.g., forgotten trinket, poor lighting conditions, unsteady hand), the
user is prompted to use the default authentication solution, e.g., text password.
Strong passwords. Popular and ubiquitously available trinkets (e.g., iWatch, Coke
can) should not be chosen as trinkets, as an adversary can easily predict and replicate
them. To address this problem, Pixie can store a dataset of popular trinket images,
then, during the trinket setup process, reject reference sets that match popular
trinkets.
Defense against brute force attacks. The brute force attacks of § 4.2.3 can be
made harder to launch through video “liveness” verifications, e.g., [MR16]: capture
both video and accelerometer streams while the user shoots the trinket, then use
video liveness checks to verify the consistency between the movements extracted
from the two streams. The lack of such streams or their inconsistency can indicate
a brute force attack.
The user study. The study presented in this chapter was the first attempt to
quantify the usability aspects of an authentication solution based on trinkets. We
performed the user study in a lab setting. We were able to recruit only 42 partic-
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ipants, of which half did not stay until the last session. As we wanted to ensure
a consistent and familiar login procedure to remote services for the participants,
we only recruited students from the university who had access to myFIU, FIU’s
login portal. While the population of the study is not fully representative of the
users who would use the system, we believe that the participants had no unfair
advantage when compared to other social groups of similar age in performance: the
participants in our study achieved text password authentication times on par with
previously reported results (see § 4.6.2).
Pixie works by extracting invariant keypoints from the captured images, using
keypoint extraction algorithms (e.g. SURF [BTVG06] and ORB [RRKB11]). These
algorithms are not capable of extracting keypoints from images of object with constant shade. We attempted to address this issue by providing actionable feedback
to users, and guiding them toward choosing visually complex trinkets. In addition,
to ensure Pixie is able to identify the trinket images even when captured in slightly
different circumstances and to lower the false reject rate, we required the users to
enter 3 trinket images in the registration phase. This may partially explain why
the participants in our study did not perceive Pixie as significantly faster than text
passwords for the registration phase.
During the discoverability step, we observed that several participants had difficulties in understanding the in-app instructions on how to use Pixie. Similar
problems have been reported for other authentication mechanisms. For instance,
Bhagavatula et al. [BUI+ 15] reported that 7 out of 10 participants found understanding on-screen instructions difficult for iPhone fingerprint authentication. They
recommend to provide clearer instructions (e.g. through a demo video) on what the
users need to do. We posit that explaining the meaning of trinkets will help users
during the registration phase and improve the discoverability rate of Pixie.
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The consent form that we read and the participants signed prior to the study,
emphasizes that the focus of the study is on the usability aspects of a new application. We observed that some of the participants might have selected trinkets without
concerns over security during the study. We did not guide the participants towards
choosing specific trinkets, as we intended to observe the personal or lab objects chosen by the participants. Nevertheless, we observed that the participants preference
of Pixie over text passwords on security correlates significantly with the participants feeling of owning a unique trinket. This suggests that the participants could
corroborate the relationship between unique trinkets and higher level of security.
The trinkets used to walk the participants through Pixie (i.e., gum pack) and the
in-app user guide of Pixie (i.e., watch), appear to influence the participant trinket
selection in the first session: in the discoverability step, 8 participant chose their
watches as trinkets. In addition, during session 1, 9 participants chose the same
gum pack as used in the Pixie walk-through without even trying a different angle,
and 5 participants used their watches as trinkets. Further studies are required to
understand whether other means of communicating the goals of Pixie (e.g. using a
short video that guides the user on how to choose secure and unique trinkets) can
reduce this bias.
Further, although 50% of the participants said they prefer Pixie over text passwords, 40% percent of the participants were undecided. This may be due to the
limited experience of the participants with Pixie. In addition, 62% participants said
they would use Pixie in real life. We did not observe a statistically significant correlation between being excited about using Pixie, that could be due to the novelty
of the method, and willingness to use it. However, future studies are required to
understand in what scenarios and situations the users are willing to adopt trinket
based authentication or prefer it over text passwords.
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If we were to redo the study, we would split the Likert scale questions comparing
Pixie with text passwords into 2 questions asking the participants to rate any of
them in terms of usability and security. In addition, we would ask the participants
to justify their answers about perceived usability and security in the form of open
ended questions in the post study interview.
Real world limitations. A comprehensive study similar to the studies conducted
for biometric based solutions (e.g. [BUI+ 15]) may help identify potential limitations
of Pixie in different situations. We discuss now two such situations.
• Insufficient light. In our studies, we observed that Pixie has problems with
insufficient lighting. This is likely a problem shared also by face based authentication solutions. We took steps to partially address this problem, by designing image filters to identify the problematic images and provide users with
actionable feedback. Note that low light photography is one of the major differentiators among mobile phone manufacturers. Newer devices are equipped
with wider apertures which capture more light and optical stabilization which
allow for longer exposures and thereby taking better low light photos. As
mobile device cameras get more capable in capturing better low light photos
over time, we expect it to be less of a problem for camera based authentication
methods as well. Further, while we did not test this in our studies, we conjecture that using the camera’s flash light to illuminate the trinket could also
help address this problem. We leave it for future work to investigate better
solutions, e.g., that leverage the ability of mobile device cameras to capture
infrared light, to handle the case of reflective trinkets.
• Unstable capture conditions. Pixie may be harder to use in certain circumstances, e.g., while the user is walking or in public transportation, as movements might affect the quality of snapped photos. The ease of using Pixie in
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such scenarios is likely to depend on the trinket object type, as for snapping a
trinket image, the user needs one or both hands. Pixie has specialized filters
to identify blurry images. However, a thorough evaluation of the filters in such
scenarios will help identify the filter parameters that maximize usability.
Changing and forgetting trinkets. In contrast to biometric based authentication solutions, Pixie allows the participants to change their trinkets regularly as
they change the clothes, accessories and objects that they carry. Despite the obvious security benefits of this property, people may forget to carry their trinkets,
impacting Pixie’s usability. The simplest solution to this problem is to fall back on
default authentication using a standard approach (e.g., text password) then set a
new Pixie trinket. Another solution is to allow Pixie users to have multiple trinkets,
the additional trinkets could be chosen among frequently worn outfits or locations
visited, alternatively there could be a single backup trinket which is known to be
reliably accessible although may not be readily available such as an object kept at
home or at work. This however impacts the security of Pixie, as it becomes easier
to guess or brute force one of the trinkets.
Another approach is to use Pixie in conjunction with the security token concept,
where the token is a printed visual token that displays a pattern (e.g., random art
[PS99]). The user still needs to capture this token using Pixie, and should carry the
token at all times, just like for a credit card or mobile device. Using a simple visual
token is an alternative to using a QR code as trinket, e.g. [CHM15, KHX15]). In
addition, Pixie does not require the additional hardware (e.g., magnetic strips and
Near-field communication) used in automated access control solutions, and is thus
applicable to a wider ranger of mobile and wearable devices.
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We note that a survey about the gamut of objects that people carry with them
as well as the variability of possession habits would enable further analysis regarding
the impact of trinket changes and failure to recall.
Shoulder surfing attack. Choosing and using trinkets in public exposes users
to shoulder surfing attacks. In this respect, Pixie is similar to ATM authentication: the user needs to be cognizant of the risks and make sure that there are no
people around watching, before setting or using her trinket. We note that while personal privacy during authentication may protect Pixie users from shoulder surfing
attacks, this does not hold for biometric authentication alternatives based on face
and fingerprints. This is because face and fingerprints are almost public information, accessible to attackers in vulnerable social networks and government datasets.
Further, we note that unlike the ATM and biometric authentication scenarios, Pixie
allows the user to change her trinket once she is in a more private setting.
We have shown that Pixie is resilient to a shoulder surfing attack flavor, where
the adversary learns or guesses the trinket object type and attempts to collect and
use images of similar objects to brute force Pixie (see 4.5.2). We note that additional
information about the trinket object or the objects owned by the user can increase
the adversary chance to launch a successful attack.
In a shoulder surfing attack, the adversary still needs to capture the trinket,
or obtain a copy of it to launch a successful attack. Since Pixie authentication
requires a simple interaction with the user, it is also possible to combine Pixie with
a token (cryptographic key) stored on the mobile device. This approach is similar
to the concept of “protocredential” introduced by Corella and Lewison [CL15]. The
combined Pixie and mobile device token authentication would require the user to
possess both the particular mobile device that stores the token and the trinket.
As an alternative, Pixie can be used in conjunction with biometric authentication
solutions, e.g., [DLHB+12]: in touchscreen devices, one could use a touch gesture to
mark the trinket, as an additional authentication factor.
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Field study. We leave for future work a field study of Pixie to investigate the
longer term effects of using trinket passwords on user entry times, accuracy and
memorability, the factors that impact trinket choice, how users choose and change
their trinkets in real life, as well as the potential improvements provided by alternative means of communication of Pixie’s goals and functionality (e.g., through short
video instead of text). We also leave for future work the investigation of using mental stories to associate trinkets to accounts (e.g., use credit card as trinket for bank
account) and reducing the impact of interference [CFS+ 09, AAW15].

4.8

Conclusions

We introduced Pixie, a proof of concept implementation of a trinket based twofactor authentication approach that uses invariant keypoints extracted from images
to perform the matching between the candidate and reference images. Pixie only
requires a camera, thus applies even to simple, traditional mobile devices as well as
resource limited wearable devices such as smartwatch and smartglasses.
We manually captured and collected from public datasets, 40,000 trinket images.
We proposed several attacks against Pixie and have shown that Pixie achieved an
EER of 1.87% and FAR of 0.02% on 122, 500 authentication attempts and an FAR of
less than 0.09% on 14.3 million attack instances generated from the 40,000 images.
We performed an in lab user study to evaluate the usability aspects of Pixie as
a novel authentication solution. Our experiments show that Pixie is discoverable:
without external help and prior training, 86% and 78% of the participants were
able to correctly set a trinket then authenticate with it, respectively. 62% of the
participants expressed that they would use Pixie in real life. Pixie simplifies the authentication process: the study shows that trinkets are not only perceived as more
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memorable than text passwords, but are also easily remembered 3 and 8 days after
being set, without any inter-session use. In addition, Pixie’s authentication speed
in session 1 is 25% faster than well rehearsed text passwords and improves through
even mild repetition. We believe that Pixie can complement existing authentication solutions by providing a fast alternative that does not expose sensitive user
information.
The identified master images and the reference sets they match can be used (see
§ 4.5.2) to develop a new filter (e.g., based on supervised learning algorithms), that
detects vulnerable reference sets, likely to be matched by master images. We leave
this investigation for future work.
In addition, a promising approach to improve Pixie is to use more advanced
image processing techniques, e.g. deep neural networks [SVI+ 16b], for image feature
extraction and processing. Such techniques may improve Pixie’s usability by (i)
eliminating the requirement for capturing multiple reference images of the trinket in
the registration phase, (ii) increasing the ability to extract features even from images
of objects with constant shade, and (iii) further reducing FRRs. In Chapter 5, we
investigate this direction.
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CHAPTER 5
AI.LOCK: IMAGE-BASED AUTHENTICATION WITH SECURE
STORAGE OF CREDENTIALS

5.1

Introduction

Biometrics are widely used for authentication in consumer devices and business settings as they provide sufficiently strong security, instant verification and convenience
for users. However, biometrics are hard to keep secret, stolen biometrics pose lifelong security risks to users as they cannot be reset and re-issued, and transactions
authenticated by biometrics across different systems are linkable and traceable back
to the individual identity. In addition, their cost-benefit analysis does not include
personal implications to users, who are least prepared for the imminent negative
outcomes, and are not often given equally convenient alternative authentication
options.
In Chapter 4, we introduced Pixie, a secret image based authentication approach,
where users authenticate to a remote service using arbitrary images they capture
with the device camera. Pixie authentication solution can address several of the
problems associated with biometric-based authentication method. For instance,
using Pixie the authentication is no more tied to a visual of the user’s body (e.g.,
face and fingerprint), but that of a personal accessory, object, or scene, i.e., the
trinket.
However, Pixie has an important drawback when deployed on mobile devices (i.e.
local authentication scenario of § 4.2.1): the image keypoints (features), extracted
by Pixie, need to be stored and matched in cleartext on vulnerable devices.
Challenges. Local Image based authentication approach raises new challenges.
First, an adversary who captures or compromises the device that stores the user’s
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reference credentials (e.g. mobile device, remote server) and has access to its storage,
should not be able to learn information about the reference credentials or their
features.
Second, while biometric features such as ridge flow of fingerprints or eye socket
contours of faces, can be captured with engineered features and are invariant for a
given user, images of objects and general scenes lack a well defined set of features that
can be accurately used for authentication purposes. Improper features will generate
(i) high False Accept Rates (FAR), e.g., due to non-similar images with similar
feature values, and (ii) high False Reject Rates (FRR) that occur due to angle,
distance and illumination changes between the capture circumstances of reference
and candidate images.
In this chapter, we first introduce ai.lock, a practical, secure and efficient image
based authentication system that converts general mobile device captured images
into biometric-like structures, to be used in conjunction with secure sketch constructs [DRS04] and provide secure authentication and storage of credentials (see
§ 5.4). To extract invariant features for image based authentication, ai.lock leverages (1) the ability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to learn representations of the
input space (i.e., embedding vectors of images) that reflect the salient underlying
explanatory factors of the data, (2) Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [F.R01]
to identify more distinguishing components of the embedding vectors and (3) Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) [Cha02] to map the resulting components to binary
space, while preserving similarity properties in the input space. We call the resulting
binary values imageprints.
In a second contribution, we propose the LSH-inspired notion of locality sensitive image mapping functions (δ-LSIM), that convert images to binary strings that
preserve the “similarity” relationships of the input space, for a desired similarity
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FAR
(%)

EER
(%)

Estimated Entropy
(bits)

Dataset
size

ai.lock (MLMS)
ai.lock (MLSS)

0.0004
0.0015

0.17

18.02
16.02

2 ×109
6 ×106

iPhone TouchID [App17a]

0.0020

-

15.61

-

0.1
0.06

8.6
0.2
6.2

9.97
10.70

> 0.5 ×109
> 2 ×106
1, 602

RSA SecurID [RSA17]

-

-

19.93

-

Text-based password [Bon12]

-

-

10-20

7 ×107

Solution

Deepface [TYRW14] (face)
SoundProof [KMSv15] (sound)
[SRRM16b] (eye movement)

Table 5.1: ai.lock variants vs. commercial and academic biometric, token-based
authentication solutions, and text passwords. ai.lock MLSS variant has no false
rejects, as it is evaluated under attack samples only. Under large scale datasets
of powerful attacks, ai.lock achieves better entropy than state-of-the-art biometric
solutions.
definition (see § 5.3). A δ-LSIM function can be used to efficiently match images
based on their extracted binary imageprints.
Unlike Pixie, ai.lock builds on a secure sketch variant [DRS04] to securely store
reference imageprints and match them to candidate imageprints. ai.lock only stores
a “hash” of the object’s image (i.e., the imageprints). Furthermore, we show that on
larger and more complex attack datasets, the use of DNNs enables ai.lock to achieve
FAR that are at least 2 orders of magnitude smaller than those of Pixie (≤ 0.0015%
vs. 0.02 − 0.08%), for similar FRRs (4%).
Implementation and evaluation. We implemented ai.lock using Tensorflow [ABC+ 16]
and Bose, Chaudhuri, and Hocquenghem (BCH) codes [Hoc59a, BRC60]. We then
develop brute force image based attacks that aim to defeat ai.lock.
Particularly, to evaluate ai.lock performance under attacks, first we perform real
image attacks using manually collected and publicly available image datasets. To
evaluate ai.lock on large scale attack images, we develop synthetic image attacks that
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use images produced by generative models [RMC15]. To evaluate the resilience of
stored credentials, we introduce synthetic credential attacks, that use authentication
credentials generated with the same distribution of the credentials extracted from
manually collected images (see § 5.2.3).
We have captured, collected and generated datasets of 250,332 images, and generated 1 million synthetic credentials (see § 5.5.1). We have used these datasets to
generate attack datasets containing more than 3.5 billion (3,567,458,830) authentication instances (see § 5.5.2). We have released the code and data on ai.lock’s
github [CaS17a].
ai.lock uses an imaging sensor to reliably extract authentication credentials similar to biometrics. Despite lacking the regularities of biometric image features, we
show that ai.lock consistently extracts features across authentication attempts from
general user captured images, to reconstruct credentials that can match and exceed
the security of biometrics (EER = 0.71%). The estimated entropy [Sha01] of ai.lock
on 2 billion image pairs is 18.02 bits, comparing favorably with state-of-the-art biometric solutions (see Table 5.1).

5.2
5.2.1

Model and Applications
System Model

We consider a user that has a camera equipped device, e.g., smartphone or tablet,
a resource constrained device such as a smart watch/glasses, or a complex cyberphysical system such as a car. The user needs to authenticate to the device or an
application back-end, or authenticate through the device to a remote service. For
this, we assume that the user can select and easily access a physical object or scene.
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Figure 5.1: ai.lock model and scenario. The user captures the image of an object
or scene with the device camera. ai.lock converts the image to a binary imageprint,
and uses it as a biometric, in conjunction with a secure sketch solution, to securely
store authentication information on the device or on a remote server. The user can
authenticate only if she is able to capture another image of the same object or scene.
To set her password, the user captures the image of an object/scene with the device
camera, see Figure 5.1 for an illustration. ai.lock extracts a set of features from the
user’s captured reference image, then stores this information (imageprint) securely
either on the device or on a remote server. We note that, in the former case, the
device can associate the reference image with the user’s authentication credentials
(e.g. OAuth [DH12]) for multiple remote services. To authenticate, the user needs to
capture another image. The user is able to authenticate only if the candidate image
is of the same object or scene as the reference image. Similar to e.g., text passwords,
the user can choose to reuse objects across multiple services, or use a unique object
per service. Using a unique object per service will affect memorability. However,
due to the image superiority effect [NRW76], objects may be easier to remember
than text passwords.
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5.2.2

Application

In the following, we describe a few applications of ai.lock system.
Alternative to biometric authentication. Instead of authenticating with her
sensitive and non-replaceable biometrics (e.g. face and fingerprint), the user uses
a unique nearby scene or object that she carries, e.g., a trinket, Rubik’s cube with
a unique pattern, printed Random art [PS99], etc. ai.lock moves the source of
information from the user to an externality, as it does not require a visual of the
user’s body, but that of a personal accessory, object, or scene that the user can
recreate at authentication time. ai.lock improves on biometrics by freeing users
from personal harm, providing plausible deniability, allowing multiple keys, and
making revocation and change of secret simple.
Location based authentication. The user chooses as password an image of a
unique scene at a frequented location (office, home, coffee shop), e.g., section of
book shelf, painting, desk clutter. This approach can be generalized to enable
location based access control, e.g., to provide restricted access to files and networks
in less secure locations.
Cyber-physical system authentication. Similar to Pixie, our model supports
authentication to cyber-physical systems, including car and door locks, thermostat
and alarm systems, where key and PIN entry hardware [Sch17, Sec17] is replaced
with a camera. To authenticate, the user needs to present her unique but replaceable
authentication object to the camera.

5.2.3

Adversary Model

We assume an active adversary who can physically capture or compromise the device
that stores the user credentials. Such an adversary can not only access the stored
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credentials, but also any keying material stored on the device, then use it to recover
encrypted data and to authenticate through the proper channels. However, we
assume that the adversary does not have control over the authentication device while
the user authenticates (e.g., by installing malware). We also assume an adversary
with incomplete surveillance [FA12], i.e., who can physically observe the victim
during authentication but cannot capture the details of the secret object.
Furthermore, we assume that the adversary has “blackbox access” to the authentication solution, thus can efficiently feed it images of his choice and capture the
corresponding imageprint. The adversary can use this output to learn information
from the stored credentials. More specifically, we consider the following attacks:
• Real image attack. The adversary collects large datasets of images, e.g.,
manually using a mobile camera, and online. Then, in a brute force approach,
he matches each image as an authentication instance against the stored reference
credentials until success.
• Synthetic image attack. The adversary uses the previously collected images
to train a generative model, e.g. [GPAM+ 14], that captures essential traits of the
images, then uses the trained model to generate a large dataset of synthetic images.
Finally, the adversary matches each such image against the reference credentials.
• Synthetic credential attack. Instead of images, the adversary queries the
authentication system with binary imageprints. For this, the adversary extracts the
imageprints generated by the authentication solution on real images of his choice.
He then generates a large dataset of synthetic credentials that follow the same distribution as the extracted credentials. Finally, he matches each synthetic credential
exhaustively against the reference credentials.
• Object/scene guessing attack. While we do not consider shoulder surfing
attacks which also apply to face based authentication [XPFM16, KFB08b], we as-
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sume an adversary that is able to guess the victim’s secret object/scene type. The
adversary then collects a dataset of images containing the same object or scene type,
then uses them to brute force ai.lock (see § 5.6.3).
Finally, we assume the use of standard secure communication channels for the
remote authentication scenario where the user credentials are stored on a server.

5.3

Problem Definition

Let I denote the space of images that can be captured by a user with a camera. Let
sim : I × I → {0, 1} be a function that returns true when its input images have
been taken with the same camera and are of the same object or scene, and false
otherwise.
Informally, the image based authentication problem seeks to identify a store function S : I → {0, 1}k , and an authentication function Auth : {0, 1}k ×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}
(for a parameter k) that satisfy the following properties. First, it is hard for any
adversary with access to only S(R), for a reference image R ∈ I, to learn information about R. That is, S imposes a small entropy reduction on its input image.
Second, for any candidate string C ∈ {0, 1}∗ , Auth(S(R), C) = 1 only if C ∈ I and
sim(R, C) = 1. Thus, a candidate input to the Auth function succeeds only if it is
a camera captured image of the same object or scene as the reference image.
We observe that the secure sketch of [DRS04] solves this problem for biometrics:
given a biometric input, the secure sketch outputs a value that reveals little about the
input, but allows its reconstruction from another biometric input that is “similar”.
Therefore, the image based authentication problem can be reduced to the problem of
transforming camera captured images of arbitrary objects and scenes into biometriclike structures.
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Symbol
λ
τ
c
s
t

Description
Length of the imageprint for a single image segment
Error tolerance threshold
Correctable number of bits
Number of image segments in multi segment schema
Segment-based secret sharing threshold
Table 5.2: ai.lock notations.

Hence, we introduce the LSH-related notion of locality sensitive image mapping
functions. Specifically, let d : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → R be a distance function (e.g.,
Hamming), where λ is a system parameter. Then, for a given δ ∈ [0, 1], a δ-Locality
Sensitive Image Mapping (LSIM) function h satisfies the following properties:
Definition 5.3.1 h : I → {0, 1}λ is a δ-LSIM function if there exist probabilities
P1 and P2 , P1 > P2 , s.t.:
1. For any two images I1 , I2 ∈ I, if sim(I1 , I2 ) = true, then

d(h(I1 ),h(I2 ))
λ

< δ with

d(h(I1 ),h(I2 ))
λ

> δ with

probability P1 .
2. For any two images I1 , I2 ∈ I, if sim(I1 , I2 ) = f alse, then
probability P2 .

5.4

The ai.lock Solution

We introduce ai.lock, the first locality sensitive image mapping function, and a
practical image based authentication system. In the following, we describe the basic
solution, then introduce two performance enhancing extensions.
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Figure 5.2: ai.lock architecture. ai.lock processes the input image through a deep
neural network (i.e., Inception.v3), selects relevant features, then uses locality sensitive hashing to map them to a binary imageprint. ai.lock uses a classifier to identify
the ideal error tolerance threshold (τ ), used by the secure sketch block to lock and
match imageprints.

5.4.1

ai.lock: The Basic (SLSS) Solution

ai.lock consists of 3 main modules (see Figure 5.2): (1) Deep Image-to-Embedding
(DI2E) conversion module (2) feature selection module, and (3) LSH based binary
mapping module. We now describe each module and its interface with the secure
sketch module. Table 5.2 summarizes the important ai.lock parameter notations.
Deep image to embedding (DI2E) module. Let I be the fixed size input
image. Let Emb : I → Re be a function that converts images into feature vectors
of size e. We call Emb(I) the embedding vector, an abstract representation of I.
To extract Emb(I), ai.lock uses the activations of a certain layer of Inception.v3
DNN [SVI+ 16a] when I is the input to the network. Let e denote the size of the
output of the layer of the DNN used by ai.lock. Thus, Emb(I) ∈ Re .
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Feature selection module. We have observed that not all the components in the
embedding feature vectors are relevant to our task (see § 5.6.1). Therefore, we reduce
the dimensionality of the feature vectors to improve the performance and decrease
the processing burden of ai.lock. Let P : Re → Rp , where p < e be a function
that reduces the features of an embedding to the ones that are most important.
ai.lock uses PCA with component range selection as the P function, and applies it
to Emb(I) to find a set of components that can reflect the distinguishing features of
images. Thus, the vector produced by feature selection module is P (Emb(I)) ∈ Rp .
LSH based binary mapping module. In a third step, ai.lock seeks to map
P (Emb(I)) to a binary space of size λ that preserves the similarity properties of the
input space. A straightforward transformation of the floating point feature values
of the P (Emb(I)) vectors to their binary representation does not satisfy the second
property of the LSIM definition: significantly different feature values that differ only
in the most representative bits will have a small Hamming distance.
To address this problem, we use the LSH scheme proposed by Charikar [Cha02].
Let L : Rp → {0, 1}λ be such a mapping function. ai.lock uses as L, a random
binary projection LSH as follows. Let M be a matrix of size p × λ, i.e. λ randomly
chosen p-dimensional Gaussian vectors with independent components. Calculate
b as the dot product of P (Emb(I)) and M: the projection of the feature vectors
P (Emb(I)) on λ randomly generated vectors.
For each coordinate of b, output either 0 or 1, based on the sign of the value
of the coordinate. We call this binary representation of the input image I, i.e.
π(I) = L(P (Emb(I))), its imageprint. We denote the length of a single imageprint
by λ. Note that, the hash value for the Charikar’s method is a single bit (λ = 1).
Therefore, L can be viewed as a function that returns a concatenation of λ such
random projection bits.
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In § 5.6.5, we provide empirical evidence that the function h = L ◦ P ◦ Emb is a
(τ )-LSIM transform (see § 5.6.1), for specific τ values.
Secure sketch. ai.lock extends the secure sketch under the Hamming distance
solution from [DRS04]: reconstruct the biometric credential, then compare its hash
against a stored value. We briefly describe here the password set and authentication
procedures that we use based on ai.lock generated imageprints. Let ECC be a binary
error correcting code, with the corresponding decoding function D, and let H be a
cryptographic hash function.
• Image password set. Let R be the reference image captured by the user
and let πR = π(R) be its ai.lock computed imageprint. Generate a random vector
x, then compute and store the authentication credentials, SS(R, x) = hSS1 , SS2 i,
where SS1 = πR ⊕ ECC(x) and SS2 = H(x).
• Images based authentication. Let C be the user captured candidate image,
and let πC = π(C) be its ai.lock computed imageprint (§ 5.4). Retrieve the stored SS
value and compute x′ = D(πC ⊕ SS1 ). The authentication succeeds if H(x′ ) = SS2 .

5.4.2

ai.lock Variants

In the following, we introduce two ai.lock extensions, intended to increase the entropy provided by ai.lock’s imageprints. First, we modify ai.lock to use the embedding vectors obtained from multiple layers of Inception.v3 network. Second,
we extend ai.lock to split the input image into multiple overlapping segments and
concatenate their resulting binary representations.
By combining the concept of these approaches we can have 4 variants of ai.lock
as follows: Single Layer Single Segment (SLSS) image, Multi Layer Single Segment
(MLSS) image, Single Layer Multi Segment (SLMS) image and Multi Layer Multi
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Segment (MLMS) image. In the following, we describe necessary modifications to
the basic ai.lock modules to work with these variants.
ai.lock with Multiple DNN Layers
Representations learned by a DNN are distributed in different layers of these networks. The lower (initial) layers of convolutional neural networks learn low level
filters (e.g. lines, edges, colors), while deeper layers learn more abstract representations (e.g. shapes) [ZF14]. The use of a single DNN layer prevents the basic ai.lock
solution from taking advantage of both filters.
To address this issue, we propose an ai.lock extension that collects the embedding
vectors from multiple (l) layers of Inception.v3 network. In addition, we modify the
basic ai.lock feature extractor module as follows. The Principal Components (PCs)
of activations for each layer are computed separately and are mapped to a separate
binary string of length λ. Then, the binary strings constructed from different layers
are concatenated to create a single imageprint for the input image. Thus, the length
of the imageprint increases linearly with the number of layers used in this schema.
ai.lock with Multiple Image Segments
We divide the original image into s overlapping segments (see Figure 5.3(a)). We
then run the basic ai.lock over each segment separately to produce s different imageprints of length λ. However, we identify the PCs for the embedding vectors of
each segment based on the whole size images. The intuition for this choice is that
random image segments are not good samples of real objects and may confuse the
PCA. We then generate the imageprint of the original, whole size image, as the
concatenation of the imageprints of its segments.
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Figure 5.3: (a) 3 overlapping segments of an image. (b) Top: sample images generated by DCGAN, Bottom: visually similar images in Nexus Dataset to images
generated by DCGAN.
Secure sketch sharing. We extend the secure sketch solution with a (t, s)-secret
sharing scheme. Specifically, let x1 , .., xs be (t, s)-shares of the random x, i.e., given
any t shares, one can reconstruct x. Given a reference image R, let R(1) , ..R(s) be its
(i)

segments, and let πR = π(R(i) ), i ∈ 1, 2, 3, ..., s be their imageprints. Then, we store
(1)

(s)

(i)

(i)

SS(R, x) = hSS1 , .., SS1 , SS2 i, where SS1 = πR ⊕ ECC(xi ) and SS2 = H(x).
To authenticate, the user needs to provide a candidate image C, whose segments
(i)

C (i) , i = 1..s produce imageprints πC = π(C (i) ) that are able to recover at least t of
x’s shares xi .

5.5

Implementation and Data

We build ai.lock on top of the Tensorflow implementation for Inception.v3 network
[ten17]. For the error correcting code of secure sketches, we use a BCH [Hoc59a,
BRC60] open source library [Jef17], for syndrome computation and syndrome decoding with correction capacity of up to c bits. The value for c is calculated empirically
using the training dataset (see § 5.6.1).
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Basic (SLSS) ai.lock. In the basic ai.lock solution, we use the output of the
last hidden layer of Inception.v3 network, before the softmax classifier, consisting of
2, 048 float values. Our intuition is that this layer provides a compact representation
(set of features) for the input image objects, that is efficiently separable by the
softmax classifier.
Multi layer ai.lock. For the multi DNN layer ai.lock variants, we have used 2 layers
(l = 2). The first layer is the “Mixed 8/Pool 0” layer and the second layer is the
last hidden layer in Inception.v3. The embedding vector for the “Mixed 8/Pool 0”
consists of 49, 152 float values. As described in § 5.4.2, the embedding vectors of
each layer are separately processed by the feature selection and LSH modules; the
resulting binary strings are concatenated to form the imageprint of size 2λ.
Multi segment ai.lock. For the multi segment ai.lock variant, we split the image
into multiple segments that we process independently. Particularly, we consider 5
overlapping segments, cropped from the top-left, bottom-left, top-right, bottomright and the center of the image. We generate segments whose width and height
is equal to the width and height of the initial image divided by 2, plus 50 pixels
to ensure overlap. The extra 50 pixels are added to the interior sides for the side
segments. For the middle segment, 25 pixels are added to each of its sides. Each
segment is then independently processed with the basic ai.lock (i.e., last hidden layer
of Inception.v3, PCA, and LSH).
Multi layer multi segment ai.lock. This is a hybrid of the above variants: split
the image into 5 overlapping parts, then process each part through Inception.v3
network, and extract the activation vectors for each of the two layers of Inception.v3
(the last hidden layer and Mixed 8/Pool 0 layer). The output of each layer for
each segment is separately processed as in the basic ai.lock. Thus, the resulting
imageprint of the image has 10λ bits.
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5.5.1

Primary Data Sets

Real Images

Nexus dataset. We have used a Nexus 4 device to capture 1,400 photos of 350
objects, belonging to 33 object categories. Example of object categories in this
dataset includes watches, shoes, jewelry, shirt patterns, and credit cards. We have
captured 4 images of each object, that differ in background and lighting conditions.
Note, this is the same dataset as we introduced in § 4.4.1.
ALOI dataset. We have used the “illumination direction” subset of the Amsterdam Library of Object Images (ALOI) [GBS05b] dataset. This dataset includes
24 different images of 1000 unique objects (24,000 in total) that are taken under
different illumination angles.
Google dataset. We have used Google’s image search to retrieve at least 200
images from each of the 33 object categories of the Nexus image dataset, for a total
of 7,853 images. This dataset forms the basis of a “targeted” attack. This is the
same dataset as we used to break Pixie (see § 4.5.2).
YFCC100M toy dataset. We have extracted a subset of the Yahoo Flickr Creative
Commons 100M (YFCC100M) [TSF+ 16] image dataset (100 million Flickr images).
This subset includes 126,600 Flickr images tagged with the “toy” keyword, and not
with “human” or “animal” keywords.
Synthetic Data

Synthetic image dataset. Manually capturing the Nexus dataset was a difficult
and time consuming process. In order to efficiently generate a large dataset of simi-
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lar images, we have leveraged the ability of generative models to discover an abstract
representation that captures the essence of the training samples. Generative models, including Variational AutoEncoders (VAE) [KW13] and Generative Adversarial
Networks (GAN) [GPAM+ 14], are trained to generate samples that are similar to
the data they have been trained on (see § 3.1.5 for a review on GANs). Such models
have been shown to be suitable for representation learning tasks, e.g., [RMC15].
We have used a DCGAN [RMC15] to generate a large set of synthetic images
that are similar to the images in the Nexus dataset. Specifically, we have trained a
DCGAN [RMC15] using the images of the Nexus dataset for 100 training epochs.
Image augmentation, e.g., rotation, enhancement, and zoom, is performed to artificially increase the number of Nexus image dataset samples to include 20 variants per
image. We then used the trained network to generate synthetic images: generate a
random vector (z) drawn from the uniform distribution, then feed z to DCGAN’s
generator network to construct an image. We repeated this process to generate
200,000 images, that form our synthetic image dataset. Figure 5.3(b) shows sample
images generated by this network, alongside similar images from the Nexus dataset.
Synthetic credential dataset. We have generated the binary imageprints for
the images in Nexus dataset based on the best parameters of ai.lock (see § 5.6.1).
For each considered λ value, we consider the value at each position of the binary
imageprint as an independent Bernoulli random variable. We then calculate the
probability of observing a 1 in each position based on the imageprints of the Nexus
dataset. We use these probabilities to draw 100,000 random samples (of length
λ) from the corresponding Bernoulli distribution for each position. The resulting
random binary imageprints form our synthetic credential dataset. We have experimented with 10 values of λ ranging from 50 to 500, thus, this dataset contains 1
million synthetic imageprints.
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5.5.2

Evaluation Datasets

We use the above image datasets to generate authentication samples that consist of
one candidate image and one reference image.
ai.lock attack dataset
We use roughly 85% of the images from the Nexus, ALOI and Google datasets as a
training set to train and estimate the performance of ai.lock. We use the remaining
15% of images in each dataset (i.e., 220 Nexus, 3,600 ALOI and 1,178 Google images)
as a holdout set. We use the holdout dataset to assess the generalization error of
the final model, and as a real image attack dataset (see § 5.6.3).
We generate the samples in holdout dataset using each subset of Nexus, ALOI
and Google separately as follows. Each image of the Nexus holdout dataset is
chosen as a reference image once, then coupled once with all the other images in
the Nexus, ALOI and Google sets, used as candidate images. Therefore, there are
220×219
2

= 24, 090 combinations of samples for the images in the Nexus set. For each

55 unique objects in this set, there are 6 ( 42 ) possible valid samples that compare
one image of this object to another image of the same object. Thus, there are
55 × 6 = 330 valid samples in the Nexus set. We then generate 220 × 3, 600 = 792K
and 220 × 1, 178 = 259, 160 invalid samples from comparing Nexus images to images
in ALOI and Google sets respectively. Therefore, the ai.lock holdout set contains a
total of 1, 075, 250 samples.
In addition, the training set is further divided into 5 folds, for cross validation.
Each training fold contains 236, 4080 and 1335 images of Nexus, ALOI and Google
datasets respectively. Therefore, there are

236×235
2

= 27, 730 samples for the fold’s

59 unique Nexus set objects, of which 59 × 6 = 354 pairs are valid. Similarly, we
generate 236 × 4, 080 = 962, 880 and 236 × 1, 335 = 315, 060 invalid samples, that
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consist of Nexus images coupled with ALOI and Google images, respectively. Thus,
each training fold has a total of 1, 305, 670 samples, of which 354 are valid.
Synthetic image attack datasets
We divide the synthetic image dataset of § 5.5.1 into 2 equal sets, each containing
100,000 images. Then, we build two synthetic image attack datasets (DS1 and DS2)
by repeating the following process for each subset of the synthetic image dataset:
combine each Nexus dataset image, used as a reference image, with each image from
the subset of the synthetic image dataset, used as a candidate image. Therefore, in
total we have 140 million samples in each of DS1 and DS2.
Synthetic credential attack dataset
We use the synthetic credential dataset described in § 5.5.1 to build a synthetic
credential attack dataset: for each value of λ, combine the imageprint of each Nexus
dataset image, used as a reference imageprint, with each imageprint in synthetic
credential dataset, used as the candidate imageprint. Hence, we have 140 million
authentication samples in this dataset for each value of λ. We repeat this process
for 10 values of λ, ranging from 50 to 500. Therefore, in total this dataset contains
10 × 140 M = 1.4 billion samples.
Illumination robustness evaluation dataset
To evaluate the performance of ai.lock under illumination changes, we use the ALOI
holdout set (3, 600 images) that includes up to 11 images of each object captured
under a different illumination condition. Specifically, we pair each image in the
ALOI holdout set (i.e., not used during training) with all the other images in this
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λ
τ × 10

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

7.80 7.30 7.07 6.95 6.80 6.87 6.80 6.85 6.87 6.82

Table 5.3: Error tolerance threshold (τ ) values for the basic ai.lock obtained through
cross validation over the ai.lock dataset, when using PCs with feature ranked 200400.
set. Therefore, we have a total of

3600×3599
2

= 6, 478, 200 authentication samples in

the illumination robustness evaluation dataset, of which 6, 306 samples are valid.
Entropy evaluation dataset
We randomly selected 2 billion unique pairs of images from the YFCC100M toy
dataset. In each pair, an image is considered to be the reference, the other is the
candidate.

5.6

Experimental Evaluation

We evaluate ai.lock and its variants. First, we describe the process we used to
identify the best ai.lock parameters. We use these parameters to evaluate the performance of ai.lock under the attack datasets of § 5.5.2. We also show that ai.lock
is a δ-LSIM function, empirically estimate its entropy, and measure its speed on a
mobile device.

5.6.1

ai.lock: Parameter Choice

We identify the best parameters for the ai.lock variants, starting with the SLSS
solution, using 5 fold cross validation on the ai.lock training dataset (see § 5.5.2).
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Best error tolerance threshold
In each of the 5 cross validation experiments, we identify the best threshold that
separates the binary imageprints of the testing set. Particularly, we normalize the
Hamming distance of each pair of imageprints in the test fold by the length of the
imageprints. Then, we apply more than 4K different real values, between 0 and
1, as a threshold on the normalized Hamming distances of the authentication pairs
to classify them. At the end of the 5th cross validation experiment, we select the
threshold that has the maximum average performance, in terms of F1 score, as the
best separating threshold. We call this the Error Tolerance Threshold, which we
denote by τ .
Table 5.3 reports the τ values for basic ai.lock and MLSS ai.lock variant with
different values of λ, when using PCs with feature rank 200-400. We observe that
as λ increases, the value for τ decreases: we posit that larger λ values preserve more
information about the input vectors (PCs of the embedding vectors) in the LSH
output.
We translate τ to the error correcting capacity required for ECC. Specifically,
for an imageprint of length λ, we choose an ECC that is able to correct up to
c = ⌊λ × (1 − τ )⌋ bits.
Best principal component range
To identify the best PC range, we use 5 fold cross validation as follows. First, we
retrieve the embedding vector (output of the last hidden layer of Inception.v3) for
each image in the ai.lock training dataset. Then, for each cross validation experiments, we use 4 training folds to find the principal components of the embedding
vectors. Then, we transform the embedding vectors of the test fold into the newly
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of ai.lock performance (F1 score) when using different subset
of principal component feature ranks for different imageprint length (λ) values. PCs
ranked 200-400 constantly outperform other tested subsets.
identified feature space. Finally, we project them into several randomly generated
vectors (LSH) to construct the binary imageprint of the images.
To choose the best PCs, we have experimented with different subsets of the
transformed feature space of various size including the first and second consecutive
principal component sets of size 50, 100, 150, and 200, as well as, the first 400 PCs.
Figure 5.4 shows the cross validation performance achieved by ai.lock when using
different subsets of PC features for different λ values. We observe that the PCs
ranked 200-400 perform consistently the best. This might seem surprising, as higher
ranked PCs have higher variability and thus we expected that they would have more
impact in differentiating between valid and invalid samples. We conjecture that
some of the lower rank coordinates of these transformed vectors are more efficient in
capturing the lower level details of the input object images that differentiate them
from other object images.
Motivation for feature selection using PCA. We now justify the need for
the PCA step of ai.lock. For this, we compare the best version of ai.lock running
PCA (i.e., features ranked 200-400), with two other versions. First, we consider a
baseline version (which we call “Raw”), that uses no feature selection component.
Specifically, Raw applies LSH to the raw embedding vectors, then, identifies the
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Figure 5.5: PCA motivation: FRR vs. FAR of (i) ai.lock when using PCA (with
features ranked 200-400), (ii) ai.lock with no feature selection (“Raw”), and (iii)
250 independent instances of ai.lock when using a feature selection approach that
randomly selects 200 features. ai.lock with PCA consistently achieves the lowest
FRR and often the lowest FAR.
best threshold τ using the 5-fold cross validation experiment described previously
for ai.lock. Second, we compare against an ai.lock variant where we replace the
PCA component with a random choice of 200 features (of the embedding vectors)
produced by the last hidden layer of Inception.v3. Figure 5.5 shows the results of
this comparison for λ values of 150, 250, 350 and 500, and 250 different instances of
ai.lock with random feature selection. We observe that ai.lock with PCA (PCs of
rank 200-400) consistently achieves the significantly lower FRR, and often the lowest
FAR. In addition, we observe that randomly choosing the features is not ideal, as it
often performs worse than when no feature selection is used at all.
ai.lock MLSS variant. Similar to the basic ai.lock, we have experimented with
multiple ranges of PCs and λ values to identify the τ values for MLSS ai.lock,
using the 5 fold cross validation experiment on the ai.lock training dataset. Table
5.4 reports the τ values for MLSS ai.lock variant with different values of λ. As
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λ

200

τ × 10

250

300

350

400

450

500

6.75 6.74 6.61 6.58 6.55 6.57 6.56

Table 5.4: Error tolerance threshold (τ ) values for MLSS ai.lock obtained through
cross validation over the ai.lock dataset, when using PCs with feature ranked 200400.

t (matching segment counts out of 5)
F1 score (%) for SLMS
F1 score (%) for MLMS

3

4

5

93.13 90.95 85.84
95.53 94.64 92.42

Table 5.5: Cross validation performance (F1 score) for different values of t (number
of segments that need to match out of 5) when using PCs with feature rank 200-400
and λ = 500 for SLMS and MLMS variants of ai.lock. t = 3 consistently achieves
the best performance.
mentioned before, the value of τ decreases as we increase λ.
ai.lock Multi segment variants. For this ai.lock variant, we identify the τ values
separately for each image segment, using the 5-fold cross validation experiment
explained previously. Therefore, we end up having 5 different τ values corresponding
to each image segment. The τ corresponding to each segment can be used to identify
if there is a match between the piece of the candidate image to the corresponding
piece in the reference image. We say that the whole candidate and reference images
match, when t of their segments match. We have tested with t ranging from 3 to 5
and observed that t=3 achieved the best F1 score (see Table 5.5).

5.6.2

Cross validation performance for trained ai.lock model

We now report the cross validation performance of ai.lock with the parameters
identified above, for λ ranging from 50 to 500. Figures 5.6(a)-(c) compare the F1
score, FAR and FRR values of the best version of the ai.lock variants (basic SLSS,
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Figure 5.6: (a-c) ai.lock cross validation performance, and (d-f) ai.lock holdout
performance using different ai.lock variants: Single Layer Single Segment (SLSS),
Multi Layer Single Segment (MLSS), Single Layer Multi Segment (SLMS), Multi
Layer Multi Segment (MLMS). Exploiting information from multiple Inception.v3
DNN layers (multi layer variants) lowers the FRR, while splitting images into smaller
segments (multi segment variants) lowers the FAR. The MLMS variant of ai.lock
consistently achieves the lowest FAR, that can be as low as 0% for the holdout
dataset.
SLMS, MLSS, and MLMS) over the 5-fold cross validation experiments, using ai.lock
training dataset. The performance of all ai.lock variants improves with increasing
the value of λ. The MLMS ai.lock achieves the best performance, with an F1 score
of 95.52% and FAR of 0.0009% when λ = 500. The MLSS ai.lock also consistently
improves over the basic ai.lock, with a smaller FRR and a smaller or at most equal
FAR. Its FRR (4.18% for λ = 500) is slightly smaller than that of MLMS variants
(5.36%), but it exhibits a slight increase in FAR. For large values of λ, the FRR of
SLMS and SLSS are almost equivalent.
The average cross validation Equal Error Rate (EER, the rate at which the FAR
= FRR) of ai.lock for the SLSS and MLSS variants is less than 0.67% and 0.17%
respectively when using PCs with feature rank 200 − 400 and λ = 500.
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λ

50

150

250

350

500

FAR×10+6

33.87

4.34

3.29

0.69

0.20

Table 5.6: SLSS ai.lock performance on synthetic attack DS1. The FAR decreases
significantly as λ grows from 50 to 500. The FAR when λ = 500 is only 0.2 × 10−6 .

The purpose of the LSH-based transformation is to encode the feature vector of
an image extracted by a DNN into a binary string. Our conjecture is that larger
lambda values extract more high quality information about the feature vectors,
which in turn leads to lower FAR and FRR. This is partly due to the random
nature of the LSH we used (see Figure 5.10), where roughly half of the bits among
diﬀerent images are diﬀerent, and images of the same object have a smaller distance
overall. Using more LSH bits reduces the variance of the distance that was due to
perturbations from using a random projection, hence provides a better separation
between TP and FP image comparisons.

5.6.3

ai.lock Under Attack

Holdout dataset, real image attack
The performance over the ai.lock holdout set is reported in Figure 5.6(d)-(f). As
before, the performance of all the ai.lock variants improves with the increase in λ.
In agreement with the results of the cross validation experiments, we conclude that
exploiting information from multiple Inception.v3 layers decreases the FRR, while
using information from multiple image segments decreases the FAR. In addition,
the MLMS ai.lock variant achieves the highest F1 score (97.21% for λ = 500). The
SLMS and MLMS schema consistently achieve the lowest FAR, which is as low as
0% on the holdout dataset.
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Figure 5.7: Histogram of the number of broken reference images, using the synthetic
attack dataset DS1. The x axis shows the range for the number of times a breakable
Nexus reference image is defeated by the attack images and the y axis shows the
number of such breakable images. A majority of the “broken” reference images are
defeated only by a small number of candidate images. The ratio of broken references
(r) decreases significantly when λ increases.
Synthetic image attack
We use the synthetic attack dataset DS1 of § 5.5.2 to evaluate the performance of
SLSS ai.lock, using the trained parameters of § 5.6.1. We emphasize the importance
of achieving a low FAR in this experiment: this powerful adversary can generate
and try many synthetic images.
Table 5.6 shows the performance of ai.lock in classifying these attack samples.
The FAR decreases significantly with λ, and is as low as 0.00002% when λ = 500.
Figure 5.7 shows the histogram of the number of times when the Nexus image
references are broken using the synthetic image dataset DS1, for different λ values.
The value r indicates the percentage of the reference images that have been broken
at least once. The proportion of the reference images that have been broken at
least once decreases significantly by increasing λ: from 16.86% to 0.79% (11 Nexus
images) when λ is 150 and 500 respectively. A majority of the broken references are
broken only by a small number of candidate images: when λ = 500, only 2 of the
11 broken images have been broken 5 times by the synthetic images in DS1. The
empirical average number of trials until finding the first matching synthetic image,
over the 11 broken reference images, is 31,800.
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Figure 5.8: (a) Cross validation FAR, (b) Cross validation FRR , (c) Holdout FAR,
and (d) Holdout FRR of SLSS ai.lock when trained over the ai.lock and synthetic
image attacks of DS2.
Vaccinated ai.lock. To further improve the ai.lock resistance to synthetic image
attacks, we use the synthetic image attack dataset DS2 (see § 5.5.2) along with the
ai.lock training dataset, to train ai.lock. Specifically, we divide the synthetic image
attack dataset DS2 into 5 folds and distribute them into the 5 training folds of the
ai.lock dataset. In other words, we train ai.lock on an additional 236 × 20,000 =
4,720,000 invalid authentication samples. The holdout set remains untouched and
is used to evaluate the effectiveness of this approach. Then, we train ai.lock with
SLSS as before using the cross validation experiment (see § 5.6.1).
We experimented with two cases. First, the invalid synthetic image attack samples in DS2 contribute to both PCA-based feature selection and the error tolerant
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Figure 5.9: FAR of ai.lock on synthetic image attack, when trained on the ai.lock
dataset vs. when trained also on DS2. The “vaccinated” ai.lock improves its resistance to the synthetic image attack: the FAR drops by more than 74%, 51% and
59% when λ is 50, 150 and 350 respectively.
threshold (τ ) discovery processes. Second, those samples are only used in the process
of discovering τ . Figure 5.8 shows the cross validation FAR and FRR (a, b) as well
as the performance over the holdout set (c, d). In both experiments, we observed
a drop in the FAR of ai.lock, however, the FRR increases. The FAR improvement
is higher for the second case. We conjecture that the inclusion of synthetic, not
camera captured images, is misleading the PCA based feature selection module into
capturing irrelevant information.
We used the ai.lock trained on the synthetic image attack dataset DS2 to evaluate
its performance over the synthetic image attack DS1. Figure 5.9 compares the
performance of ai.lock when trained on the ai.lock dataset and when trained on the
ai.lock and the synthetic dataset DS2. Training also over synthetic image attack
samples helps ai.lock to be more resilient to synthetic image attack, especially for
small values of λ.
Synthetic credential attack. Table 5.7 shows the FAR values for ai.lock under
the synthetic credential attack dataset described in § 5.5.2. For all values of λ
greater than 300, the FAR of ai.lock is equal to 0. Even for a λ of 50, the FAR
is 11.89 × 10−4 %. This is an important result: even a powerful adversary who can

134

λ

50

150

250

350

500

FAR×10+6

11.89

0.09

0.03

0.000

0.000

Table 5.7: SLSS ai.lock performance on the synthetic credential attack. ai.lock is
unbreakable under 1.4 billion samples of the synthetic credential attack: its FAR is
0 when λ ≥ 300.
# of words in image search query

1

2

3

4

Dataset size (dsize )
Avg # of trials before FA (random order)
Avg # of trials before FA (guessing attack)

12, 413
12, 078
12, 034

24, 882
23, 205
22, 755

26, 418
24, 641
23, 921

26, 766
25, 028
24, 488

Portion of broken references (%)

5.0

9.0

10.9

9.0

Table 5.8: ai.lock under the object guessing attack. The average number of trials
before the first false accept (FA) drops only slightly in the object guessing attack
scenario when compared to a random ordering of attack images. Thus, knowledge
of the authentication object type provides the adversary only nominal guessing
advantage.
create and test synthetic credentials on a large scale, is unable to break the ai.lock
authentication.
Object/Scene Guessing Attack
Data. We have asked a graduate student to tag each of the 55 unique object images
in the Nexus holdout set with 1 to 4 words. For each value of the number of tags per
image (i.e., 1 to 4), and each object image, we collected 300-500 images provided by
Google’s image search engine. Thus, we generated 4 Google image datasets, one for
images found when searching with 1 tag, another when searching with 2 tags, etc.
In total, we have collected 90,479 images.
ai.lock performance under object guessing attack. We use the 4 collected
image datasets from Google to generate a total of 19, 905, 380 “guessing attack”
authentication samples, and use them to evaluate the guessing entropy [DMR04] of
ai.lock under an object/scene guessing attack (see § 6.2).
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Specifically, using each of the 4 Google image datasets we perform the following
two brute force attacks. The first attack emulates an object guessing attack: re-order
the images in the Google dataset to start the brute force attack with the images
of the same object type, then continue with images of other object categories in
a random order. Finally, count the number of trials before the first match (false
accept) occurs. The second attack is a standard brute force attack: randomly shuffle
the images in the Google image dataset and use them to brute force each image in
the Nexus holdout set. We use the second attack as a baseline, to determine if
knowledge of the object type impacts the trial count to success. In both attacks,
we count each of the unbreakable reference images as “success” at dsize trials, where
dsize is the number of images in the corresponding Google image dataset.
Table 5.8 summarizes the ai.lock performance under the object/scene guessing
attack scenario. We observe an increase in the portion of the Nexus images that are
broken when the simulated adversary uses more words to describe the authentication
objects for collecting the attack image dataset. However, for all experiments, the
average number of trials before success drops only slightly in the object guessing
attack scenario compared to the baseline. This is due to the fact that the reference
images were mostly broken with images of different object categories. We conclude
that knowledge of the secret object type does not provide the adversary with a
significant guessing advantage.

5.6.4

Resilience to Illumination Changes

We evaluate the resilience of ai.lock to illumination changes using the 6,478,200
authentication samples of the illumination robustness evaluation dataset (§ 5.5.2).
While the FAR of the MLMS variant of ai.lock (for λ = 500 and t = 3) remains

136

very small (0.006%), its FRR increases to 16.9%. Decreasing the required matching
segments count (t) to 2, reduces the FRR to 11.43%, which results in a slightly
higher FAR of 0.010%.

5.6.5

Is ai.lock δ-LSIM?

We now evaluate if the basic ai.lock (SLSS) variant, with the parameters identified
in § 5.6.1 preserves the similarity of the input space, i.e., if it satisfies the LSIM
properties (see Definition 5.3.1). We use the ai.lock holdout set to evaluate the
probability of obtaining the same hash value for valid and invalid samples.
Let πi and πj be the imageprints corresponding to two images in the ai.lock
holdout set. Let dH (πi , πj ) denote the Hamming distance and SH (πi , πj ) denote the
normalized Hamming similarity of these imageprints, i.e., SH (πi , πj ) = 1 −

dH (πi ,πj )
.
λ

The output of ai.lock can be considered either as a single bit or a string of bits.
In the former case, the imageprints consist of the concatenation of the output of
multiple hash functions, while in the later case, the entire imageprint is assumed to
be the ai.lock hash value. In the following, we empirically evaluate the P1 and P2
values (see Definition §5.3.1), for the case where the ai.lock individual imageprint
bits are considered as the hash value. We further show that ai.lock is also a δLSIM function when the entire ai.lock imageprint is considered as the hash value
(multi-bit).
ai.lock with single bit hash value is a δ-LSIM
We show that ai.lock with a single bit hash value is a δ-LSIM (see Definition 5.3.1).
ai.lock uses Charikar’s random projection LSH [Cha02]. Therefore, for any
embedding vector (the input to LSH function) u and v, P r[1 bit collision] = 1 −
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Figure 5.10: Histograms of normalized Hamming similarity between imageprints
of valid and invalid authentication samples in the ai.lock holdout set. The red
rectangles pinpoint the focus areas: valid samples with Hamming similarity below
0.6 and invalid samples with Hamming similarity above 0.6. Higher values of λ
provide more effective separation between valid and invalid samples: when λ = 500,
no invalid samples have similarity above 0.6.
λ

150

350

500

P1
P2

0.799
0.500

0.797
0.500

0.796
0.500

Table 5.9: Average probability of collision, for valid (P1 ) and invalid (P2 ) samples in
the ai.lock holdout set per imageprint bit basis. In all cases, P1 > P2 , thus conclude
that ai.lock with single bit hash value is an LSIM function.
θ(u,v)
,
π

where θ(u, v) denotes the angle between u and v. We use the angle between

the feature vectors of images in the ai.lock holdout set to compute the average
probability of collision: 0.79 for valid and 0.50 for invalid authentication samples.
Figure 5.10 shows the histogram of normalized Hamming similarity between imageprints in the valid and invalid samples of the ai.lock holdout set. Unsurprisingly,
most invalid samples have a Hamming similarity between 0.4 and 0.6: different
images have imageprints that are similar in around half of their bits (see also Table 5.9). We observe that the overlap between the Hamming similarities of valid
and invalid samples significantly reduces for higher values of λ.
In addition, we compute these probabilities empirically by counting the number
of times when the hash values collide for valid and invalid samples, after the LSH
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λ

150

350

500

P1
P2

8.6e-1
2.8e-6

9.3e-1
0.0

9.1e-1
0.0

Table 5.10: Average probability of collision, for valid (P1 ) and invalid (P2 ) samples
in the ai.lock holdout set, when the ai.lock imageprint is considered as image hash
value and at most c = ⌊λ × (1 − τ )⌋ bits of error is allowed. In all cases, P1 > P2 ,
thus conclude that ai.lock is an LSIM function.
transformation. We then use this count to compute the average probability of
collision for a valid (P1 ) and invalid (P2 ) authentication samples (see Table 5.9).
We observe the remarkable similarity of these values, to the ones above, computed
analytically. As λ increases, the empirical P1 approaches the analytic lower bound
(0.79). We perform a Mann-Whitney one-sided test with alternative hypothesis
P 1 > P 2. This test suggests that there is a significant gap between P1 and P2
(p − value = 0.00, α = 0.05) for all cases, hence, ai.lock is a δ-LSIM on the Nexus
holdout dataset.
ai.lock with multi-bit hash value is a δ-LSIM
We set δ = τ , where τ is the error tolerance threshold obtained from the ai.lock
training process (see Table 5.3), for different values of λ. Table 5.10 shows the P1
and P2 values achieved by the basic ai.lock over the holdout dataset. We perform
Mann-Whitney one-sided test with alternative hypothesis P 1 > P 2. Based on the
observed p − value = 0.00, (α = 0.05), for different values of λ, we conclude that the
alternative hypothesis is true, hence, ai.lock is a δ-LSIM function over the holdout
dataset.
We can also compute the probability of collision for imageprints in an error
tolerant way using the probability of collision for a single bit (P rsingleBit collision ).
Let X be the random variable denoting the number of matching bits for a pair
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λ
150
350
500

Avg Pr[collision+ ] Avg Pr[collision− ]
8.4e-01
9.0e-01
9.0e-01

5.9e-06
4.1e-06
2.2e-06

Table 5.11: The average probability of imageprints collision for genuine and fake
pairs of images in ai.lock holdout set when at most c = τ × λ error is allowed.
ai.lock hash LSH-like property which maps the similar images to binary strings
with higher probability of collision.
of imageprints. We assume the extraction of each imageprint bit is an independent random variable with probability P rsingleBit collision .

Therefore, P r[X >=

c] = (P rsingleBit collision )c (1 − P rsingleBit collision )c . These values are reported in Table
5.11. We observed that the collision probabilities computed based on ai.lock dataset
are very close to those estimated based on probability of collision for a single bit.
Compared to ai.lock with single bit hash value, we observe concatenating multiple hashes enlarges the gap between P1 and P2 values.

5.6.6

On the Entropy of Imageprints

We have used the entropy evaluation dataset (see § 5.5.2) to empirically calculate
the entropy of the imageprints generated by the ai.lock variants. The empirical
entropy of an authentication solution is proportional to the size of the keyspace
that the attacker needs to search to find a match for the authentication secret. For
biometric information, estimating this size is difficult. In such cases, the entropy
1
) [O’G03]. We performed this study for different
can be estimated as −log2 ( F AR

values of λ and the best parameter choice of ai.lock (see § 5.6.1), using the entropy
evaluation dataset.
On the 2 billion image pairs in the entropy evaluation dataset, the FAR of the
SLSS ai.lock variant is 0.020% and 0.035% when λ is 50 and 500 respectively, for an
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λ

150

DI2E module (Inception v.1)
DI2E module (Inception v.3)
PCA + LSH module

250

350

500

0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
0.044 0.049 0.051 0.066

Table 5.12: Processing time (in seconds) of SLSS ai.lock modules, for different values
of λ. The performance of the DNN module does not depend on λ and is 0.7s for
Inception.h5. The combined performance of the PCA and LSH modules increases
with λ but is under 70ms even when λ = 500. When using Inception.h5, the overall
ai.lock speed is below 0.8s.
entropy of 12.28 bits and 11.48 bits. We have visually inspected several hundreds of
image pairs that resulted in false accepts and observed that a significant proportion
were due to images that contained the same object type, e.g. ribbons, helmets, etc.
This result is not unexpected: the SLSS variant uses only the last hidden layer of
Inception.v3 network. Since Inception.v3 is trained for image classification task, it is
expected to have similar activations on the last hidden layer for images of the same
object type. We expect to eliminate this situation by requiring the match between
activations of multiple inception layers (multi layer variant).
The FAR of the MLMS ai.lock variant on the entropy evaluation dataset, for λ
values of 500 and 150, is 0.0007% and 0.0004% respectively. Therefore, the estimated
entropy of ai.lock imageprints is 17.14 and 18.02 bits respectively.
In the cross validation experiments reported in § 5.6.4, MLMS ai.lock achieved
best performance (F1 score) when λ = 500. The calculated FAR from the entropy
evaluation dataset is consistent with the cross validation FAR (0.0009%). When λ is
500, the FRR of ai.lock MLMS is 5.37%. However, when λ = 150, MLMS achieves
a lower FAR of 0.0006%, for a higher FRR of 7.85%.
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5.6.7

ai.lock Speed

We have implemented ai.lock using Android 7.1.1 and Tensorflow 0.12.1 and have
evaluated its speed using 1,000 images of the Nexus dataset on a Nexus 6P smartphone (Qualcomm Snapdragon 810 CPU and 3GB RAM). Table 5.12 shows the
average processing time of the 3 main ai.lock modules for different values of λ.
Independent of the value for λ, ai.lock’s DI2E module takes 1.9s to compute the
activations of all the layers of Inception.v3. When using Inception.h5 [SLJ+ 15] (a
smaller network), DI2E module takes 0.7s. The combined PCA and LSH speed increases with the value of λ, but is below 70ms for λ = 500. The processing overhead
of ai.lock is below 2s and 1s using Inception.v3 and Inception.h5 respectively.
To minimize its impact on user experience on a Nexus 6P, ai.lock needs to use
Inception.h5. The most significant processing overhead of ai.lock is on computing
the activation of the DNN, which directly depends on the size of the network. Note
that compressing the network using the DNN distillation approach [HVD15] can
alleviate this overhead. In addition, future device and Inception improvements will
likely improve the ai.lock performance and accuracy.

5.7

Discussion and Limitations

Default authentication, revocation and recovery. If the image based authentication fails a number of times or the ai.lock secret is not available, the authentication
falls back to the default authentication mechanism, e.g. text passwords.
Strong passwords. ai.lock benefits from users choosing strong, high-entropy and
unique objects for authentication. ai.lock can use datasets of images of frequently
occurring, thus low entropy, objects and learn to reject similar objects during their
registration by the user. Further, the image classification task can be adapted to
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detect images belonging to classes of weak, low-entropy authentication objects. In
addition, similar to text passwords, users could be encouraged to pick an ordered
combination of personal objects for authentication.
Usability. Although usability is not the focus of this chapter, we expect ai.lock
to share several limitations with face based authentication mechanisms due to their
similarities in the form factor. These include susceptibility to inappropriate lighting
conditions [BUI+ 15]. While the FAR of ai.lock remains small under illumination
changes, its FRR increases, affecting its usability. However, DNNs are capable of
learning representations that are invariant to input changes, e.g. lighting, translation, etc. Thus, the DI2E module of ai.lock can be further fine-tuned to be more
resistant to illumination changes. We leave the investigation of such improvement
for future work. In addition, we leave for future work investigating alternative, more
advanced DNN models and exhaustive search for the choice of layer to be used in
DI2E module of ai.lock.
In Chapter 4, we have evaluated the usability aspects of an image based authentication approach, and have shown that (1) the user entry time was significantly
shorter compared to text passwords on a mobile device, (2) the participants were
able to remember their authentication objects 2 and 7 days after registering them,
and (3) the participants perceived object based authentication to be easier to use
than text passwords, and were willing to adopt it. As the user interface of ai.lock is
similar to Pixie, the directions we identified in § 4.7 for investigating the usability aspects of Pixie, will also apply to ai.lock. Particularly, further studies are required to
understand (1) the user choice of the secret objects or scenes and whether it impacts
the secret key space, (2) the ability of ai.lock to filter out common or low-entropy
images, (3) the scenarios where users are willing to adopt ai.lock authentication and
(4) other limitations associated to ai.lock authentication.
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Shoulder surfing. Similar to face based authentication, ai.lock is vulnerable to
shoulder surfing attacks where the adversary captures images of the objects or scenes
used by victims. However, ai.lock eliminates remote attacks, e.g., [PLK+ 12], moves
the target away from sensitive body features, and enables users to trivially change
their image-passwords. Similar to biometrics, ai.lock can also benefit from liveness
verification techniques [RATC17], that ensure that the adversary has physical access
to the authentication object or scene, to prevent sophisticated image replay attacks.
In addition, in § 5.6.3 we show that the knowledge of the authentication object type
does not provide the adversary with significant advantage when launching a brute
force attack.
Multi-factor authentication. ai.lock can also be used in conjunction with other
authentication solutions. For instance, the image password set and authentication
steps described in § 2.1.1 can take advantage of a secondary secret (e.g. password,
PIN), increasing the number of authentication factors to improve security. To this
end, let r be a random salt. We modify x in the fuzzy biometric protection solution
outlined in § 5.4.1 to be the randomized hash of the secondary secret computed
using salt r. Randomized hashing ensures the required formatting and bit length
for x can be achieved using key derivation function (e.g. HKDF [KE10]), etc. The
random salt r needs to be stored along with the other authentication credentials,
i.e. SS(R, x).
Compromised device. Our model assumes an adversary that physically captures
a victim’s device and thus has black-box access to the authentication function.
ai.lock is not resilient to an adversary who installs malware on the victim device.
Such malware may for instance leverage PlaceRaider [TRCK13] to construct three
dimensional models of the environment surrounding the victim, including the authentication object.
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Trusted hardware can secure ai.lock and even obviate the need for secure sketches.
However, it would reduce the number of devices where ai.lock can be applied. Techniques similar to AuDroid [PSJA15] could be employed to ensure that unauthorized
processes or external parties cannot access and misuse the device camera, however,
they may still leave ai.lock vulnerable to cache attacks [LGS+ 16].

5.8

Conclusions

In this chapter, we introduced ai.lock, a secure and efficient image based authentication with secure storage of authentication credentials. We have presented a suite of
practical yet powerful image based attacks and built large scale attack datasets. We
have shown that even under our powerful attacks, ai.lock achieves better entropy
than state-of-the-art biometric authentication solutions.
We have implemented an ai.lock in Android using Tensorflow [ABC+ 16] and
shown that it is resilient to attacks. Its FAR on 140 million synthetic image attack
samples is 0.2×10−6 %. ai.lock was unbreakable when tested with 1.4 billion synthetic
credential attack samples. Further, we show that ai.lock is a δ-LSIM function, over
images that we collected (see § 5.6.5). ai.lock is fast, imposing an overhead of under
1s on a Nexus 6P device.
ai.lock security can be tuned by changing the length of the binary imageprints
(λ). Longer imageprints can preserve more information about the input images,
resulting in better overall performance of ai.lock. However, this cannot be arbitrary
large due to the limitations of the current binary error correcting codes. In addition,
certain level of security (FAR) versus usability (FRR) can be achieved by adjusting
error tolerance threshold (τ ).
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CHAPTER 6
CEAL: IMAGE-BASED KEY AUTHENTICATION

6.1

Introduction

Phishing attempts [Ram10, RAM+ 18] often impersonate user trusted contacts (e.g.,
social networking friends, e-mail contacts) and services (e.g., financial institutions,
online markets). Therefore, in today’s Internet the ability to verify the authenticity
of online contacts or services is of paramount importance.
Public key cryptography is the dominant and reliable method for verifying the
identity of an entity over the Internet and in secure end-to-end communications.
One central problem to designing a public key encryption system is to facilitate the
process of evaluating the authenticity of a binding between a public key and an
entity (i.e., its owner).
There are two major approaches for addressing this problem: (1) a public key
infrastructure (PIK) in which one or more centralized third-party Certificate Authorities (CAs) certify the authenticity of pairs of key and their ownership, and (2) a
web of Trust (WoT) which decentralizes the task of authenticating public keys by relying on a chain of individual endorsements (i.e., signatures) to the link between the
owner and public key. Numerous security incidents, e.g. DigiNotar [Fis12], TrustWave [Con12], have shown the vulnerabilities associated with failure of centralized
CAs. On the contrary, WoT benefits from being independent of any central point of
failure. However, its deployment raises several usability issues including challenges
in verifying the keys for the first time and issues with recovering the keys [FVY14].
Nevertheless, to address public key authentication problem for decentralized systems without pre-defined authorities (e.g., SSH [GT06], OpenPGP [CDF+ 07], and
secure messaging applications [UDB+ 15]) manual key verification of the key by a hu-
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man verifier is used. Public keys are long strings of arbitrary bits and this makes the
process of comparison difficult for the human verifier. In practice, key fingerprint,
short hashes of the public keys are used to simplify this process for users: A user
transfers the reference key fingerprint corresponding to her public key to another
contact through a reliable out-of-bound channel, e.g., a secure key server, trusted
web site, etc. To authenticate this user, a contact can manually compute the key
fingerprint corresponding to the contact’s key and compare it to the reference key
fingerprint (see Figure 1.2).
Recent study by Tan et al. [TBB+ 17] have shown that the Visual Key Fingerprint Generation (VKFG) solutions, that represent the key fingerprint using an
image (e.g. Vash [vas14]), can increase usability and attack resistance of the key fingerprint verification. Yet, 10% of the generated attack images that they generated
for Vash [vas14], when modeling a similar adversary as we describe in this chapter,
were missed by human verifiers.
We introduce CEAL (CrEdential Assurance Labeling), a novel approach to generate visual fingerprint representations of cryptographically strong public strings.
CEAL’s generated images (i.e. ceal) stands out from existing approaches in three
significant aspects: i) involves a learning step where the target style and domain of
the fingerprint images are captured into a generator model from a large collection
of sample images rather than hand curated as a collection of rules, hence providing
a unique capacity for easy customization, ii) integrates a model of the visual discriminative ability of human perception so the resulting fingerprint image generator
avoids mapping distinct keys to images which are not distinguishable by humans, iii)
deterministically generates visually pleasing fingerprint images from an input vector
where the vector components are designated to represent visual properties which
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are either readily perceptible to human eye, or imperceptible yet are necessary for

accurately modeling the target image domain.
Challenges. To build CEAL, we need to address several important challenges:
• Human distinguishability. Due to the wide variety in the visual systems
of the humans, identifying the space of human distinguishable images is a diﬃcult
task. However, humans are good at identifying shapes, colors and objects [Wil66].
In addition, the human visual system is better at distinguishing changes in images
when their content is more natural [PTT00]. We exploit these properties to generate
realistic images that are distinguishable by average humans.
• Generating human distinguishable images. While using GAN [GPAM+14]
would ensure that generated images are realistic, thus easy to compare, our experiments have shown that not all the components of the input to GAN (i.e. the input
latent vector), will result in a perceptible change in the generated images when
modified. Furthermore, the perceptability of a change could depend on the values
of the other components (see § 6.5.2). This severely limits the application of GAN to
fingerprint image generation, as the indistinguishable images mean that an attacker
can forge a key that has a fingerprint image similar to the authentic one, thereby
successfully spoof the human verification.
To address this problem, we employ a mechanism that eﬃciently evaluates the
distinguishability of the generated images by the generator network during training
of a GAN and provides a feedback for the generator to generate images that are human distinguishable. While ideally one would use humans to verify the satisfaction
of this requirement, this process does not scale well.
• Automatic classification of human distinguishability. The above challenge suggests the need for an automatic solution. For this, we build a Human
Perception Discriminator (HPD), a classifier that can predict whether two images
are perceived as distinct by human verifiers.
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However, training a classifier that accurately predicts the perception of all human
visual systems, using limited human labeled datasets that we collect, is a difficult
task. Specially, given the wide variety in the visual systems of the humans who will
compare these images in real life (range of ages, visual acuity, color blindness, etc).
Instead, we settled to build an Human Perception Discriminator (HPD) that only
has high precision: if it predicts that two images are different, they will be perceived
to be similar by human verifiers, only with a very small probability. We show that
even with such a HPD, that may have a lower recall, we are able to train a GAN
that satisfies our requirements.
• Input mapping impact on human-distinguishability of generated images. Our experiments with Vash, state-of-the-art VKFG [TBB+ 17], revealed that
not all the bits of the input string, when modified, result in a human-perceptive
change in the generated images (see § 6.7.4). To ensure all ceal images that are generated, using any input string, are human distinguishable, we conjecture that it is
possible to build a GAN with a special latent vector. Particularly, when a subset of
latent vector components (called major components are changed even individually,
it can result in human-perceptible changes in the generated images, while the other
(minor components cannot individually produce such changes and encode relatively
imperceptible characteristics of the images. We built the constraints of major and
minor components into CEAL training procedure, which not only decomposed these
components in the latent vector, but also pushed the efficiency of the major components to encode larger keys. We then use the major components to estimate the
capacity of CEAL.
• Capacity. In addition to the human aspects, the security of a key fingerprint
depends on the encoding capacity of a solution, i.e., the max number of unique
distinguishable images the algorithm can generate, where the larger capacity solution
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is stronger against attacks. CEAL is able to push the key payload capacity of the
images to the limit of human perception. The separation of the major and minor
components allows the use of error correction codes to properly encode the input
vectors to CEAL into a representation that will guarantee the generated image to
be human distinguishable (see Definition 6.4.2).
Implementation and evaluation. We implemented and trained CEAL using
Tensorflow [ABC+ 16]. We then show that ceal images are distinguishable and it is
computationally hard for even powerful adversaries to find a collision. We run brute
force attacks using 156 million attack images generated for 79 million target inputs.
We then use HPD to identify likely successful attack images along with their broken
targets. We use MTurk to label these images. Out of 308 potential attack samples
we identified, only 0.97% was missed by human.
In addition, the human verifiers can quickly compare ceal images: on average, it
took 2.04s for our workers to compare similar (attack) pairs of ceal images.

6.2
6.2.1

Model and Applications
System Model

We consider a key fingerprint based authentication scenario where every identity
represents his keying material or online identify (e.g. email address, IP address,
Bitcoin account, etc.) using an image (i.e. key fingerprint of his key or identity).
To authenticate the identity, one should obtain the key fingerprint of the contact
in advance through a secure channel. Upon authentication verification, the user
computes the key fingerprint of the online identify and compares it to his reference
(see Figure 1.2).
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6.2.2

Applications

We now discuss several applications of visual key fingerprint solutions.
Bitcoin Clipboard Attack Prevention. Visual key fingerprints can prevent
clipboard hijacking attacks performed on Bitcoin users [Sub18]. In this type of
attack, a malware gains access to the clipboard of a user while he copy-pastes a
Bitcoin address, and replaces it with the attacker’s address. Key fingerprints for
Bitcoin addresses can prevent this attack: The user compares the fingerprint of the
copy-pasted address with the reference of the recipient’s address.
Phishing Attack Prevention. Visual key fingerprints can also provide both server
and contact authentication in online communications. Social network, e-mail, and
financial service providers can use visual key fingerprints to prevent phishing attacks,
by allowing their users to authenticate both the service and their contacts on the
site. For instance, CEAL can provide a visual clue of the identity of a website that
is visited by a user, i.e., the domain names of website.
Authentication in E2EE Apps. Key fingerprint solutions can be used for authentication in different online system such as End-to-End Encrypted (E2EE) applications on smartphones (e.g., WhatsApp [Wha], Viber [Vib], Facebook messenger [Con16]). To authenticate the other party in the communication, the user needs
to manually compare the peer’s public key fingerprint against a reference fingerprint
that she has previously acquired through a secure channel (e.g., in person, from a
trusted sites, etc).
Avatars. Similar to identicons [Par07], visual key fingerprints can also be used to
represent unique avatars for users of online wiki pages, forums or who post blog
comments. For instance, the email, IP address, or the browser fingerprint of the
user can be used to generate a ceal for her identity, while helping preserve the user’s
identity and improve the user experience of the web site visitors.
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Device Pairing. Visual key fingerprints can be used to pair devices (e.g., Bluetooth
Secure Simple Pairing using ECDH [Pad17]): the user can confirm the identity of
the other device by verifying the ceal corresponding to the device’s key.
Security Indicators. A visual key fingerprint generated by CEAL can provide
a visual password hint for users while they are typing their password: the ceal
corresponding to the user’s password is shaped as the user enters the character and
the user can verify if he has entered the right password without requirement to
display the password on the screen.
File Integrity Check. Key fingerprints can provide a more usable alternative for
checking the integrity of files downloaded from the Internet. Instead of comparing
hash values (of the downloaded file and a reference from a trusted site), the user
will compare their fingerprints.

6.2.3

Adversary Model

We assume an adversary who attempts to generate input keys whose visual fingerprints will be perceived by a human verifier to be similar to the fingerprint of a
specific victim (see Figure 6.1). We assume that the adversary has blackbox access
to the VKFG function. While the adversary can brute-force search the input space,
we also consider a (γ, d)-adversary, similar to that of Dechand et al. [DSB+ ], who
picks candidate strings within Hamming distance d < γ to the victim’s key K. The
adversary can then apply VKFG to the candidate strings, to generate attack visual
fingerprints.
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Figure 6.1: Adversary model: Let’s assume that Alice is trying to verify the identify
of his contact, Bob. For this, Alice computes the fingerprint of the public key of the
contact and compares it to a trusted reference of Bob’s key fingerprint that she has
obtained previously through a secure out of band channel. However, the adversary
can perform a man-in-the-middle-attack. Particularly, the adversary attempts to
impersonate the victim (Bob), by using a public key whose corresponding fingerprint
image will be perceived to be the same as that of the victim (Bob).

6.3

Problem Definition

Informally, we seek to construct a set of images, where each image can be distinguished from any other image in the set, by a human. Furthermore, we desire to
construct a hash-like mapping function, from an input space of strings of the same
size to the set of images that we generate. In the following, for simplicity, we also
refer to input strings as keys. This will allow us to represent a given input string
with an image, which will not be confused for another input’s image representation.
For practical applications, we require the set of images to be large, and infeasible
to store and enumerate. Therefore, we define our set through a generator, which
takes an input string and outputs the corresponding element in the set. In the rest
of this section, we provide a formal definition of the visual fingerprint problem, and
introduce mechanisms which we have used to build our solution.
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We define set of RGB images I, and a function HP Dratio : I × I → [0, 1] that
captures the proportion of experiments where humans would perceive the pair of
images to be distinguishable. Let Pui,j ∈ {0, 1}, denote the result of the uth human
perception experiment on an image pair Ii , Ij ∈ I, Pui,j = 1 if and only if the human
perceives the images to be different, Pui,j = 0 otherwise. Then, if h is the number of
human experiments conducted per each image pair, HP Dratio (Ii , Ij ) =

Ph

u=1

h

Pui,j

.

We seek to build a visual key fingerprint generation function V KF G : {0, 1}γ →
IS , where, IS ⊂ I. VKFG, and thereby IS , has the following desired property: For
all binary input strings Ki , Kj ∈ {0, 1}γ , and their corresponding mapped images
Ii , Ij ∈ IS : V KF G(Ki ) = Ii , V KF G(Kj ) = Ij ,

Ki 6= Kj ⇐⇒ HP Dratio (Ii , Ij ) = 1
In practice, it is very challenging to build a generator that satisfies the VKFG
requirement for all possible human visual systems. However, having access to a
HP Dratio function, would immediately allow a generator training algorithm to tap
into golden annotations of which images are suitable to generate. In practice, we
are not able to run a large number of perception experiments for any given pair of
images. However, given a sufficient number of annotations, a regression predictor
model HP Dpredict : I × I → [0, 1] may be used to approximate the HP Dratio
function, E(|HP Dpredict(I1 , I2 ) − HP Dratio (I1 , I2 )|) < ǫ. We show that, even when
a small number of annotated data is present, a very limited classification model
HP Dequal : I × I → {0, 1} which can detect distinguishable image pairs with high
precision at the cost of low recall, P (HP Dratio > 0 | HP Dequal (I1 , I2 ) = 1) < ǫ, is
sufficient for training a generator which satisfies the VKFG requirement
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6.3.1

Requirements for a Key Fingerprint Generator

Here, we briefly summarize the requirements for a VKFG function.
• Human-distinguishability of fingerprints. Any pair of fingerprint images
that can be mapped from the key space should be distinguishable by humans.
• Capacity. To be resistant against attacks, the solutions needs to have sufficiently large capacity, i.e., the number of unique distinguishable images that the
VKFG can generate should be sufficiently large.
• Ease of comparison. Humans should be able to quickly compare any generated images for equality.

6.4

The CEAL System

In practice, it is very challenging to build a generator that satisfies the VKFG
requirement for all possible human visual systems (see § 6.3). Instead, we propose to
′

build a weak visual key fingerprint generation function V KF Gweak : {0, 1}γ → IW ,
where IW ⊂ I. Let dH denote the Hamming distance. The V KF Gweak is not
able to guarantee that key pairs will be distinguishable if their dH is within d,
E(HP Dratio (Ii , Ij ) | dH (Ki , Kj ) < d) < 1 − ǫ. However, for key pairs whose dH
value is at least d, V KF Gweak is able to guarantee human distinguishability, i.e.,
′

∀Ki , Kj ∈ {0, 1}γ , dH (Ki , Kj ) ≥ d ⇐⇒ HP Dratio (Ii , Ij ) = 1, where Ii , Ij ∈ IS ,
V KF Gweak (Ki ) = Ii , and V KF Gweak (Kj ) = Ij . Therefore, our problem reduces to
building such an instance of V KF Gweak and identifying the minimum value for d
that satisfies the above requirements.
We show that it is possible to build a VKFG using a V KF Gweak with the help
′

of an error correcting code encoder, ECC. Let ECC : {0, 1}γ → {0, 1}γ , with minimum distance of d, hence ∀Ki , Kj ∈ {0, 1}γ , Ki 6= Kj =⇒ dH (ECC(Ki ), ECC(Kj )) ≥
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Figure 6.2: CEAL System. CEAL accepts as input a binary string and used input
mapper module to map the input to the input latent vector components to Gceal ).
The generator network, then generates the visual key fingerprint (ceal) corresponding to the input string.
d. We can apply the ECC to the input and apply V KF Gweak to the encoded string,
which makes sure that the input to V KF Gweak are always human distinguishable
by definition of the V KF Gweak . Therefore, V KF Gweak ◦ ECC : {0, 1}γ → IW ′ ,
where IW ′ ⊂ IW , and ∀I1 , I2 ∈ IW ′ , HP Dratio (I1 , I2 ) = 1.
We introduce CEAL (CrEdential Assurance Labeling), a VKFG function that
uses a GAN [GPAM+ 14] to generate realist images and address the requirements of
§ 6.3.1. CEAL has two major components: (1) CEAL DCGAN a DCGAN [RMC15]
network with an additional discriminator, i.e. a human perception discriminator;
(2) Key Mapper (KMap). The process of generating a ceal image for an input string
is depicted in Figure 6.2. Let K be the input (e.g. (truncated) hash of the user’s
key, i.e. its binary fingerprint). Let γ = |K|. The KMap module in CEAL converts
the input key into a latent vector L. Let λ = |L|, γ < λ. The latent vector is then
used as input to the generator network of CEAL DCGAN (Gceal ). It then generates
ceal corresponding to the input string.
To thwart adversaries who can generate K ′ to be at small Hamming distance
from K (see § 6.2.3), we design CEAL to generate image fingerprints that are visually
different even when the keys are similar. For this, we define the following image pair
generation (IPG) process, that takes as input a seed latent vector with length λ and
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an index i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., λ}, and outputs two vectors v1 and v2 , also of length λ:
Definition 6.4.1 (Image Pair Generation: IPG(v, i)). Generate vectors v1 and
v2 , such that v1 [i] = 1 and v2 [i] = -1, and v1 [j] = v2 [j] = v[j], ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., λ}, j 6=
i. -1 and 1 are the extreme values of each component. We use these values to
maximize the effect of a component in generated images when generating ceals.
We further introduce the following conjecture:
Conjecture 6.4.2 (Major and Minor Components). We conjecture that a
subset of the latent vector components, when changed individually, can produce perceptible changes in the generated images. We call these “major components” of the
latent vector. Further, we conjecture that a disjoint subset of the latent vector components, when changed individually, do not produce perceptible changes in the output
images.
According to Conjecture 6.4.2, we further conjecture that only the major components contribute to the entropy or capacity of the CEAL VKFG function, while
the minor components can help CEAL generate realistic images or maintain other
visual aspects of the image.
Let M be a system parameter, the number of major components of the latent
vector. Thus, the number of minor components is m = λ − M. We select the values
for the M major components from the set {−1, 1} to maximize the effect of each
component on the visual characteristics of the generated images. However, we select
the values for each of the m minor components, uniformly random from (−1, 1).
In the following, we use CEAL to denote the system and ceal to denote its output
image for a given user input. We now describe each module of CEAL.
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Figure 6.3: CEAL DCGAN architecture and training. We use the combination of
Discriminator loss and HPD loss to train the generator to generate distinguishable
and realistic images. We also learn a latent vector that consist of major and minor
components (see Conjecture 6.4.2).

6.4.1

CEAL DCGAN

We introduce CEAL DCGAN, a DCGAN [RMC15]-based deep generative model
(see Figure 6.3). CEAL DCGAN architecture is similar to the architecture of DCGAN [RMC15]. The heart of the CEAL DCGAN is a generator network, i.e., the
CEAL generator (Gceal ), that can generate realistic and human distinguishable images. For an input key (K), we use KMap (§ 6.4.2) to transform the binary key
fingerprint of a K into the major and minor components, that are then concatenated
to form the input latent vector to CEAL generator. The Gceal then generates the
image (i.e. ceal) corresponding to K.
We train the generator network using two classifiers (see Figure 6.3): (1) the
CEAL discriminator (Dceal ) that is trained to differentiate between real images,
from a dataset of images, and synthetically generated images by Gceal ; (2) HPD
classifier that is trained to estimate the likelihood that a human will label a pair of
images as either same or different.
We train the discriminator network of CEAL DCGAN similar to conventional
GAN using a real dataset of images (see § 3.1.5). However, Human Perception
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Discriminator (HPD) is a classifier we train to estimate the human distinguishability
of the image pairs (HP Dratio ), see § 6.3. The output of this classifier is referred to
as HP Dpredict. In the following, we first describe the HPD. We then describe how
we used trained HPD along with Dceal to train CEAL DCGAN to generate realistic
and distinguishable images.
Human Perception Discriminator (HPD)
The Human Perception Discriminator (HPD) module takes two images as input, and
computes the probability that the images are perceived as being different images by
humans.
The HPD Architecture and Training Process. We build HPD using a DNN.
The high level architecture of the HPD classifier network, illustrated in Figure 6.4, is
similar to a Siamese network [CHL05]. Specifically, the HPD consists of two identical, twin networks (with shared weights). Each network accepts as input one of the
two input images and passes it through the layers of trained Inception.v1 [SLJ+ 15]
network (see § 3.1.4). It then extracts 50, 176 image features i.e., the activations of
the ‘Mixed 5c” layer of inception.v1. In § 6.6.1 we experimentally justify the choice
of the layer. Following the Inception.v1 network, HPD adds to both of its twin
networks, several additional fully connected layers.
To train the HPD network, we do not update the weights of Inception.v1 layers.
However, we optimize the weights of the (three) additional fully-connected layers,
using weighted contrastive loss [CHL05] with L2 regularization. The purpose of this
loss is to enable the network to differentiate between the two images and regularization is used to prevent overfitting. Equation 3.1 shows how the weights are updated
based on the weighted contrastive loss for two input samples X1 and X2.
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Figure 6.4: Human Perception Discriminator (HPD) architecture. HPD passes input
images I1 and I2 through the Inception.v1 network, applies 3 fully connected layers to
generate image feature vectors O1 and O2 , computes the Squared Euclidean distance
between O1 and O2 and passes it through a fully connected layer to the computed
distance. HPD classifies I1 and I2 as different or same based on this distance.
After training the (three) additional layers in the twin Siamese network, we freeze
the network weights and feed their derived output, i.e., the component-wise squared
differences between the last layers of the networks for the input image pair, to an
additional fully connected layer (here, with 1 neuron, i.e. HPD output, with sigmoid
activation function). We optimize this layer’s weights using well known weighted
cross-entropy loss and L2 regularization of the layers weights. We train this layer
to classify the image pairs into either of “same” or “different” classes, based on the
squared Euclidean distance between the image pair features that is obtained from
the Siamese network. As we describe in § 6.6, we decide the choice of architecture
(including the number of layers and nodes in each layer) through hyper-parameter
search.
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Figure 6.5: Image pairs generated while training CEAL: Step 1 focuses on promoting
CEAL to generate different images when a major component value is flipped (set
to 1 and -1). Step 2, focuses on promoting minor components to not change the
visual characteristic of generated images when their values are modified. Step 3,
prompts CEAL to generate diverse set of images by further training it using major
components. (see § 6.4.1).
Training CEAL DCGAN
While the DCGAN [RMC15] generates realistic images, we train CEAL DCGAN to
generate images that are both realistic, and visually distinguishable by human. To
achieve this, in each training epoch, we train Gceal in 3 steps, shown below. In each
step, we randomly create a set of latent vector pairs, that we generate from a set
of random seed latent vectors whose components are uniformly selected from (-1,1).
We then use Gceal to generate the corresponding image pairs. Similar to DCGAN,
we train Gceal using the output (real/fake) of discriminator (Dceal ) for the generated
images by Gceal . In addition, we use the HPD (§ 6.4.1) to compute the HP Dpredict
corresponding to each image pairs. We then use the HP Dpredicts as a feedback to
Gceal about the visual characteristics of the images that it generated: adjusts the
weights of Gceal based on an objective that is a function of HP Dpredict.
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Although in each of the 3 steps we use a diﬀerent set of latent vector pairs
as input to Gceal, the objective functions for all the steps has a general form as
shown in Equation 6.1. Therefore in each step, we implicitly use this equation as
the loss function to train Gceal. In this equation, HP Dloss is the HPD loss that
we define exclusively for the step. This loss is an indicator of how diﬀerent the
generated images are, as perceived by a human. α ∈ IR is a weight that determines
the contribution of HP Dloss to the overall loss value for the step. Gloss is the
generator loss in the conventional GAN (i.e., Gloss = −log(Dceal(Gceal(z))), where
z is a sample latent vector). This loss is an indicator of how realistic and visually
similar the generated images are, compared to the images in the real image dataset
used for training Dceal.

L(θGceal ) = α × HP Dloss + Gloss

(6.1)

Human Distinguishability. We leverage the input latent vector to control the
visual characteristics of the images generated by Gceal. Specifically, we train Gceal
to generate (1) visually distinguishable images when the values of individual major
components in the latent vectors are changed (flipped between 1 and -1) and (2)
visually indistinguishable images when the values for minor components are flipped
(see § 6.3).
Let M and m = λ − M be the number of major and minor components in the
latent vector input to Gceal. We now describe each of the 3 steps, i.e., how we
generate the 3 sets of latent vector pairs, and the HP Dloss function that we use in
that training step. Each latent vector pair that we generate, is diﬀerent in d = 1 or
d = 2 specific major or minor components.
• Step 1. Generate M random seed latent vectors. Then, for each index i ∈
{1, 2, 3, ..., M}, use the IPG(i) of Definition 6.4.1, along with the corresponding
generated seed latent vector, to generate two random latent vectors v1 and v2. Use
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Gceal to generate images I1 and I2 from v1 and v2 respectively. Use the HPD classifier
to compute HP Dpredict(I1 , I2 ).
To force the ith component of the latent vector to be a major component, i.e.,
maximize the effect of the ith component on the visual characteristics of the generated images, we want the HPD classifier to classify all these image pairs (I1 , I2 ) as
different (class 1). To achieve this, we define the HP Dloss for the pair of images to
be: HP Dloss(v1 , v2 ) = cross entropy(1, HP Dpredict(I1 , I2 )).
• Step 2. Generate m random seed latent vectors. For each minor position i ∈
{M +1, M +2, ..., λ}, form sample latent vector pairs v1 and v2 as in Definition 6.4.1.
Use Gceal on v1 and v2 to generate images M1 and M2 .
To force the ith component of the latent vector to be a minor component, we want
the HPD classifier to classify (M1 , M2 ) as same (class 0). To achieve this, we define
the HP Dloss for this pair to be: HP Dloss(v1 , v2 ) = cross entropy(0, HP Dpredict(M1 , M2 )).
• Step 3. Generate one batch of random seed latent vectors (here, 64). For each
latent vector, pick two random major components i, j ∈R {1, 2, 3, ..., M} and i 6= j.
Copy seed latent vector v into two other latent vectors v1 and v2 , then set v1 [i] = 1
and v2 [j] = 1. Thus, v1 and v2 only differ in the i-th and j-th components. Let N1
and N2 be the images that are generated by Gceal from v1 and v2 respectively. We
define the loss of the generator as HP Dloss = cross entropy(1, HP Dpredict(N1 , N2 )).
This step seeks to train Gceal to use any 2 major components to impose different
effects on the visual characteristic of generated images.
Realism. In each epoch, the discriminator is also trained similar to conventional
DCGAN to discriminate between the real images from a particular dataset and
synthetic images generated by Gceal in all the 3 steps above. Subsequently, Gceal
is trained using the classification signal provided by Dceal : we included this signal
as Gloss in the overall loss function used for training Gceal in each step (see Equa-
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tion 6.1). This process encourages Gceal to generate previously unseen images, that
look like the images in the real image dataset, thus deceive Dceal to classify them as
real images.

6.4.2

Key Mapper (KMap)

KMap takes as input user data (e.g., public key, shared key, Bitcoin address, IP
address, domain name) and outputs a latent vector L of length λ. For this, KMap
first computes a cryptographic hash of the input to produce K, its binary key
fingerprint, of length γ.
To generate the major components of the latent vector L, KMap employs an error
correcting code with encoder E (see § 3.3) that encodes a binary string of length γ
into a code word of length ≤ M (i.e., the number of major components). Specifically,
KMap computes E(K), then performs a one-to-one mapping between the bits of the
code word E(K) and the major components of L: L[i] = -1 if E(K)[i] = 0 and L[i]
= 1 if E(K)[i] = 1, i = {1, 2, 3, ..., M}. The indices of these components in the
latent vector are arbitrary selected. If |E(K)| < M, we set L[i] = -1 for M − |E(K)|
other i positions of the major components.
The error correcting code enables KMap to compensate for the training limitation of the generator network of the CEAL DCGAN (§ 6.4.1) and fine tune the
distinguishability of ceal images that it generates (see § 6.6).
KMap uses then a pseudo random number generator R seeded with K, to randomly select the values for m = λ − M minor components of L: L(i) ∈ U(−1, 1),
i ∈ {M + 1, M + 2, M + 3, ..., λ}.
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6.5

Data

To evaluate CEAL, we use several datasets of real and synthetically generated images. We describe them in the following sections.

6.5.1

Real Outdoor Image Dataset

We use a subset of 150,113 outdoor landscape images (mountains, ocean, forest) of
64 by 64 pixels, from the MIT Places205 dataset [ZLX+ 14, Out18]. In addition, we
manually collected 35 additional images that represent outdoor scenes using Google
image search. We selected images that include only a few objects and colors, e.g.,
horizon and landscapes. These are used as obviously same images in our surveys
(see § 6.5.2).

6.5.2

Ground Truth Human Perception Dataset

We train a DCGAN network with random uniform input latent vector of length
λ = 100, using the real outdoor image dataset of § 6.5.1. We stopped training the
network when we started to observe realistic images similar to the ones in training
dataset (after 10 epochs). We refer to this trained network as “vanilla DCGAN”.
We generated two datasets of synthetic image pairs using vanilla DCGAN and
collected their labels using MTurk workers. For this, we followed an IRB-approved
protocol to recruit 500 adult workers located in the US, to label 558 unique image
pairs. We asked each worker to label each image pair as being either “same” or
“different” images. After analyzing the workers responses, 318 image pairs were
labeled as different and 240 pairs were labeled as same. In following, we describe
the two labeling processes that generated this dataset.
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Participants.. We collected labels from 500 human workers: 337 female and 163
male, with an age range of 18 to 84 (M=44.54, SD=14.64). 85.5% of our participants
had college education or higher. 220 (40.5%), 251 (50.3%), 26 (5.2%), 21 (4.0%)
participants used a desktop, laptop and mobile device, or tablet to answer the
surveys respectively.
Labeling Process 1
We used the vanilla DCGAN network to generate 100 synthetic “different” image
pairs using 100 random seed latent vectors (v) and IPG of Definition 6.4.1 for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 100}. We assume that the images in each such pair are perceived as
being “different” by humans.
In addition, we generated 40 identical image pairs: 32 pairs from the real outdoor scenes image dataset (§ 6.5.1) plus 8 pairs from randomly selected synthetic
images among the above 100 image pairs of the previous step. We used proportional
sampling to divide the total of 140 image pairs (100 “different”, 40 “same”) into 4
groups of size 35 (25 assumed “different”, 10 assumed “same”). We then recruited 4
groups of 100 different MTurk workers (400 workers in total) and asked each group
of 100 workers to label each of the 35 image pairs in one of the groups. Thus, each
image pair received 100 labels, one from each worker to which the pair was shown;
each worker labeled 35 image pairs.
To avoid collecting low quality labels from inattentive workers, we have included
an attention test (a.k.a. golden task [LWZF17]) at the beginning of the surveys. We
did not collect the labels from workers who failed to answer the attention test correctly. In addition, we removed the responses from speeders [GMS15], i.e., workers
who completed a survey in less than a minute, which is about one standard error less
than the average worker response time. We also removed the answers from workers
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who made more than 10 errors (or 10% error) with respect to the assumed labels
for the image pairs they processed. In total, we have removed the responses of 34
of the 400 workers. Subsequently, we have the labels from at least 94 workers for
each image pair.
We then assigned to each image pair its assumed (“same” or “different”) label,
only if more that 90% of the worker responses agreed with it. Otherwise, we assigned
the opposite label. This is because we wish to have high confidence for the image
pairs labels. By this choice, we will be conservative in the case of “different” images:
we don’t want to have an image pair labeled as different if not almost all of our
workers agreed. Consequently, 75 and 65 of the image pairs were respectively labeled
as different and same by our workers.
Verification Device. The device on which the comparison is taking place does
not have a significant affect on user performance and time to compare image pairs.
Particularly, we studied the quality of responses collected from 400 MTurk workers
in the DCGAN image labeling Process 1. 160, 201, 21, and 18 participants used
a desktop, laptop, mobile phone, or tablet to complete the surveys respectively. A
Kruskal-Wallis test, did not show a significant difference between the number of
errors made (w.r.t. the hypothetical labels) by participants responding to surveys
using either of four devices, i.e., desktop, laptop, mobile phone, and tablet, to
complete the surveys (P-value = 0.93). We also did not observe any significant
difference between the overall time it took for the participants using different devices
to complete our surveys (P-value = 0.06).
Labeling Process 2
Following the Labeling Process 1 (§ 6.5), we identified the index of 3 random components in the input latent vector to vanilla DCGAN whose corresponding generated
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images were labeled with relatively high error rates by workers (respectively, 52%,
27% and 20%). This error rate was calculated with respect to the hypothetical
labels we assumed for images. We then performed a second labeling experiment,
to determine if the error rate we observed was due to the fact that the component
always produces indistinguishable image pairs when its value is flipped or this is
due to other factors, e.g. the contribution of all the other components on what the
image looks like.
First, for each of the 3 image pairs with the relatively high error rate in labeling
Process 1, with hypothetical label of “different”, we generate 99 variant image pairs
as follows: Let j be the index of the component that we flipped to generate this
particular image pair in Process 1 (which resulted in a high error rate). Also, let v
be the seed latent vector (see Definition 6.4.1) corresponding to this image pair. For
all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 100} index values, where i 6= j, we use the IPG of Definition 6.4.1
to obtain two copies of v that only differ in the i-th component, then use the vanilla
DCGAN to obtain an assumed “different” image pair. In total, we generate 297
(99 × 3) image pairs that are hypothetically different.
Second, for each random 10 components (inducing previous 3 component) with
relatively high error rate in Process 1, with hypothetical label of “different”, we
generate 10 image pairs using a new seed latent vector randomly. We obtain two
copies of the new seed latent vector and set the values of the j th components to 1
and -1 in the first and second copy respectively. Thus, in total, we generate 100
image pairs.
Further, we used a total of 49 unique hypothetically same pairs in this study:
28 from real and synthetic images that were labeled correctly by a majority of the
workers in Labeling Process 1, 3 real images that we collected from Google images
(see 6.5.1) and 18 synthetic images randomly selected from the above Process 1.
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We selected the image pairs for each survey as follows. We split the 397 assumed
“different” and a random subset of size 10 from 49 “same” image pairs into 10
different sets, each for a different survey. Except for one residual survey, each survey
consists of 50 image pair comparisons: 30 image pairs out of 297 image pairs of first
step, 10 image pairs out of 100 image pairs of second step, and 10 assumed same
image pairs. We asked 10 MTurk workers to label the image pairs in each set as
either “same” or “different” (total of 100 workers).
As before, we eliminated the labels provided by speeders and the workers who
failed the attention check at the beginning of the surveys. In total, we removed
responses from 13 workers. Then, for each image pair, we assigned it the assumed
“different” or “same” label, only if more than 80% of the workers agreed with it.
Otherwise, we assigned the opposite of the hypothetical label as the true label of
the image pair. In total, 243 images were labeled as different, while 203 image pairs
were labeled as same. We found no disagreement between the labeling results for
28 hypothetically same image pairs that were common in Process 1 and 2.
The Spearman correlation test did not reveal any significant monotonic correlation between the error rate for components in Process 1, and image pairs corresponding to these components, in both experiments. Therefore, we conclude that
the visual characteristics of a generated image is determined by a combination of
effects of each component in the latent vector.

6.5.3

HPD Classifier Dataset

In order to train the Human Perception Discriminator (HPD) classifier, we have
generated 6 different datasets of synthetic image pairs, containing a total of 26,802
image pairs, including the labeled image pairs from ground truth human perception
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Dataset Name

# pairs

Labeled Synthetic Image Pairs

Similarity

558

Mixed

Unrealistic DCGAN Image Pairs

11,072

Same

Minor Change in Latent Vector

7,040

Same

Blob Image Pair Dataset

2,108

Different

10%-different Image Pair Dataset

1,024

Different

Enhanced Synthetic Image Pair Dataset

5000

Different

Table 6.1: Size of 6 generated image pair datasets, of either “same”, “different” or
“mixed” image pairs, used to train the HPD classifier.
dataset. Table 6.1 lists these datasets and their corresponding number of image
pairs. In the following, we describe each dataset.
Set 1: Labeled Synthetic Image Pairs. This dataset is the gold standard human
perception labeled dataset of § 6.5.2 (318 “different” and 240 “same” image pairs).
Set 2: Unrealistic DCGAN Image Pairs. In order to train the HPD to correctly classify visually similar, but random noise images, as “same” we generated
an unrealistic image dataset of 11,072 image pairs using a poorly trained vanilla
DCGAN: (1) 10,048 image pairs using a vanilla DCGAN trained for only 1400 iterations, i.e., less than an epoch, and (2) 1,024 image pairs using the same vanilla
DCGAN trained for 3600 iterations (slightly more than an epoch).
We generated each of these image pairs as follows: randomly generate a latent
vector, then select a random component and set its value to 1 once and -1 the other
time. We label each pair as “same”. That is, we wish to train the HPD classifier to
classify these image pairs as being the same, as this is how a human verifier will see
them (gray images with random noise).
Set 3: Minor Change in Latent Vector. To increase the number of synthetic
“same” image pairs in the synthetic datasets, we chose a random seed latent vector
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and (1) used it to generate one image of the pair and (2) chose a random component
of the seed latent vector and multiplied its value by c ∈ [0, 1], then generate the
other image in the pair. We generated 1024 image pairs with c = 0.5, 3008 pairs
with c = 0.6 and 3008 pairs with c = 0.7, for a total of 7,040 image pairs. We
manually sampled and verified that these image pairs look the same.
Set 4: Blob Image Pair Dataset. First, we generated 20 different blobs of
random shapes and colors. Then, we generated 1,000 realistic images using the
vanilla DCGAN model using random input latent vectors. We then form image
pairs that consist of (1) one synthetic image and (2) the same image, overlayed with
one randomly chosen blob. We only accept the composite image (2) if its dominant
color is dissimilar in the blob overlap position, to the color of the blob. To measure
the similarity between colors we compute the Delta E CIE 2000 [SWD05] score,
representing colors that are perceived to be different by humans [Sch11]. We accept
the composite image if this score exceeds 50. In total, we generated 2,108 “blob”
image pairs.
Set 5: 10%-different Image Pair Dataset. We generated 1,024 different image
pairs as follows: generate a random seed latent vector, copy it to v1 and v2 , select
10 random latent components (out of 100) and set the values of these components
to 1 in v1 and -1 in v2 . We then used the trained vanilla DCGAN to generate
the corresponding image pair. Thus, these 1,024 image pairs are generated from
latent vectors that are different in 10% of the components. We set this percentage
experimentally, where we found 10% to be the smallest percentage of difference that
resulted in always distinguishable image pairs.
Set 6: Enhanced Synthetic Image Pair Dataset. We generated 5,000 different
image pairs as follows. For each of 1,000 random, vanilla DCGAN generated images,
we generated 5 images, by applying either of 5 enhancements, change (1) image
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Network

Hyper-parameters

labeled synthetic
dataset

Unrealistic DCGAN
image pairs (itr 1400)

Unrealistic DCGAN
image pairs (itr 3600)

All other
synthetic datasets

m

w

r

F1

FPR

FNR

Precision

F1

FPR

FNR

F1

FPR

FNR

F1

FPR

FNR

Siamese model 1

1.64

0.49

0.02

0.72

0.20

0.35

0.82

-

0.06

-

-

0.32

-

0.77

0.01

0.35

HPD model 1

-

1.57

0.24

0.82

0.24

0.21

0.84

-

0.15

-

-

0.47

-

0.83

0.02

0.29

HPD model 2

-

0.78

0.17

0.54

0.04

0.62

0.93

-

0.004

-

-

0.12

-

0.63

0.001

0.54

Table 6.2: Performance of the best HPD classifier and its underlying Siamese-like
network, over different HPD classifier datasets.
brightness, (2) contrast, (3) color, (4) add noise to the image, and (5) apply a blur
filter to the image. We experimented with multiple parameters for each enhancement
function and selected the parameters so that the generated image pairs (the original
image and its enhanced version) are visually distinguishable.

6.6

Implementation

We have built CEAL in Python using Tensorflow 1.3.0. In this section, we describe
the process we used to identify the parameters for which CEAL components,HPD,
CEAL DCGAN and KMap, performs best. In the case of the first two components,
we discuss the networks training and hyper parameter tuning.

6.6.1

HPD Training and Parameter Choice

Inception.v1 Layer Choice. We experimented with using activations of different
layers of the Inception.v1, for image feature extraction in HPD (see 6.4.1). Specifically, we performed 200 runs of each 3 experiments, where we used activations from
either the (1) “Mixed 5c”, (2) “MaxPool 5a 2x2” or (3) “MaxPool 4a 3x3” layers
of the Inception.v1. In each run, we kept the architecture and initial weights of the
fully connected layers weights in HPD identically. We then trained each of the 3
networks for 1000 epochs. We repeated this process 200 times. We then compared
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the performance of trained classifiers using either of these 3 sets of features, using a
paired t-test.
We found a significant difference between the performance (over holdout datasets)
of HPD classifiers trained using the “Mixed 5c” layer features, compared to the
other two layers (P-Value = 0.000 when compared to “MaxPool 4a 3x3” layer, and
P-Value = 0.000, when compared to “MaxPool 5a 2x2” features). In the following,
we implicitly use the features extracted based on the activations of the “Mixed 5c”
layer. The length of the activations vector for this layer is 50,176.
Training the HPD. We use the 6 datasets of § 6.5.3 to train and evaluate HPD.
Particularly, we randomly split each synthetic dataset (except the Labeled Synthetic
image pairs), into training ( 80% of samples) and holdout ( 20%) sets: we use the
training sets to train the HPD classifier, then test its performance over holdout sets.
For the Labeled Synthetic image pairs dataset, we make sure the number of ground
truth image pairs that are labeled as same and different are distributed to training
and test sets proportionally to their size.
We hyper-tuned the architecture and parameters of the HPD classifier to find a
classifier which accurately identifies samples from the “different” class (has high
precision).

Such a classifier is necessary when training the CEAL DCGAN to

ensure CEAL DCGAN stays away from generating images that are not humandistinguishable. Among the classifiers that we have trained with high precision, we
chose the one with a quite balance FPR and FNR (highest F1).
Specifically, we experimented with different numbers of fully connected layers
in the twin network of HPD and different numbers of neurons in each layer, and
adding drop-out with different probabilities for the last hidden layer of the Siamese
network. Further, instead of computing the Euclidean distance between the output
of the Siamese network for the two images in a pair, we also tested by concate-
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nating these outputs and feeding them directly into the following fully connected
layer(s). Figure 6.4 shows the best performing architecture for the HPD network.
Table 6.2 shows the performance of the Siamese network and of the HPD networks
that we trained and used to train CEAL DCGAN. In addition, we also use an HPD
model that has the same weights as HPD model 1 in the Siamese layers, but different weights in the fully connected layer on top of the twin networks in the HPD
architecture. This network, referred to as HPD model 2, has a higher precision on
the hold out datasets compared to model 1 (see Table 6.2). We also, tested with
this network to train and evaluate CEAL.

6.6.2

CEAL DCGAN Parameter Choice

In addition to using different HPD models to train CEAL DCGAN, we experimented
with 2 different architectures using different number of neurons in the first layer of
Gceal (i.e. 8,192 and 16,384). The size of this layer also directly impacts the number
of following convolution transpose (a.k.a deconvolution) layers in Gceal : more input
neurons, larger layers.
We also performed a grid search in the parameters of the CEAL DCGAN including (1) the input size (λ ∈ 64, 128, 256, 512), (2) the number of major and minor
components ( λ2 , and (3) the α ∈ [25, 75] with step size 5, in the loss functions of the
ceal generator (see Equation 6.1). For best performing parameters, we also tested
with different weight initialization for the networks weights.
We trained the CEAL DCGAN using the process described in § 6.4.1, for 5
epochs, with batch size 64, and the Adam optimizer [KB15] to minimize Equation 6.1
for each step. We completed an epoch when all the images in the outdoor image
dataset were shown to the discriminator. In order to make the training process more
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stable, we trained the generator 3 times for every time we train the discriminator,
but using the same inputs.
We observed that, when α is increased, the HP Dloss decreases faster (see Equation 6.1). However, the quality of the images is reduced for large values of α. In
addition, we observed that it is harder to train networks with larger values of λs:
the quality of images generated by CEAL DCGAN and their distinguishability decreases as we increase λ. Finally, we observed that when the size of the nodes in
the first layer of Gceal is increased, the network generates smoother (blurred) with
lower quality images.
We also experimented with the number of times that the generator network is
trained using the three steps described in § 6.4.1, in each training epoch of Gceal .
Using the first and third steps, we train Gceal to prompt major components to result
in perceptible change when their values are modified. However, the second step
focuses on training minor components to make them cause imperceptible change in
the output images when their values are changed from -1 to 1. We observed that
when the minor components are trained using Step 2 twice, there is a better balance
between Gloss and HP Dloss of the trained network. Therefore in the following, we
implicitly train Gceal twice using Step 2.
Evaluating the generative models is a hard task. Theis et al. [TOB15] discuss
that the generative models should be evaluated with respect to the application
domain, since performance using a certain criterion does not necessarily extend to
good performance with respect to another criterion. In order to compare the trained
networks, we use the values for the HP Dloss as well as the Gloss . The former is an
indicator of how different the generated images are as perceived by human, while the
latter is an indicator on how realistic and visually similar the generated images are
compared to the images in the real image dataset used for training the discriminator.
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We have manually evaluated the quality of the images generated by the networks
we trained. The parameters for the best performing network using HPD model 1
are α = 40, λ =256, and M = m = 128. The values of the HP Dloss and Gloss for
this model were 0.6 and 12, respectively.

6.6.3

Key Mapper Parameter Choice

In early experiments, we observed that in order to consistently achieve human distinguishability, we need to flip the values of more than 1 major component (see
§ 6.3). To identify the minimum number of major components that need to be modified to achieve consistent human distinguishability, we manually inspected CEAL
image pairs generated by flipping d major components, where d = 1, 2, 3, ..., 128. We
identified d > 10 to be a suitable value. Therefore, through this paper we consider 3
different values for γ i.e., 92, 85 and 78. For this, we use BCH(127, 92, 5), BCH(127,
85, 6) and BCH(127, 78, 7) respectively in the key mapper module to transform the
binary key fingerprint of length γ into a binary string of length 127 that are at least
in Hamming distance of 11, 13, and 15 respectively.
Note, as we show in our experiments, the choice of γ and the BCH error tolerance
(t) can be used to tune the security vs capacity of CEAL (see § 6.7.3). Based on our
attack results, γ = 78 was selected as the parameter that achieves highest security
(see S 6.7.3 and 6.7.3). In addition, in § 6.7.2, we found that recruited human
subjects labeled all the ceal samples that were generated using latent vectors that
are different in d = 15 major components as different. Note, we did not used any
randomness provided by minor components: the minor components are the same
between target and attack strings. Therefore, we use a BCH(n=127, k=78, t=7)
for KMap, an ECC with minimum Hamming distance of 15 bits that transforms a
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message of length 78 into a code word of length 127. Thus, CEAL DCGAN accepts
binary key fingerprints of length γ = 78 bits. Based on this setting, the maximum
capacity of CEAL is 278 , i.e., CEAL can generate 278 unique and distinguishable
images. In § 6.3, we described that we can achieve human distinguishability with
some error. In the following, we estimate this error to be ∼ 1.02%.

6.7

Empirical Evaluation

In this section we use human participants to evaluate the CEAL system with parameters identified in § 6.6, and compare it against Vash [vas14], the state-of-the-art
visual fingerprint solution. In the following, we first describe the procedure we employed to run the user studies, then investigate Vash and report vulnerabilities that
we identified. We evaluate the effects of major and minor components on human
perception, and the resilience of CEAL against the adversary described in § 6.2.3.
Finally, we compare the human distinguishability and verification speed of CEAL
and Vash.

6.7.1

User Study Procedure

Throughout our evaluation, we followed an IRB-approved protocol to recruit Amazon Mechanical Turk workers to evaluate the performance of CEAL and Vash [vas14].
Specifically, we have recruited 519 adult, US-based workers, to compare a total of
6,579 image pairs: 6,309 CEAL and 270 Vash generated image pairs.
We asked each worker to compare either 35 or 50 pairs of images, and paid
them $0.4 or $0.5, respectively. To verify worker attention, and discard data from
inattentive ones, we included 5 attention check questions in each survey: 3 obviously
different pairs of images, and 2 pairs of same (duplicated) images. For CEAL, we
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generated an obviously different attention check image pair from a random seed
latent vector, and flipped (1 vs. -1) a random set of its 100 major components (out
of 128). For Vash, we generated obviously different attention check image pairs
randomly. We manually verified that all these image pairs look indeed different.
We removed the answers from 12 participants who had incorrectly answered
more than 2 (out of 5) attention check questions in the study.
Thus, we collected labels from 507 human workers: 180 female and 327 male,
with an age range of 18 to 84 (M=35.41, SD=10.38). 90.94% of our participants
had college education or higher. 253 (50%), 249 (49%), 5 (1%) participants used a
desktop, laptop and mobile device to answer the survey respectively.
Overall, for each image pair, we collected annotations from at least 3 workers.
In the Vash user studies of § 6.7.4, we collected at least 10 labels for each image
pair. We then used majority voting [LWZF17] to aggregate the labels assigned by
the workers to each image pair, and produced the human-assigned label.

6.7.2

Choice of Major Component Count

We first leverage the above human workers to evaluate the effects of changing the
values for the major and minor components of the input latent vector to the CEAL
DCGAN, on the visual characteristics of the generated images.
For this, we first evaluated CEAL’s ability to meet one of our training objectives, i.e., that major components have perceptible impact on the generated images
while minor components do no cause perceptible change in the images. than minor
components. For this, we used the IPG of Definition 6.4.1 (λ=256), to generate two
datasets D1 and D2 of image pairs, each containing 8,128 image pairs. We generated
the image pairs in D1 using random latent vectors that were different in only one
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Figure 6.6: The distribution of “different” and “same” labels as annotated by MTurk
workers. The number of image pairs that are identified as same decreases as we flip
more number of minor components or major components.
major component, while the pairs in D2 differ in only one minor component. We
then used our HPD models (see Table 6.2) to compute the probability that image
pairs are perceived as different by a human verifier. A t-test showed that indeed,
the scores given by HPD to image pairs in D1 are significantly higher than those
given to image pairs in D2 (P-value = 0.00).
In a second experiment we evaluated the ability of human workers (see § 6.7.1)
to perceive changes in images when we changed the value for major and minor
components in the latent vector. Specifically, we generated 1,000 image pairs by
flipping (i.e., 1 vs. -1) 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30 randomly chosen major components in
each of 200 latent vectors respectively. Further, we generated another set of 3,000
image pairs, by flipping the values of 2, 3 and 5 randomly chosen minor components
in the latent vectors of 1,500, 1,000 and 500 images respectively.
Figure 6.6 shows the percentage of images that were annotated as “different” and
“same” by workers, for each of the 8 different types of image pairs in our study. We
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Attack
Dtataset

Size

# attacks found
by HPD

# human
verified attacks

(78, 1)-adversary
(78, d)-adversary

78M
78M

13
295

0(0.00%)
3 (1.02%)

Table 6.3: Attack image datasets we generated to break CEAL. We show the
dataset size, the portion of the (target, attack) samples that were identified by
HPD model 1, and the number of attack images validated by human workers.
observe that 91.0% of the image pairs that had only 5 major components flipped,
were recognized as different by workers. This is significantly higher than the portion
of samples labeled as different when we flipped 5 minor components (Z = 14.35, Pvalue = 0.00). In addition, the number of identified different images increased as
we flipped more major components: when we flipped 15 major components, none of
the image pairs were identified as being the same.
Thus, we found that even if we take out the randomness provided by minor
components to the ceal images, the generated images are distinguishable if enough
number of major components (here, > 15) are flipped. Thus, in the following, we
set d to 15.

6.7.3

CEAL Under Attack

CEAL Under (78, 1)-Attack
We now evaluate CEAL under brute force attacks perpetrated by the adversary
defined in § 6.2.3. We first consider a (γ, 1)-adversary, who can find usable inputs
that are within 1-Hamming distance of victim input, and uses them to generate
attack ceal images. Specifically, for γ=78 (§ 6.7.3 includes a similar evaluation for
γ=92), we generated 1 million target inputs randomly. Then, for each such input,
we considered all γ “attack” strings that are within 1-Hamming distance, and used
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Figure 6.7: Sample (target, attack) image pairs we generated for (γ = 78, d = 1)attacks, along with the human subjects’ labeled for these image pairs.
the CEAL DCGAN to generate ceal images corresponding to the target and attack
strings. Therefore, in total we generated 78 million ceal image pairs for γ = 78.
Note, we select d=1 as it is highly likely to generate similar images for similar input
to a GAN.
We first used the HPD classifier to decide if the generated image pairs would
be perceived as being the same by a human verifier. Out of 1 million target ceal
images, 13 of them were broken (only) once according to the HPD model 1 (see
Table 6.3 top). We then presented these 13 presumably broken ceal images to
human verifiers (see § 6.7.1). None of these images were labeled as being the same
by the recruited workers. Figure 6.7 represents several target and attack ceal images
that we generated.
CEAL Under (78, d)-Attack
We now consider a (γ, d)-adversary (§ 6.2.3), where 1 ≤ d ≤ γ. Specifically, for each
value of d ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..γ}, we have built an attack dataset as follows: We generated 1
million random “target” inputs, then for each target input, we randomly selected an
“attack” string that is within Hamming distance d from the target. We generated
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Figure 6.8: Sample (target, attack) image pairs we generated for (γ = 78, d)-attacks,
along with the human subjects’ labeled for these image pairs.
the ceal images corresponding to each target and attack strings pair. Thus, in total
we generate γ million ceal image pairs, organized into γ datasets, each containing 1
million (target, attack) ceal image pairs. We present results over an evaluation for
γ of 78. We include results for γ of 85 and 92, in § 6.7.3.
We then run HPD model 1 over the (target, attack) image pairs that we generated. For γ = 78, HPD model 1 predicted 295 of image pairs as indistinguishable.
When we presented these image pairs to human workers (§ 6.7.1), only 3 of them
were verified as being the same (see Table 6.3 bottom).
Based on the small false accept rate of CEAL on this attack and the (γ, 1)attack of § 6.7.3, we conclude that for γ=78, CEAL is resilient to adversaries that
are significantly more powerful that the ones considered in previous work [DSB+ ,
TBB+ 17]. Under attacks of similar strength, Tan et al. report a false accept rate of
12% for Vash [vas14] and 10% for the OpenSSH Visual Host Key [LLvG09]). This
is significantly larger than the CEAL false accept rate (i.e. 3/(13 + 295) < 1%).
Figure 6.8 represents several (target, attack) ceal images in this experiment, along
with their labeled that we collected using MTurk.
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γ

# attack
samples

# broken ceals
HPD model 1

# human
verified attacks

92

92 M

443

11 (2.48%)

85

85 M

379

-

78

78 M

295

3 (1.02%)

Table 6.4: Number of broken ceal images in (γ, d)-Attacks as identified by
HPD model 1.
CEAL Under (92, 1)-Attack
Similar to § 6.7.3, we consider and adversary with access to all attack keys whose
binary fingerprint is in 1-Hamming distance of a target key. For γ = 92, out of
1 million target ceal images, 27 of them were broken at least once according to
HPD model 1 The maximum number of times (out of γ) that a target key fingerprint
was broken under HPD model 1 is once. We manually verified the identified (target,
attack) image pairs. Although, several of the image pairs were indeed similar, we
did not find any of the 27 image pairs to be undistinguished.
CEAL Under (γ, d)-Attack
We now report the performance of a (γ, d)-adversary when breaking CEAL with
γ of 92, 85 and 78. Similar to attack performed in § 6.7.3, we generate γ million
pairs of (target, attack) samples. Table 6.4 shows the total number of “broken”
ceals for each value of γ using HPD model 1. We observe that only a small number
of ceal images were broken according to HPD model 1. Also, this value decreases
when using a KMap that uses a BCH code with higher error tolerance (i.e., higher
minimum Hamming distance between the code-words).
We labeled 443 and 295 pairs of images that were identified by HPD for γ
equal to 92 and 78 respectively using the user study procedure described in § 6.7.1.
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Figure 6.9: (γ = 92, d)-adversary: The break ratio of 1 million target ceal images
for each value of d, where d is the Hamming distance between the attack and the
target binary fingerprints and 0 < d < 93 according to (left) HPD model 1 and
(right) HPD model 2 (see § 6.7.3)
Our workers identified 11 and 3 of image pairs as same respectively in each group.
In addition to the above Mturk study, we manually labeled 379 image pairs from
experiments with γ = 85. We only identified 5 image pairs out of 379 image pairs
to be visually very similar.
In addition to HPD model 1, we used HPD model 2 to identify potential successful attack samples in 92M pairs of images we generated to model a (γ = 92, d)adversary. Figure 6.9 shows the portion of broken ceal images in each of the 92
datasets according to (left) HPD model 1 and (right) HPD model 2. As expected,
the number of broken ceal images decreases as the Hamming distance between the
target and attack binary key fingerprints increases. We observe the same effect for
γ = 85 and γ = 78.
As HPD model 2 has a higher FPR compared to HPD model 1, it identified a
larger number (906,678) pairs as potential attack samples. To validate the results
of the HPD model 2, we used the workers from § 6.7.1 to also annotate 1,557 ran-
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Figure 6.10: Distribution of “different” and “same” labels as annotated by human
workers for Vash image pairs. The number of image pairs that are identified as
same decreases as the number of buckets (b) and number of nodes (n) in the tree
are decreased.
domly chosen, successful attack image pairs that were identified by HPD model 2
for d = 1. Only 23 image pairs (out of 1,557) were identified as being the same by
our participants. Thus, as we discussed previously, even with the imperfect HPD
models we have, we are able to train CEAL DCGAN to generate ceals that are
indistinguishable only with small probability (0.01 for γ = 78).

6.7.4

Human-Distinguishability of Vash

To evaluate the ability of Vash [vas14] to generate human-distinguishable images,
we generated 120 Vash image pairs, all different, as follows. We first quantized the
random values used to select each operation into the Vash tree (see § 2.3.2), into 32
buckets, and quantized the operation parameter values into b buckets of the same
lengths. We experimented with values of b in {4, 8, 16}. We then generated random
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trees until we had 30 trees of each size N ∈ {15, 20, 40, 60}. Then, we corralled these
trees into groups of 10. For each tree, we selected a random node (i.e., operation)
and changed the value of one of its parameters by q. The values for q that we used
for each group of trees are {0.25, 0.125, 0.0625} respectively (for each value of b).
When selecting the operations, we made sure that each operation type appears in
almost the same number of trees in each group. We generated thus 10 image pairs
for each of the 12 combinations of q and n.
We used the procedure of § 6.7.1 to label these pairs using 40 human workers.
Each image pair was labeled by 10 workers.
Figure 6.10 shows the portion of image pairs in each category that were labeled
as either same or different images by our workers. We observe that human workers
were able to consistently label image pairs correctly as different, only when the
number of nodes N in the tree was 15, and the number of quantization buckets was
4 (i.e., a parameter needed to be changed by at least 0.25). Thus, Vash images
are human-distinguishable only when the generating tree is small. However, when
we generated 10,000 random Vash images (see experiment in § 6.7.5), 99.98% of
them were constructed from trees of more than 15 nodes. This suggests that most
of Vash-generated images are vulnerable to attack, and that Vash is unlikely to
provide second pre-image resistance.

6.7.5

CEAL vs. Vash

We estimate a lower bound on capacity of Vash and CEAL using the method proposed by Orlitsky et al. [OSV07]. We also report the time to compare ceal images
and compare it to Vash.
Data. We generate 10K images randomly (from random keys) using Vash and
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Key fingerprint
representation

Attack
dataset size

# attacks found
by HPD

Verified
attacks

CEAL

∼50M

1

0 (0%)

VASH

∼50M

150

24 (16%)

Table 6.5: Attack datasets generated using 10K random images for each key fingerprint representation and the result of user study to label identified attacks by
HPD model 1.
CEAL (total 20K images). Then for each dataset of images, generated using Vash
and CEAL, we use HPD model 1 to predict if pairwise images are human distinguishable (total

10K×9999
2

= 49, 995, 000 comparisons). Here, we also evaluate per-

formance of HPD model 1 on 120 Vash images pairs and labels that we collected
from user study reported in § 6.7.4. On 120 image pairs, HPD model 1 has a FAR
of 0.21, FNR of 0.14 and F1 of 0.76. This results confirms that our trained HPD
model, also perform well in identifying distinguishable changes in images (e.g. Vash)
that are dramatically different that the images used in training (nature images).
To estimate the number of distinguishable images for each VKFG, we compute
k̂(Nr , r) =

Nr 2
2r

where Nr is the number of samples until observing r repetition, i.e.,

human indistinguishable images (see [OSV07]). Note, we use this method as a lower
bound estimate for the capacity of VKFG, as any estimation method fails when
k >> s2 , where k is the real population size and s is the sample size used for the
estimate. Therefore, it is not possible to check if capacity of CEAL is 278 using a
only 10K samples.
HPD identified 150 (3−4 %) and 1 (2−6 %) Vash and ceal image pairs as indistinguishable in the first 10K samples of each. We then labeled these image pairs using
MTurk (see Table 6.5). Particularly, we labeled the identified Vash images using 15
MTurk workers using similar procedure as described for previous Vash user study
(see § 6.7.4). We also labeled the 1 identified ceal image pair using MTurk using the
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procedure described in § 6.7.1. Out of 150 (target, attack) image pairs, 24 image
pairs were identified as same by our workers (16%). Therefore, we estimate the number of perceptually different images generated by Vash as k̂(Nr , r) =

10K 2
2×24

= 220.99 .

This result is aligned with the results reported by Hsiao et al. [HLS+ 09]. However,
after user study the identified ceal image pair was labeled as different by our workers. Therefore, we did not identify any indistinguishable images in the first 10K
samples of ceal.
Vash vs CEAL Images Comparison Time. We compare the response time
of participants to (target, attack) image pairs we generated for 150 Vash image
pairs as well as 309 ceal image pairs (295 images from § 6.7.3, 13 images of § 6.7.3
and 1 image pairs identified in the above experiment). The average comparson
time over Vash attack images is 3.03s (M=1.4s, SD=5.42s), while for ceal is 2.04s
(M=1.5s, SD=3.44s). A t-test revealed that the time to compare ceal attack images
is significantly shorter than the time they took to compare Vash attack images
(P-Value = 0.024).
In addition, to compare timing for Vash and ceal images with almost the same
level of distinguishability, we compare the time to compare the ceal and Vash images
that were distinguishable by human ∼ 70% of the times. For this, we consider the
time to compare Vash image pairs that were generated using n = 15 for different values of q (see § 6.7.4) to the time it took to compare ceal images that were generated
using latent vectors with 5 different minor components (see § 6.7.2). The average
comparison time over ceal image pairs is 4.82s (M=3.71s, SD=4.43s). However, this
value for Vash images is 6.15s (M=3.71s, SD=5.89s). Again, a t-test revealed that
the average comparison time for ceal images is significantly lower than that of Vash
(P-Value = 0.020).
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6.8

Discussion and Limitations

Increasing entropy. One way to increase the entropy of the CEAL key fingerprint
generator, is to design and train multiple generators (see § 6.6), then use the input
key to decide which generator to use (e.g., the value of the key’s first two bits to
pick one out of 4 generators). However, we note that this approach imposes an
exponential increase on computation and storage: to achieve k bits of entropy, we
need to train and access 2k generators. Instead, in the proposed CEAL approach,
we use careful training to achieve its entropy.
Improving HPD. As we defined in § 6.3, we use a HPD, a classifier that we use to
predict human distinguishability (HP Dration ) of image pairs. However, due to data
and training limitations, our classifier has some error. However, we show that even
using a weak classifier, we are able to train a generator network to generate images
that are human distinguishable.
For instance, we manually verified ceal image pairs that were identified as same
by our workers in § 6.7.3. The input strings for the verified attack images were
within a Hamming distance of 2, 4 and 6 from their target. We manually checked
these image pairs and observed that 2 of these images represent a blue sky with
shadows from different angles (see Figure 6.8). We conjecture that, by training
HPD to further identify texture-less images as being the same, and retraining CEAL
DCGAN, we can avoid generating such images.
Usability and effectiveness. The results of our studies do not generalize to the
entire population, as we performed them on only a subset of MTurk workers, which
are also not representative of the entire population. For instance, we conjecture
that workers who work on visualization tasks are less likely to suffer from vision
loss problems. Further, MTurk workers have different goals (minimize their time
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investment, maximize financial gains) which may differ from those of regular key
fingerprint based authentication users, i.e., not only minimize time investment, but
also correctly detect attacks.
We also note that key fingerprint comparisons should be robust to key fingerprints displayed on devices with different screen properties (e.g., size and resolution),
or even when printed on paper, to be compared against an image shown on a screen.
Our experiments showed no difference between the responses from users comparing
the key fingerprint on different devices. However, an extensive study is required to
properly evaluate this aspect. In addition, we leave for future work the evaluation
of the memorability of CEAL-generated images, which may help improve long term
recognition and verification of key fingerprints as it bring meaning to key fingerprint
images, e.g. compared to several textual representation, bar-codes, etc.
In addition, commonly used key text-based fingerprints have been shown to be
ignored by users [Gut11]. Thus, an extensive study is required to understand if
representing key fingerprints as realistic and familiar-looking images, will help draw
user attention, and increase verification rates.

6.9

Conclusions

In this chapter, we built the first visual fingerprint solution with built-in input
distribution properties, and have shown that it is substantially superior to state-ofthe-art solutions, in terms of entropy, human accuracy and speed of evaluation.
We leave for future work an investigation into the use of CEAL with key stretching methods to improve entropy, investigating alternative HPD and GAN (e.g.
[KALL18]) architectures, and including other types of classifiers during training,
e.g. to build ceals appropriate for color blind people.
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